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This dissertation is comprised of three essays on issues related to the financial reporting 
practices of credit unions in the United States. The first essay relies on an agency theory 
perspective to examine the extent of earnings management in U.S. credit unions through loan 
loss provisions (LLP). The context of member-owned credit unions provides a different set of 
financial reporting incentives than the one typically found in shareholder-owned banks, thus 
providing an opportunity to extend earnings management research. The sample comprises U.S. 
credit unions above $50 million in total assets, between 2003 and 2016. Results show that credit 
union managers engage in income smoothing through the discretionary use of LLP to avoid 
earnings declines. Results also show that larger and better-capitalized credit unions engage in 
more earnings management, as do credit unions with a federal charter. Moreover, credit unions 
are driven by the incentive of merging to engage in earnings management. The findings are 
economically significant, and thus, relevant to policymakers contemplating new regulations since 
these managerial activities may place the cooperative principle at risk. 
The second essay examines how competition affects risk-taking of a matched sample (by 
size and county) of banks and credit unions, and whether it affects differently credit unions and 
banks. Several measures of risk-taking are used in the study. The period of the study is from 
2010 till 2017. First, univariate analyses are conducted to compare the risk-taking of the two 
types of institutions. We find that the means of the risk-taking measures do not differ 
significantly between banks and credit unions. Second, examining the difference in the risk-
taking of credit unions and banks in a multivariate analysis, we find that banks’ managers engage 
in riskier activities. Third, we examine the effect of competition on the risk-taking. We find that 
increased competition induces managers of credit unions and banks to take more risk; this 
finding supports the competition-fragility hypothesis. We also find that credit unions’ managers 
take more risk than banks’ managers in the presence of competition. Finally, by including the 
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quadratic term of competition, we find that there is a non-linear relationship between competition 
and risk-taking. This study has public policy implications: the American Banking Association 
argues that public policy toward credit unions and banks should be similar due to their 
similarities; whereas, credit unions express their difference to protect their privilege of tax 
exemption. 
The third essay attempts to identify certain traits of the target credit unions in comparison 
to acquiring and non-merging credit unions. The analysis is performed both qualitatively and 
quantitatively. First, the paper presents a clinical analysis of three cases of mergers of credit 
unions. Each case is analyzed from the perspective of agency theory to determine the reason for 
merger. The three cases illustrate how the executives and directors are seeking their own utilities 
at the expense of the members. Second, we aim to identify certain characteristics of target credit 
unions empirically by comparing a sample of acquired credit unions to a matched sample of non-
merging credit unions and the acquiring credit unions. The sample comprises U.S. credit unions 
above $10 million in total assets that merged to expand their services between 2011 and 2017. 
We identified a list of ratios that are used by the NCUA for credit union assessment, a univariate 
analysis of variance tests for differences between the means of these ratios among the three 
groups (targets, acquiring, and non-merging credit unions); the means of the ratios of the three 
groups are statistically different. Then, factor analysis is performed to classify the major factors 
that explain the majority of variance. Growth, capital adequacy, asset quality, and earnings are 
the major ratios that differentiate between the target, acquiring, and non-merging credit unions. 
The paper has public policy implications; it provides the NCUA with the necessary information 
for the amendment of the voluntary mergers proposed rule on May 25, 2017.  
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
Our motivation to study credit unions springs from the practical importance of better 
understanding this financial sector which provides inexpensive, reliable and beneficial financial 
services to communities all over the world. According to the world council of credit unions, 
89,000 credit unions in 117 countries enhance the lives and communities of 260,000,000 
members (https://www.woccu.org/impact/credit_unions). In the United States, for example, 
6,100 credit unions in 2015, serve 103.7 million members with a penetration rate of about 48.8% 
(percentage of credit union members of the active population age between 15 and 64 years), and 
with total assets of around $1.2 trillion (WOCCU, 2016). Moreover, the importance of credit 
unions in the U.S. is also reflected in their tax exemption status where earnings are distributed in 
the form of higher savings returns, lower loan rates, and lower fees to members.  
Despite the significant importance of credit unions in the communities, and their high 
penetration rate of almost 50%, credit unions have been rarely investigated in the academic 
accounting literature. The lack of focused attention on the financial reporting practices and 
incentives of such organizations is puzzling considering also their relative importance in the 
world’s financial system. For example, some of the strongest banks in the world are cooperatives 
or cooperative unions, Desjardins Group in Canada and Norinchukin Bank in Japan ranked 
among the strongest banks in the world in the 2014 index of the World’s Strongest Banks 
published by Bloomberg. 
This dissertation aims to shed some light into three interrelated issues in the realm of 
credit unions’ financial reporting practices in the U.S. The first essay examines the extent of 
earnings management to avoid reporting earnings declines, and the characteristics of the credit 
unions that are engaging in earnings management. Theoretically, Rasmusen (1988) and Fama 
and Jensen (1983a; 1983b) claim that members and boards of cooperatives are less likely to 
monitor and replace managers than do stockholders and boards of for-profit firms. Therefore, it 
is assumed that principal-agent problems are more likely to occur due to the lack of member 
participation in cooperatives. Accordingly, we examine the extent or earnings management from 
the perspective of the agency problem in credit unions. The second essay examines the 
difference in risk-taking of credit unions and banks, and whether the presence of competition 
would affect their risk-taking differently. Credit unions are now perceived as interchangeable to 
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mainstream financial service providers such as banks (Feinberg, 2001; Feinberg & Rahman, 
2001; Hannan, 2003; Schmid, 2005; Tokle & Tokle, 2000), and are aggressively competing with 
them by being more active on the lending side (Fox, 2018). Accordingly, we show whether the 
risk-takings are different in the absence and presence of competition. The third essay examines 
the characteristics of target credit unions in voluntary mergers by comparing targets to acquiring 
and non-merging credit unions. According to the National Credit Union Administration (NCUA) 
merger rules, the voluntary merger process is legal, except that it is not transparent to members, 
especially regarding compensation paid to boards and executives of acquired credit unions. 
Accordingly, we investigate the motives of management and characteristics of target credit 
unions. 
Altogether, this dissertation investigates important issues related to the financial reporting 
practices of credit unions. Specifically, the three essays address the following research questions: 
1- Do credit union managers engage in earnings management to avoid reporting earnings 
declines? What are the characteristics of these credit unions and what are their incentives? 
2- Is risk-taking in credit unions different from risk-taking in commercial banks? Does 
competition affect risk-taking in credit unions differently than in commercial banks? 
3- What are the characteristics of the target credit unions in comparison to acquiring and 
non-merging credit unions? 
In the first essay, we examine the economic implications of the agency problem between 
managers and members/owners in credit unions. Unlike banks, which governance system follows 
closely Jensen and Meckling (1976) shareholder principal-agent perspective; credit unions are 
characterized by a specific weak governance system among its members, the board of directors 
and the general manager (Hillier, Hodgson, Stevenson-Clarke, & Lhaopadchan, 2008; Keasey, 
Thompson, & Wright, 2005). The governance system is weak in both oversight and monitoring 
since the board of directors consists mainly of volunteer members lacking the necessary skills to 
manage and monitor the credit union (Hillier et al., 2008). Such governance system allows 
managers to use their own discretion to manipulate earnings towards their own benefits. Hence, 
the first essay examines the extent of earnings management to avoid reporting earnings declines, 
and the characteristics of the credit unions that are engaging in earnings management. Second, 
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the incentive of the merger that underlies such earnings management is investigated. Results can 
be summarized in the following fashion. First, credit union managers in the U.S. engage in 
income smoothing through the discretionary use of loan loss provision to avoid earnings 
declines. Results also show that larger and better capitalized credit unions engage in more 
earnings management, as do credit unions with a federal charter; moreover, credit unions with 
lower profitability engage more in earnings management. Second, concerning management’s 
incentives to engage in earnings management, results show that credit unions engage in earnings 
management if they have an incentive to acquire another credit union. This study extends the 
earnings management literature in the financial industry. Prior studies have investigated how 
bank mangers use their financial reporting discretion as a tool to avoid capital adequacy 
requirements or to smooth earnings. Moreover, prior studies find that income smoothing is more 
commonly practiced among publicly traded banks than privately owned ones due to the presence 
of more external stakeholders in public banks. This study finds that credit unions’ managers still 
engage in earnings management, even if credit unions are not publicly traded, due to the 
presence of manager- owner agency problem. 
In the second essay, we focus on the competition between credit unions and commercial 
banks. Both types of financial institutions compete in the same markets, and households 
essentially consider credit unions as an alternative to banks (Anderson & Liu, 2013). Moreover, 
nowadays, credit unions are aggressively competing with banks by being more active on the 
lending side; the rise in credit unions’ lending activity is exerting competitive pressures upon 
commercial banks (Fox, 2018). Furthermore, a principal belief about the relationship between 
bank competition and risk is that as competition increases on banks, they would change their 
choices of borrowers (Bushman, Hendricks, & Williams, 2016). In this context, this study aims 
to examine the risk-taking of banks and credit unions, and how competition affects risk-taking, 
i.e., whether it affects differently credit unions and banks. Three proxies are used for risk-taking: 
1) the Z-score, which measures an institution’s stability, 2) the ratio of non-performing loans to 
total loans, and 3) the ratio of loan charge-offs to total loans, which proxy for credit risk. First, 
univariate analyses are conducted to compare the means of the risk-taking and competition 
measures of the two types of institutions. Results show that the means of the risk-taking 
measures and the mean of the firm-specific measure of competition do not differ significantly 
between credit unions and banks in the sample. Second, examining the difference in the risk-
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taking of credit unions and banks in a multivariate analysis, we find that banks’ managers engage 
in riskier activities. Third, also relying on regression analyses, the effect of competition on risk-
taking is examined. We find that increased competition induces banks’ and credit unions’ 
managers to take more risk. We also find that credit unions’ managers take more risk than banks’ 
managers in the presence of competition. Finally, the risk-taking proxy is regressed on the 
quadratic term of the competition measure to find any possible non-linear relationship between 
competition and risk. This essay adds to the scant literature on the comparison of risk-taking 
between credit unions and banks, and extends the literature that considers the competition 
between credit unions and commercial banks. 
In the third essay, we examine the voluntary mergers in credit unions by performing a 
qualitative and a quantitative analysis. First, the paper presents a clinical analysis of three cases 
of mergers of credit unions. Each case is analyzed from the perspective of agency theory to 
determine the reason for merger. The three cases illustrate how the executives and directors are 
seeking their own utilities at the expense of the members. Second, we aim to identify certain 
characteristics of target credit unions empirically by comparing a sample of acquired credit 
unions to a matched sample of non-merging credit unions and the acquiring credit unions. We 
identified a list of ratios that are used by the NCUA for credit union assessment, a univariate 
analysis of variance tests for differences between the means of these ratios among the three 
groups (targets, acquiring, and non-merging credit unions); the means of the ratios of the three 
groups are statistically different. Then, factor analysis is performed to classify the major factors 
that explain the majority of variance. Growth, capital adequacy, asset quality, and earnings are 
the major ratios that differentiate between the target, acquiring, and non-merging credit unions. 
This essay contributes to the merger literature of credit unions. It provides recent evidence on the 
latest trend of voluntary mergers that are putting the cooperative principle at risk. 
The rest of the dissertation is organized as follows. The next three chapters present the 





Chapter 2: Earnings management in U.S. credit unions. 
Abstract 
Relying on an agency theory perspective, this study examines the extent of earnings 
management in U.S. credit unions through loan loss provisions (LLP). The context of member-
owned credit unions provides a different set of financial reporting incentives than the one 
typically found in shareholder-owned banks, thus providing an opportunity to extend earnings 
management research. The sample comprises U.S. credit unions above $50 million in total 
assets, between 2003 and 2016. Results show that credit union managers engage in income 
smoothing through the discretionary use of LLP to avoid earnings declines. Results also show 
that larger and better-capitalized credit unions engage in more earnings management, as do credit 
unions with a federal charter. Moreover, credit unions are driven by the incentive of merging to 
engage in earnings management. The findings are economically significant, and thus, relevant to 
policymakers contemplating new regulations since these managerial activities may place the 
cooperative principle at risk. 
 





The U.S. credit union movement is ‘to make available to people of small means credit for 
provident purposes’ (Federal Credit Union Act 1934). The first credit union established in the 
U.S. was in Manchester, New Hampshire, in 1908 (AICPA, 2016; Walter, 2006).  Since then, the 
credit union industry has increased its scale and reach throughout the U.S. At the end of 2016, 
there were 5,996 credit unions with more than $1.3 trillion of assets serving 108.3 million 
members, of which, around half are aged between 15 and 64 years (WOCCU, 2016). Although 
U.S. commercial banks hold more than twelve times in total assets ($14.9 trillion in total assets), 
credit unions exhibit faster growth than banks (DiSalvo & Johnston, 2017). Moreover, credit 
unions in the U.S. have granted around $883.76 billion in loans and have $1.107 trillion in 
savings and shares (WOCCU, 2016), whereas banks have granted around $8.6 trillion in loans 
and have $12 trillion in total deposits
1
. 
Credit unions are financial institutions with a special type of ownership since they are 
owned by their members, otherwise known as a members’ mutual or cooperative organization. 
This type of institutions is characterized by an ethos that focuses on self-help and voluntarism, 
especially among weaker, disadvantaged segments of society (Goddard, McKillop, & Wilson, 
2002). Credit union members act as both suppliers (depositors) and requesters (borrowers) of 
funds (Maia, Bressan, Lamounier, & Braga, 2013). Within the same credit union, members share 
common bonds; i.e., members share the same occupation, employer or geographic location. This 
bond reduces information asymmetry; thus, the credit union can grant a loan to a member based 
on that person’s reputation (Keldon Bauer, 2015; Ward & McKillop, 2005). 
However, over time, sharing common bonds has lost importance. Instead, nationwide 
credit bureaus provide detailed information on the creditworthiness of individuals (Keldon 
Bauer, 2015). Thus, the relaxation of sharing common bonds as well as larger credit union size, 
have allowed management’s interests to further diverge from members’ interests, thereby 
increasing the separation between both parties. This has led to the evolution of different 
intentions and strategies; such as increased interest in new opportunities for growth and merger 
(Goddard et al., 2002), which further induce agency problems. Moreover, Brown and Davis 
(2009) find that mutual firms have theoretically a high likelihood of seeing management–
                                                 
1
 The data on banks is from SNL financials database. 
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stakeholder agency problems arise even though such mutual structure is free of depositor–owner 
conflicts. Entrenched managers may want to pursue growth, profit, and additional benefits, 
which are not in the best interests of members/owners. Moreover, Leggett and Strand (2002) 
claim that as more membership groups and members register in a credit union, agency problems 
intensify and so managers tend to channel any residual earnings away from members and 
towards themselves.  
Theoretically, Rasmusen (1988) and Fama and Jensen (1983a; 1983b) claim that 
members and boards of cooperatives are less likely to monitor and replace managers than do 
stockholders and boards of for-profit firms. Therefore, it is assumed that principal-agent 
problems are more likely to occur due to the lack of member participation in cooperatives. Credit 
unions are one type of cooperative financial institutions which operate on the principle of one-
member/one-vote in terms of governance rule. However, even if members of the credit union are 
capable of exercising control through their votes, the existing literature shows that few intend to 
do so (Van Dalsem, 2017; Wilcox, 2006). Thus, even in the absence of the depositor-owner 
conflicts, the management-stakeholder agency problem still exists in credit unions.  
With the economic implications of agency problems between managers and 
members/owners potentially rising as credit unions gain in size and scope, the study aims to 
examine if and how U.S. credit unions’ managers take advantage of their situation through the 
mechanism of earnings management. Healy and Wahlen (1999) define earnings management as 
it “occurs when managers use judgment in financial reporting and in structuring transactions to 
alter financial reports to either mislead some stakeholders about the underlying economic 
performance of the company or to influence contractual outcomes that depend on reported 
accounting numbers” and this is mainly due to managerial self-interest. For example, managers 
have the incentive to manipulate earnings if it affects their compensation package (Healy, 1985), 
they are faced with job security concerns (Kanagaretnam, Lobo, & Mathieu, 2003), they want to 
issue shares for the first time in the capital market, to avoid violating debt covenants, or reduce 
regulatory costs (Healy & Wahlen, 1999). Moreover, it is common for banks to manage earnings 
to meet capital and regulatory requirements (Anne Beatty & Liao, 2014). In the credit union 
industry, there is scant evidence regarding the use of earnings management to meet capital 
regulatory requirements, but results are mixed. In Australia, credit unions use accounting 
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window dressing techniques to manage capital (Hillier et al., 2008), whereas in Brazil credit 
unions do not manage earnings towards regulatory capital requirement (Maia et al., 2013). On 
the contrary, Brazilian credit unions manage earnings to avoid reporting losses. Since credit 
unions follow country-specific regulations, this study aims to detect the extent of US credit 
unions’ agency problems through the mechanism of earnings management. First, we examine the 
extent of earnings management to avoid reporting earnings declines, and the characteristics of 
the credit unions that are engaging in earnings management. Second, the incentive of merger that 
underlies such earnings management is investigated. 
The sample consists of 83,634 credit union-quarterly observations over the period 2003–
2016. Similar to banks, the loan loss provision (LLP) is the largest accrual in credit unions and 
managers have wide latitude for discretion in its estimation; therefore, the use of LLP as a proxy 
for earnings management will be examined. Following prior research, abnormal loan loss 
provision (DLLP) is estimated as the residual of the regression of LLP on beginning loan loss 
allowance, total loans outstanding, changes in total loans outstanding, net loan charge-offs, 
beginning balance of non-performing loans, change in non-performing loans, loan mix, and 
controls for quarters. Next, a regression of abnormal LLP on earnings, change in earnings, and 
other variables that proxy for credit union characteristics is performed. Results can be 
summarized in the following fashion. First, credit union managers in the U.S. engage in income 
smoothing through the discretionary use of LLP to avoid earnings declines. Results also show 
that larger and better capitalized credit unions engage in more earnings management, as do credit 
unions with a federal charter; moreover, credit unions with lower profitability engage more in 
earnings management. Second, with respect to management’s incentives to engage in earnings 
management, results show that credit union engage in earnings management if they have an 
incentive to acquire another credit union. Hence, acquiring credit unions after 2009 engage more 
in earnings management than non-merging credit unions. Even though it is evident in both large 
and small credit unions, it is more significant in large credit unions where management is 
seeking growth through mergers.  
This study contributes to the literature in several ways. First, this study extends the 
existing literature on earnings management. Several prior studies analyze earnings management 
in firms in its different forms, more specifically the real earnings management (Graham, Harvey, 
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& Rajgopal, 2005; Roychowdhury, 2006; Wang & D'Souza, 2006; Xu & Taylor, 2007) and 
accrual-based earnings management (Dechow & Skinner, 2000; Fields, Lys, & Vincent, 2001; 
Healy & Wahlen, 1999). Moreover, earnings management in banks has been explored 
extensively in the U.S. (Barth, Gomez-Biscarri, Kasznik, & López-Espinosa, 2017; 
Kanagaretnam, Lobo, & Mathieu, 2004; Kanagaretnam, Lobo, & Mathieu, 2003; Beatty, Ke, & 
Petroni, 2002), and on an international basis (Anandarajan, Hasan, & Lozano-Vivas, 2003; 
Anandarajan, Hasan, & McCarthy, 2007; Fonseca & González, 2008). However, similar 
attention has not been given to alternative organizational forms, such as credit unions. The lack 
of focused attention on the financial reporting practices and incentives of organizations such as 
credit unions is puzzling considering their relative importance in the world’s financial system. 
For example, some of the strongest banks in the world are actually cooperatives or cooperative 
unions; Desjardins Group in Canada and Norinchukin Bank in Japan ranked among the strongest 
banks in the world in the 2014 index of the World’s Strongest Banks published by Bloomberg. 
Few studies examine earnings management activities in credit unions. For instance, Maia et al 
(2013) find that the Brazilian credit unions do not manage their earnings towards regulatory 
capital adequacy, rather they engage in income smoothing and earnings management to avoid 
reporting losses. In contrast, Australian credit unions’ management increases capital adequacy 
ratios by practicing accounting window dressing techniques (Hillier et al., 2008). Moreover, 
credit unions are common and active over several countries, but they operate differently 
according to the country’s regulations (K. Davis, 2005). Therefore, this study is the first, to my 
knowledge, that examines earnings management in U.S. credit unions. 
Second, this study contributes to the growing literature on credit unions. More 
specifically, this study sheds light on the governance of credit unions. Unlike banks, which 
governance system follows closely Jensen and Meckling (1976) shareholder principal-agent 
perspective, credit unions are characterized by a specific weak governance system among its 
members, the board of directors and the general manager (Hillier et al., 2008; Keasey et al., 
2005). The governance system is weak in both oversight and monitoring since the board of 
directors consists mainly of volunteer members lacking the necessary skills to manage and 
monitor the credit union (Hillier et al., 2008). Moreover, Wilcox (2006) claim that the interests 
of managers and members of mutuals are not aligned and that the governance of mutuals is 
ineffective as it is more or less held by a set of entrenched managers (Akella & Greenbaum, 
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1988; Wilcox, 2006). Such governance system allows managers to use their own discretion to 
manipulate earnings towards their own benefits.  
Third, this study contributes to regulators and standard setters in the United States. 
Federally chartered credit unions are supervised by the National Credit Union Agency (NCUA), 
which also manages the National Credit Union Share Insurance Fund (NCUSIF). The NCUSIF is 
responsible for providing share insurance to all federal credit unions and federally insured, state-
chartered credit unions, and assuring that each union deposits up to a certain threshold. Despite 
all the rules and regulations; this study shows that management, coupled with a weak governance 
system, is compromising its fiduciary responsibilities by taking accounting choices to report 
earnings that look better for its own interest at the expense of members. This behavior from the 
management side would put the cooperative principle at risk.  
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows: the next section provides institutional 
background information and reviews the relevant literature. Section 3 provides the theoretical 
framework and develops the hypothesis. Section 4 details the sample selection and describes the 
research design including the empirical model. Section 5 discusses the empirical results. Finally, 
section 6 concludes the paper. 
2.2 Institutional background: 
2.2.1 Development of credit unions 
“A credit union is a customer/member-owned financial cooperative, democratically 
controlled by its members, and operated for the purpose of maximizing the economic benefit of 
its members by providing financial services at competitive and fair rates” (World Council of 
Credit Unions [WOCCU], 2017). Even though they are not part of mainstream financial 
institutions, credit unions still play a significant role in the financial industry. This is shown by 
their substantial memberships across the world and in many developed and developing countries. 
According to the WOCCU 2015 statistical report, around 60,500 credit unions worldwide serve 
223 million people (WOCCU, 2016).  
In the United States, the credit union movement was initiated in order ‘to make available 
to people of small means credit for provident purposes’ (Federal Credit Union Act 1934). The 
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first established credit union in the United States was St. Mary’s Cooperative Credit Association, 
which was chartered in Manchester, New Hampshire, in 1908 (NCUA, 2006; Walter, 2006; 
AICPA, 2016). At that time, banks and savings institutions did not provide small and unsecured 
loans to cover for small payments, such as medical bills or purchase of home appliances. Thus, 
credit unions were initiated to fill this need (Walter, 2006). However, credit unions in the U.S. 
have drastically progressed compared to similar institutions across the world; making this 
industry reach a final and highly successful developed stage (Ryder, 2005; Ryder & Chambers, 
2009). Thus, even though credit unions are not considered the main contributor to the U.S. 
financial industry, their shares and importance in the U.S. financial market cannot be devalued 
(Keldon Bauer, 2008). Moreover, the relaxation of sharing a common bond, which was once a 
primary restriction, helped ease the growth of credit unions through the attraction of more 
members (Goddard et al., 2002). The number of credit unions in the U.S. reached 6,100 credit 
unions in 2015, serving 103.7 million members with a penetration rate of about 48.8% 
(percentage of credit union members of the active population age between 15 and 64 years), and 
with total assets of around $1.2 trillion (WOCCU, 2016).  
2.2.2 Regulation and governance of credit unions 
According to the AICPA Guide (2016), credit unions are supervised and regulated by 
either a federal or a state charter with periodic examinations by the corresponding supervisory 
agency examiners. On the one hand, the National Credit Union Agency (NCUA) supervises 
federally chartered credit unions. The NCUA also administers the National Credit Union Share 
Insurance Fund (NCUSIF), which provides share insurance to all federally chartered credit 
unions and federally insured, state-chartered credit unions, and assures that each has a minimum 
amount of deposit. On the other hand, state-chartered credit unions are supervised by the 
regulatory agency of the chartering state. In general, most state-chartered credit unions are 
required to obtain share insurance provided by the NCUSIF, but it is also acceptable to obtain 
insurance from other private insurance sources, depending on state laws. However, insurance 
coverage is obligatory for all credit unions (Goddard et al., 2002). In addition to the insurance 
requirement, all credit unions with at least $10 million of assets must submit their reports and 
financial statements in accordance with the U.S. generally accepted accounting principles 
(GAAP) to the NCUA board (AICPA, 2016). 
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Credit unions, considered as member-owned democratic institutions, intend to voluntarily 
support the weaker segments of society. They provide various social, educational and 
developmental activities. Due to their unique nature, credit unions are treated differently from 
banks (Goddard et al., 2002). For instance, credit unions enjoy a tax-exemption. Moreover, credit 
unions are characterized by a different type of ownership. Owners of credit unions are the 
members themselves who are exposed to equal rights for voting and decision-making 
irrespective of the size of the deposits paid (Goddard et al., 2002). Therefore, each credit union 
member has the right to one vote at the annual general meeting to elect the board of directors 
(Mook, Maiorano, & Quarter, 2015). In return, board members elect members/owners to take 
part in the committees to form the governance system of the credit union (AICPA, 2016; Mook 
et al., 2015).  
The elected board members are usually volunteers whose primary responsibility is to 
establish the general operation and ensure that it abides by all laws and regulations (AICPA, 
2016). They ensure that the credit union is financially stable while maintaining management 
integrity (AICPA, 2016). Therefore, for the credit union to satisfy its objectives to meet the 
needs of its members, any surplus or profit generated at the end of the year should be re-invested 
in better services or distributed as dividends to the members. However, the form of dividends in 
a credit union is based on patronage or service use, which is different from the concept of 
dividend distribution to shareholders following their investments in stock-based corporations 
(McKillop & Wilson, 2011). 
2.2.3 How are credit unions different from banks? 
In 2001, the United States Department of Treasury
2
 identified five characteristics that 
differentiate credit unions from banks. First, credit unions are owned by their members. Each 
member is eligible to one vote in selecting the board of directors or other important decisions, 
irrespective of the size of the member’s deposit. Second, credit unions cannot raise capital 
through the stock market; however, the capital is created from retained earnings. Third, boards of 
directors of credit unions are composed of unpaid volunteer members. Fourth, credit unions 
operate as not-for-profit financial institutions; therefore, all profits are retained as capital, or 
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distributed to the members as a dividend in the form of lower interest rates on loans and higher 
interest rates on deposits. Fifth, credit unions members share a common bond identified in the 
field of membership. These members can share the same occupation, the same employer or live 
in the same geographic location.  
Despite these differences between credit unions and other types of financial institutions, 
credit unions are similar to other financial institutions regarding the service they provide (lender 
and depositor services), and they compete in the same market. Moreover, similar to other types 
of financial institutions, the credit unions follow the same financial reporting standards and abide 
by the same set of acts and regulations.     
2.2.4 Related research on earnings management in banks 
Earnings management in financial institutions is another avenue related to this study.  
While the literature has extensively discussed earnings management in banks, few have 
performed in-depth research on earnings management in credit unions. In this section, the 
literature is briefly reviewed, emphasizing recent work that is most closely related to this study. 
Extant literature focuses on earnings management in banks, mostly with respect to the 
different managerial incentives and methods used to manage earnings. Earnings manipulation 
ranges from income smoothing, to beating a specific benchmark, or further to maximize 
earnings. In addition to earnings management, regulations imposed on banks motivate managers 
to perform regulatory capital management. Thus, the debate about banks’ earnings management 
is mostly as to whether their financial reporting discretion is used as a tool to avoid capital 
adequacy requirements or to smooth earnings. 
There are several methods to manipulate earnings or capital (Beatty & Liao, 2014). 
However, the most common and largest bank accrual used to smooth earnings is the loan loss 
provision. There is a broad consensus within the literature, conducted on both U.S. and non-U.S. 
data, on the income smoothing hypothesis which claims that the level of loan loss provision and 
bank earnings are positively related (Anandarajan et al., 2007; Fonseca & González, 2008; 
Kanagaretnam et al., 2003; Kanagaretnam et al., 2004). Nevertheless, few papers refute this 
association (Ahmed, Takeda, & Thomas, 1999; Collins, Shackelford, & Wahlen, 1995; Anne 
Beatty, Chamberlain, & Magliolo, 1995). Moreover, managers also take advantage of the 
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recognition of gains and losses from securities’ sales (Barth, Gomez-Biscarri, Kasznik, & López-
Espinosa, 2017; Beatty & Harris, 1999) and the one-time accounting change in post-retirement 
benefits (Ramesh & Revsine, 2000) as means to manipulate earnings. 
Another area of investigation is the difference in earnings management techniques 
between publicly-traded and privately-held banks. For example, in a U.S. context, Beatty and 
Harris (1999) and Beatty et al. (2002) find that income smoothing is more commonly practiced 
among publicly traded banks than privately owned ones. This practice is more common due to 
the presence of more external stakeholders in public banks compared to private banks. External 
stakeholders rely more on earnings announcements and financial statements. This leads us to 
infer that accounting information has a signaling effect; and earnings manipulation is used for 
signaling to external stakeholders. Moreover, the presence of uninformed shareholders about the 
trading costs in public banks incentivize managers to engage in income smoothing (Fonseca & 
González, 2008). 
2.3 Theory and hypothesis development 
2.3.1 Agency problem and earnings management 
A vast literature compares the advantages of a mutual organizational form in contrast to a 
joint-stock form (Baker & Thompson, 2000; K. Davis, 2005; Hansmann Henry, 1996; Wilcox, 
2006). One of the main differences between both organizational forms is the nature of the agency 
problem (K. Davis, 2005). For instance, the mutual form reduces the extent of the agency 
problem between owners and customers; in contrast, the mutual form aggravates the agency 
problem between owners and managers. More specifically, in credit unions, the agency problem 
arises from self-serving and entrenched managers engaging in activities that serve their interest 
and do not serve the interest of owners (Wilcox, 2006). Owners/members with unclear and weak 
property rights typically have no intention, and no clear incentive, to monitor and discipline the 
entrenched managers (K. Davis, 2005). As a result, the agency problem will increase in these 
credit unions. Another factor that contributes to the aggravation of the agency problem in credit 
unions is the acceptance of the Credit Union Membership Access Act (CUMAA) in 1998. The 
act grants credit union members the freedom to transfer their deposits to other credit unions 
within the same geographical area (Van Dalsem, 2017). Thus, owners/members prefer to shift 
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their membership to other credit unions rather than participate in the governance of their original 
credit union (Hoel, 2011); as a consequence, the relationship between management and 
owners/members is weakened. 
Moreover, Davis (2005) discusses the intensity of the owner-manager agency problem 
with the development of the credit union: when the credit union is newly formed, the operational 
and strategic goals are limited, and both board members and managers share similar duties and 
expertise; as a result, the owner-manager agency problem may not be considered severe. As the 
credit union grows and reaches maturity, more ambitious strategic goals will be set (e.g. 
expansion in new areas, exploration of new opportunities, or development of the range of 
financial services). To achieve these goals, credit unions seek professional management whose 
personal goals may be superior to the goals of the members/owners, and as a result intensify the 
severity of the agency problem. For instance, on a personal level, managers may have the 
ambition to increase a credit union’s size for reasons of economies of scale (Keldon J. Bauer, 
Miles, & Nishikawa, 2009).  
In brief, a credit union is a particular type of financial institution which differs in its 
ownership and governance structures, as well as in the owner-manager agency problem. Mutuals, 
unlike public banks, do not have the pressure from stock market investors to constantly report 
earnings with an increasing trend. However, they have the incentive to please their 
members/owners. Members/owners benefit from cash distributions if a credit union reports 
positive earnings. To report positive earnings, pressure is placed on managers to put in full 
efficiency and limit their ambitions (Maia et al., 2013). On the contrary, negative returns signal a 
poor financial performance that puts the credit union at risk of failure, and managers would face 
a bad reputation and job loss (Hillier et al., 2008). As a result, managers are likely to seek means 
to ensure the institution’s continuity to save their jobs and/or access to perks (K. Davis, 2005; 
Wilcox, 2006) by hiding poor performance (Frame, Karels, & McClatchey, 2002; Hillier et al., 
2008). Dechow and Skinner (2000) state that managers opportunistically delay reporting poor 
performance by avoiding reporting losses and earnings declines. Therefore, it is anticipated that 
credit union managers use their discretion and engage in earnings management to avoid reporting 
earnings declines in order to achieve their personal goals. If income before the loan loss 
provision increases, then we expect that managers increase the discretionary loan loss provision; 
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thus they engage in income decreasing earnings management. And, if income before the loan 
loss provision decreases, then we expect that managers decrease the discretionary loan loss 
provision; thus they engage in income increasing earnings management. The first hypothesis is 
the following:   
Hypothesis 1 (H1):  Management engages in earnings management to avoid earnings decline. 
2.3.2 Credit union characteristics and earnings management 
This section investigates the characteristics of the credit unions engaging in earnings 
management. Existing academic literature finds that credit unions’ behavior differs across age, 
size, growth, and profitability (C. Brown & Davis, 2009; Forker & Ward, 2012; Goddard, 
McKillop, & Wilson, 2008). Unlike public firms
3
, the credit union size captures economies of 
scale effects (Ward & McKillop, 2005). Larger credit unions experience economies of scale 
(McKillop, Ferguson, & Goth, 2006) and can afford to employ trained and professional 
managers (Ward & McKillop, 2005). However, management-owner agency problem is higher in 
the presence of professional management who seek more personal goals at the expense of 
members' interests (Keldon J. Bauer et al., 2009). As a result, the agency problem increases with 
credit union size. Therefore, the study expects earnings management to increase as the size of the 
credit union increases.  
Hypothesis 2a (H2a): Credit unions exhibiting larger size engage more in earnings 
management. 
Profitability is considered a determinant of the institution’s financial health. Rasiah 
(2010) classified the profitability indicators of commercial banks into two main categories: 
internal and external determinants. The internal determinants consist of management controllable 
factors such as liquidity, investment in securities, investment in subsidiaries, loans, non-
performing loans, and overhead expenditure. On the other hand, external determinants are those 
that cannot be controlled by management such as interest rates, inflation rates, market growth 
                                                 
3
 The evidence on the effect of size on earnings management is inconclusive: On one hand, Watts and Zimmerman 
(1990) claim that larger companies are more likely to engage in income-decreasing earnings management. On the 
other hand, Richardson (2000) indicates that larger firms are more likely to perform income-increasing earnings 
management practices since they are faced with market pressure from their investors. 
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and market share. Similar to banks, credit unions’ management can use its discretion in granting 
loans and estimating loan losses. Therefore, profitability is inversely related to discretionary loan 
loss provision.   
Hypothesis 2b (H2b): Credit unions with lower profitability engage more in earnings 
management. 
Credit unions have limited access to external capital equity. Unlike banks, to accumulate 
capital, credit unions can only rely on retained earnings. For example, a large amount of loan 
losses can cause the net worth to fall below regulatory requirements (Wilcox, 2002). Holding 
enough reserves signifies that members’ deposits are safe and that sufficient liquid assets are 
available to ensure the ability of non-current asset purchases later when needed (C. Brown & 
Davis, 2009; K. Davis, 2001). However, holding excess reserves may indicate that a credit union 
is being risk-averse and missing some investment opportunities that may have profited the credit 
union with large positive returns (Berger, 1995; Goddard et al., 2008). On the other hand, other 
evidence shows that high level of reserves would be favorable to future members through free 
riding activity at the expense of current members (Emmons & Mueller, 1997; Forker & Ward, 
2012; Hart & Moore, 1996). According to the signaling hypothesis, managers may be aware of 
the future financial situation of the institution; thus, it is less costly for managers to indicate 
growth through capital-assets ratio (Goddard et al., 2008) and as net worth increases, managers 
can take more risk (Goddard et al., 2002). Therefore, as net worth increases, managers are more 
likely to use their discretion in estimating loan loss provision: 
Hypothesis 2c (H2c): Credit unions exhibiting higher net worth engage more in earnings 
management. 
Moreover, regulatory bodies discipline the behavior of credit unions' managers. Credit 
unions can be either federal or state chartered. A state-chartered credit union follows the laws of 
the state that governs it; while federal-chartered credit unions are controlled by the National 
Credit Union Agency at the federal level. Reichert and Rubens (1994) claim that state 
regulations are more lenient than federal regulations. Accordingly, state-chartered credit unions 
are expected to take advantage of their liberal status and engage in more risky activities. 
Moreover, Wolken and Navratil (1985) find that credit unions would choose to be state-chartered 
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rather than federal-chartered if they were in states with more liberal regulation. On the contrary, 
recent studies (Ayers, Ramalingegowda, & Yeung, 2011; Kedia & Rajgopal, 2011) stress the 
importance of the geographic distance between the firm and the regulator. The proximity of the 
regulator to the firm has a monitoring role and disciplines the managers. For example, Kedia and 
Rajgopal (2011) find that firms closer to the SEC offices are less likely to restate their financial 
statements. In the same token, state-chartered credit unions are closer to their regulator, the state, 
than federal-chartered credit unions. Therefore, we expect that the management of state-
chartered credit unions is monitored and disciplined more than federal-chartered credit unions. 
As a result, I expect state-chartered credit unions would engage in fewer earnings management 
activities than the federal-chartered credit unions. 
Hypothesis 2d (H2d): State-chartered credit unions engage less in earnings management. 
2.3.3 Management incentives and earnings management 
More recently, the agency problem in credit unions is exacerbating which is placing the 
cooperative model at risk. This is apparent from the managed sales of credit unions 
(CreditUnions.com, 2017) and the inherent demutualization bias (Davis, 2005). Contributing 
factors include the emergence of professional management pursuing personal objectives, 
together with the economic realities of technological change, financial liberalization, increased 
competition, and prudential regulation based on minimum capital requirements. While takeovers 
or demutualization processes look good and proper on paper, the whole process is designed to 
keep members in the dark; and is based on wealth expropriation motives (Davis, 2005). 
Examining a list of acquirers compared to non-merging credit unions, this study predicts that 
management would engage in earnings management if they have an incentive to participate in a 
merger. 
Hypothesis 3 (H3):  Management engage in earnings management if they have an incentive to 
participate in a merger. 
 19 
 
2.4 Empirical design 
2.4.1 Data  
The data set is constructed from financial information published by U.S. credit unions in 
their ‘5300 Call Reports’ and made available by SNL Financials. The initial sample (Table 1) 
consists of all credit union quarterly observations available on SNL Financials from the first 
quarter of 2003 until the fourth quarter of 2016. The start date is 2003, the time when SNL 
started to gather complete quarterly data for all credit unions; and the Credit Union Membership 
Access Act was effective. Moreover, in the early stages of credit union development where board 
and management responsibilities and expertise may overlap, owner-management agency 
problems may not be severe (K. Davis, 2005); therefore, new credit unions are dropped from the 
sample. According to AICPA (2016), a credit union is designated as “new” if it has been in 
existence for less than ten years and has $10 million or less in total assets. Also, federal credit 
unions with at least $10 million in assets must submit their financial reports in accordance with 
GAAP; as a result, all credit unions with less than $10 million in assets are dropped. Besides, 
credit unions with total assets greater than $50 million are considered large and sophisticated 
(AICPA, 2016); large credit unions are considered as bank competitors and operate similarly to 
banks; credit unions with total assets less than $50 million are dropped from the sample.  
[INSERT TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE] 
The final sample consists of 1,537 credit unions; the equivalent of 86,072 credit union- 
quarter observations. Observations with extreme or non-sensical values for specific variables are 
eliminated from the sample. The final sample size is 83,634 credit union-quarter observations.  
[INSERT TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE] 
2.4.2 Empirical model 
The first part of the study examines the earnings management activities in credit unions. 
In general, the allowance for loan losses and the loan loss provision are significant to financial 
institutions’ financial statements; the estimation of these accounts is subject to high degrees of 
subjectivity (AICPA, 2016). Moreover, research has shown that bank managers use their 
discretion in meeting their goals (Wall & Koch, 2000) and the largest bank accrual that managers 
 20 
 
use to manipulate earnings is the loan loss provision (Anne Beatty & Liao, 2014). Similar to 
banks, the loan loss provision (LLP) is the largest accrual in credit unions, and managers use 
their discretion in estimating it; therefore, the use of LLP as a proxy for earnings management 
will be examined.  
Similar to prior studies, a two-stage approach to examine the relation between LLP and 
earnings is used. LLP is composed of two parts: the nondiscretionary and the discretionary 
components. The discretionary component is subject to management’s control. Therefore it is the 
crucial variable in this study and its relation to earnings needs to be examined.  
Consistent with prior research (Beaver & Engel, 1996; Kanagaretnam et al., 2003; 
Kanagaretnam et al., 2004; Kim & Kross, 1998; Wahlen, 1994), the normal or nondiscretionary 
component of LLP is estimated by regressing LLP on beginning loan loss allowance, beginning 
non-performing loans, change in non-performing loans, net loan charge-offs, total loans 
outstanding, change in total loans outstanding, loan mix, and controls for quarter effects using 
the following model (all variables are scaled by beginning total assets)
4
:  
                                                                
                                          
                                     
(1) 
Where i is the credit union at time t in state j, and the variables are defined as follows: 
LLP = provision for loan losses; 
BEGLLA = beginning loan loss allowance; 
BEGNPL = beginning non-performing loans; 
 NPL = change in non-performing loans; 
NLCO = net loan charge-offs; 
LOANS = total loans outstanding; and 
 LOANS = change in total loans outstanding; 
LOANCATEGORIES = amount of all unsecured loans (UnsecLoans), car loans (CarLoans), real 
estate loans (RealEstateLoans), and all other loans to members 
(OtherLoans). 
  lnGDP = change in natural logarithm of Gross Domestic Product at the state level; 
 Unemployment = change in unemployment at the state level; 
 
                                                 
4
 As a further analysis, all the variables are scaled by beginning total loans, and results are similar. 
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The residuals from model (1) are the abnormal or discretionary component of LLP, 
referred to as DLLP. Consistent with prior research, α1, the coefficient of BEGLLA is expected 
to be negative since a higher initial loan loss allowance will require a lower LLP in the current 
period; BEGLLA is equal to accumulated LLP less write-offs at the beginning of the quarter. α2, 
α3, α4, and α5 are expected to be positive for the following reasons: Higher levels of non-
performing loans indicate that problems with the loan portfolio will require higher loss 
provisions; an increase in non-performing loans will require a higher loan loss provision in the 
current period; current loan charge-offs can provide information about future loan charge-offs, 
they can influence expectations of the collectability of current loans and hence current LLP 
(Beaver & Engel, 1996). The level of loans (LOANS) is expected to be positively related to LLP 
because a higher level of loans will also require higher provisions. The effect of a change in total 
loans ( LOANS) on LLP depends on the quality of incremental loans; therefore, no prediction for 
α6. Regarding the economic variables, the change in the natural logarithm of real per capita GDP 
is included to control for the change in economic growth. In good times, firms will borrow more. 
Therefore, credit unions will increase LLP to account for the additional risk. Thus, the coefficient 
of ∆lnGDP, α7, is expected to be positive. ∆Unemployment also controls for the economic 
condition for the region where the credit union operates. As unemployment increases, credit 
unions will increase LLP to account for the risk of default of unemployed members. The 
coefficient of ∆Unemployment, α8, is expected to be positive. The expected sign of each variable 
of model 1 is tabulated in Table 6. 
Moreover, financial institutions’ estimation of credit losses is influenced by the loan 
portfolio composition and the loan administration procedures (AICPA, 2016). The loan 
composition is used as a measure of risk in addition to non-performing loans and loan charge-
offs. For example, Kanagaretnam, Krishnan, and Lobo (2010) show that banks with a higher 
proportion of real estate loans are likely to have higher loan loss provisions. The loan portfolio 
composition variables included in this model are all unsecured loans (UnsecLoans) which 
include unsecured credit card loans and all other unsecured loans; car loans (CarLoans) which 
include new and used vehicle loans; real estate loans (RealEstateLoans) which include 1
st
 
mortgage and other real estate loans; and other loans (OtherLoans) which include payday 
alternative loans for federal credit unions only, non-federally guaranteed student loans, leases 
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receivable, and all other loans and lines of credit to members. Quarter-indicator variables, 
representing quarters of study, control for period-specific effects in model (1). 
In the second stage of the analysis, the residual from the first stage regression, 
representing the discretionary portion of LLP, is then used as the dependent variable. To measure 
whether managers engage in earnings management to avoid earnings declines, the following 
model is developed:  
                                                           
                                                   (2) 
Where i is the credit union at time t in state j, and the variables are defined as follows: 
DLLP = abnormal loan loss provision (the residual from model (1)); 
EBLLP = earnings before LLP; 
 EBLLP = change in earnings before LLP; 
lnTA = natural logarithm of total assets; 
 lnTA = change in lnA; 
ROAA = Return on Average Assets; 
NW = ratio of net worth to total assets; 
Stat = 1 for state-chartered, 0 for federally chartered credit unions; 
Pop_density = Population density at the state level; 
Educ_att = Educational attainment, ratio of people with a bachelor degree or higher 
at the state level. 
 
EBLLP and ΔEBLLP are the most interesting variables in this study; they measure 
earnings management and whether credit union managers engage in earnings management to 
avoid earnings declines. The coefficients of EBLLP and ΔEBLLP are used to test the first 
hypothesis. If the sign of β1, the coefficient of EBLLP, is positive, then credit unions use 
provisions to smooth earnings. According to the income smoothing hypothesis, financial 
institutions should decrease (increase) LLP when earnings are expected to be low (high). EBLLP 
is scaled by beginning total loans, as in Kanagaretnam et al. (2010). Moreover, the first 
hypothesis also examines whether credit union managers engage in earnings management to 
avoid earnings declines, β2, the coefficient of ΔEBLLP is the variable of interest. Similar to 
Beatty et al. (2002), managers use the loan loss provision to eliminate declines in earnings; i.e. 
financial institutions should decrease (increase) LLP when earnings are declining (increasing). 
Therefore, β2 is expected to be positive. ΔEBLLP is also scaled by beginning total loans. 
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Moreover, model (2) includes several independent regressors that test the second 
hypothesis. Previous literature typically finds that credit unions behaviors differ across age, size, 
growth, and profitability; lnA, and ROAA proxy for size, growth, and profitability, respectively. 
According to the analysis of hypothesis H2: larger credit unions engage more in earnings 
management, the coefficient of lnA, β3 is expected to be positive. Less profitable credit unions 
engage more in earnings management; the sign of the coefficient of ROAA, β5, is expected to be 
negative. And, credit unions with higher net worth engage more in earnings management; the 
coefficient of net worth ratio, β6, is expected to be positive. Moreover, we control for the growth 
of the credit union by the variable  lnTA. Governance data for credit unions is not available; 
therefore, the proxy for regulatory body, Stat, and the economic variables, Pop_density and 
Educ_att, are used as indirect proxies for oversight. State-chartered credit unions are expected to 
engage less in earnings management than federal-chartered credit unions; the coefficient of Stat, 
β7, is expected to be negative. Moreover, as the population density and the percentage of 
educated people increase, then the oversight on the credit union management increases which 
limits their discretionary behavior. Therefore, I expect that the coefficients of Pop_density and 
Educ_att, β8 and β9, to be negative.  
The third hypothesis examines whether mergers is an incentive for acquiring credit 
unions’ managers to engage in earnings management. To test the third hypothesis, the following 
model is developed: 
                                                              
                                                         (3) 
Merge is a dummy variable taking the value of one for credit unions that engaged in a 
merger after 2008
5
 and 0 otherwise. The variable of interest in Model 3 is the interaction term 
between Merge and EBLLP (EBLLP*Merge). If the incentive of managers to engage in earnings 
management is mergers, then the coefficient of EBLLP*Merge, β3, is expected to be positive. 
                                                 
5
 Credit unions specify in their call report whether they completed a merger or acquisition that qualifies for Business 




2.5.1 Descriptive statistics 
In the analysis, the sample is divided into two categories according to their size in total 
assets. The first category, ‘Large,’ includes all credit unions with total assets greater than $500 
million. Credit unions with total assets greater than $500 million should have an independent 
auditor and apply generally accepted auditing standards (GAAS). The second category, ‘Small,’ 
consists of the credit unions whose total assets at the fourth quarter of 2016 is less than $500 
million. Table 3Table 3 divides the credit unions and quarterly observations by charter type and 
by size categories. 
[INSERT TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE] 
Table 4 presents the summary statistics of the scaled variables used in models 1 and 2. 
The table provides the descriptive statistics of the whole sample, and the descriptive statistics of 
each size category in the study. The mean (median) size of a credit union in this study measured 
by total assets is $248 million, i.e. lnTA = 19.33 ($205 million, i.e. lnTA = 19.14), with the 
smallest credit union having $50.6 million (lnTA = 17.74) and the largest $25 billion (lnTA = 
23.94). The credit unions have a mean (median) quarterly growth rate of total assets of 1.39% 
(1.06%) and they have an average (median) return on assets and net worth ratio of 0.60% 
(0.63%) and 10.97% (10.4%) respectively. The mean of the DLLP is 0.0000 which is by 
construction; the median is also -0.00002 meaning that half of the credit unions engage in 
income-increasing LLP (negative DLLP) and the other half engage in income-decreasing 
(positive DLLP). Around 52% of the credit unions in the sample are state-chartered.  
As for the group categories, the category of large credit unions has an average (median) 
return on assets and net worth ratio of 0.77% (0.8%) and 10.59% (10.2%), respectively; whereas 
the category of small credit unions have an average (median) return on assets and net worth ratio 
of 0.52% (0.54%) and 11.16% (10.54%) respectively.  
[INSERT TABLE 4 ABOUT HERE] 
Table 5 reports correlations for the scaled dependent and independent variables used in 
models 1 and 2. The lower part is the Pearson’s correlation matrix, and the upper part of the table 
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is the Spearmen’s correlation matrix. LLP is positively correlated with beginning loan loss 
allowance (BEGLLA), beginning non-performing loans (BEGNPL), change in non-performing 
loans (ΔNPL), net loan charge-offs (NLCO), and loans outstanding (LOANS). Moreover, DLLP 
is positively correlated to earnings (EBLLP), change in earnings (ΔEBLLP), size (lnTA) and net 
worth (NW); and negatively correlated to growth (ΔlnTA) and profitability (ROAA). 
[INSERT TABLE 5 ABOUT HERE] 
The next section analyzes the research question in a multivariate framework to provide 
more reliable evidence. 
2.5.2 Estimation of discretionary LLP 
Model (1) is used to estimate the discretionary component of the loan loss provision. The 
error term of model (1) is the DLLP. A panel data set of credit unions over time (quarters) is used 
to control for any unobservable effects. The Hausman test determines whether to use fixed or 
random effect. The results of the Hausman test are significant; therefore, the fixed effect model 
is used. A Hausman test is performed on the whole dataset and on the subsets which are divided 
according to the size categories, and the results are all significant.  
Table 6 reports the estimation results of model (1). The coefficients of the determinants 
of LLP have the expected sign and are significant at the 1% level. The explanatory power of the 
model is high (adjR
2
 = 50.8%), the model describes the variation in LLP well.  
[INSERT TABLE 6 ABOUT HERE] 
2.5.3 Earnings management to avoid earnings declines 
First, a univariate test is employed, the test compares the DLLP and EBLLP of credit 
unions that witness earnings declines to those that witnessed earnings increases. Similar to 
Beatty et al. (2002), to avoid reporting earnings declines, I expect credit union managers to 
underestimate the discretionary part of loan loss provision. Therefore, DLLP is expected to be 
negative if ΔEBLLP is negative and vice versa.  
Table 7 presents the results of the univariate tests. The table shows summary statistics on 
one subsample of credit unions that have a negative change in EBLLP and another subsample of 
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credit unions that have a positive change in EBLLP. Credit unions with a negative earnings 
change engage in negative DLLP (income increasing), the mean is -0.0000389. Credit unions 
with a positive earnings change engage in positive DLLP (income decreasing), the mean is 
0.0000364. The difference of the means of the two subsamples is significant at the 1 percent 
level for the two-tailed t-test. Then the sample is divided according to the size categories. Large 
credit unions with a negative earnings change engage in negative DLLP, the mean is -0.0000386; 
and large credit unions with a positive earnings change engage in positive DLLP, the mean is 
0.0000351. The difference of the means of the two subsamples is significant at the 1 percent 
level for the two-tailed t-test. Small credit unions with a negative earnings change engage in 
negative DLLP, the mean is -0.0000379; and small credit unions with a positive earnings change 
engage in positive DLLP, the mean is 0.0000361. The difference of the means of the two 
subsamples is significant at the 1 percent level for the two-tailed t-test. 
[INSERT TABLE 7 ABOUT HERE] 
For the multivariate analysis, an OLS regression is used for model (2) using the error 
term of model (1) as the dependent variable. Depending on the magnitude and sign of the 
coefficient of EBLLP, this indicates whether credit union managers use their discretion in 
estimating loan loss provision to manage earnings; and the magnitude and sign of the coefficient 
of ΔEBLLP indicates whether credit union managers manage earnings to avoid reporting 
earnings declines. The results of model (2) are reported in Table 8. The positive and significant 
coefficient of EBLLP (0.19154, p-value<0.01) in table 8 indicates that credit union managers are 
engaging in income smoothing, which is a form of earnings management. The coefficient of the 
ΔEBLLP (0.00865, p-value<0.01) is positive and significant at the 1 percent level. Therefore, 
credit union managers engage in income smoothing to avoid reporting earnings declines. The 
explanatory power of the model is high (adjR
2
 = 36.8%). This is consistent with hypothesis H1. 
Economically, the results are significant, an increase of one standard deviation in each of EBLLP 
and ΔEBLLP increase DLLP by 84%. 
[INSERT TABLE 8 ABOUT HERE] 
For the large category, the coefficient of EBLLP (0.17389, p-value<0.01) is positive and 
significant at the 1 percent level, and the coefficient of the ΔEBLLP (0.01394, p-value<0.01) is 
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also positive and significant at the 1 percent level. This implies that large credit unions smooth 
earnings to avoid reporting earnings declines. For the small category, the coefficient of EBLLP 
(0.19881, p-value<0.01) is positive and significant at the 1 percent level, and the coefficient of 
the ΔEBLLP (0.00685, p-value<0.01) is also positive and significant at the 1 percent level. This 
also implies that small credit unions smooth earnings to avoid reporting earnings declines. A test 
for the significance of the difference in coefficients of large and small credit unions is conducted. 
The coefficients of EBLLP and ΔEBLLP for the large category are not statistically significant 
different from the coefficients of EBLLP and ΔEBLLP for the small category (p>0.05), 
respectively. 
2.5.4 Credit union characteristics and earnings management 
Table 8 also presents the variables that represent the characteristics of the credit unions 
engaging in earnings management. The positive and significant coefficient of lnTA (β3 = 
0.00008, p-value<0.01) is consistent with hypothesis H2a suggesting that earnings management 
increases as size increases. The negative and significant coefficient of ROAA (β5 = -0.00094, p-
value<0.01) is consistent with hypothesis H2b suggesting that earnings management increases as 
profitability decreases. The positive and significant coefficient of NW (β6 = 0.00001, p-
value<0.01) is consistent with hypothesis H2c suggesting that earnings management increases as 
net worth increases.  
For the control variables that are indirect proxies for oversight, state-chartered credit 
unions engage more in earnings management than federal-chartered credit unions, the coefficient 
is negative and significant (β7 = -0.00006, p-value<0.01); consistent with hypothesis H2d. 
Moreover, the coefficients of Pop_Density (β9 = -0.0000, p-value<0.01) and Educ_Level (β10 = 
0.00068, p-value<0.01) are significant but the sign for Educ_Level is contrary to the expected 
sign. As a sensitivity check, the regression controls for the economic variables at the 
Metropolitan Statistical Area, and the County levels; results are similar. Results are not tabulated 
for brevity. 
The findings for the two subcategories, the large and small credit unions, are similar to 
the results of the whole sample. A test for the significance of the difference in coefficients of 
large and small credit unions is conducted. Only the coefficients of Stat, and Educ_level for the 
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large credit unions are statistically significant different from the coefficients of Stat, and 
Educ_level for the small category (p<0.05), respectively. 
2.5.5 Incentives for earnings management 
Table 9 presents the results of model (3) that examines the third hypothesis (H3): the 
incentive of merger leads credit unions' managers to engage in earnings management. The 
variable of interest is the interaction term, Merge*EBLLP. The positive and significant 
coefficient of Merge*EBLLP (β3 = 0.02606, p-value<0.01) supports the third hypothesis. The 
positive and significant coefficient of Merge*EBLLP (β3 = 0.02503, p-value<0.01) for the 
category of large credit unions supports the third hypothesis; the large credit unions engage in 
earnings management for the incentive of engaging in a merger activity. Also, the results of the 
category of small credit unions supports the third hypothesis, the coefficient of Merge*EBLLP 
(β3 = 0.02381, p-value<0.01) is positive and significant. The coefficient of the interaction term 
for the large category is statistically significant different from the coefficient of the interaction 
term for the small category (p<0.05). Moreover, the coefficients of the variables Merge, ΔlnTA, 
Stat, and Educ_level for the large category are statistically significant different from the same 
coefficients for the small category (p<0.05). Economically, the differences between the large and 
small categories are significant. For example, in the category of large credit unions, the DLLP 
increases by 6.56% between non-merging and acquiring credit unions. Whereas, the DLLP 
increases by 3.41% between non-merging and acquiring credit unions in the small category. This 
can be explained by the fact that larger credit unions participate in mergers more than smaller 
sized credit unions.  
[INSERT TABLE 9 ABOUT HERE] 
2.6 Conclusion 
Credit unions are financial institutions with a special type of ownership since the 
members own them. Within the same credit union, members share a common bond, which 
reduces information asymmetry (Keldon Bauer, 2015; Ward & McKillop, 2005). However, over 
time, sharing common bonds has lost importance (Keldon Bauer, 2015). Thus, the relaxation of 
sharing common bonds as well as larger credit union size, have allowed management’s interests 
to further diverge from members’ interests, thereby increasing the separation between both 
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parties. This has led to the evolution of different intentions and strategies; such as increased 
interest in new opportunities for growth and merger (Goddard et al., 2002), which further induce 
agency problems. Moreover, entrenched managers may want to pursue growth, profit and 
additional benefits which are not in the best interests of members/owners. Theoretically, 
Rasmusen (1988) and Fama and Jensen (1983a, 1983b) claim that members and boards of 
cooperatives are less likely to monitor and replace managers than do stockholders and boards of 
for-profit firms. With the economic implications of agency problems between managers and 
members/owners potentially rising as credit unions gain in size and scope, the study aims to 
examine if and how U.S. credit unions’ managers take advantage of their situation through the 
mechanism of earnings management. The study finds that credit union managers in the U.S. 
engage in income smoothing through the discretionary use of LLP to avoid reporting earnings 
declines. Results also show that larger and better-capitalized credit unions engage in more 
earnings management, as do credit unions with a federal charter. The study also investigates the 
incentive for earnings management, it finds that credit unions' managers engage in earnings 
management if they have the incentive of engaging in merger activities.     
This study contributes to the literature in several ways. First, this study extends the 
existing literature on earnings management. Few studies examine earnings management 
activities in credit unions. For instance, Maia et al. (2013) find that the Brazilian credit unions do 
not manage their earnings towards regulatory capital adequacy, rather they engage in income 
smoothing and earnings management to avoid reporting losses. In contrast, Australian credit 
unions’ management increases capital adequacy ratios by practicing accounting window dressing 
techniques (Hillier et al., 2008). This study is the first that examines earnings management in 
U.S. credit unions. Second, this study contributes to the growing literature on the governance of 
credit unions. Credit unions are characterized by a specific weak governance system among its 
members, the board of directors and the general manager (Hillier et al., 2008; Keasey et al., 
2005). Such governance system allows managers to use their discretion to manipulate earnings 
towards their benefits. Third, this study contributes to regulators and standard setters in the 
United States. This study shows that management, coupled with a weak governance system, is 
compromising its fiduciary responsibilities by taking accounting choices to report earnings that 
look better for its interest at the expense of members. This behavior from the management side 






Chapter 3: Credit unions vs commercial banks: who takes more risk? 
Abstract 
An interesting feature of the financial services industry is that for-profit institutions and 
not-for-profit financial intermediaries compete against one another, sometimes in an aggressive 
manner. The literature on the effect of competition among these two types of financial 
institutions on their risk-taking is scant. However, the literature has extensively discussed how 
risk-taking and competition interact in the banking industry, but the evidence is inconclusive. 
According to the competition-fragility hypothesis, increased competition induces banks' 
managers to take more risk; whereas, the competition-stability hypothesis shows the opposite. In 
this context, this study aims to examine how competition affects risk-taking of a matched sample 
(by size and county) of banks and credit unions, and whether it affects differently credit unions 
and banks. Several measures of risk-taking are used in the study. The first proxy is the Z-score, it 
measures the financial institution’s stability, which is the distance from insolvency. The second 
and third proxies are the ratios of non-performing loans to total loans and loan charge-offs to 
total loans, they measure the credit risk. The period of the study is from 2010 till 2017. First, 
univariate analyses are conducted to compare the risk-taking of the two types of institutions. We 
find that the means of the risk-taking measures do not differ significantly between banks and 
credit unions. Second, examining the difference in the risk-taking of credit unions and banks in a 
multivariate analysis, we find that banks’ managers engage in riskier activities. Third, we 
examine the effect of competition on the risk-taking. We find that increased competition induces 
managers of credit unions and banks to take more risk; this finding supports the competition-
fragility hypothesis. We also find that credit unions’ managers take more risk than banks’ 
managers in the presence of competition. Finally, by including the quadratic term of competition, 
we find that there is a non-linear relationship between competition and risk-taking. This study 
has public policy implications: the American Banking Association argues that public policy 
toward credit unions and banks should be similar due to their similarities; whereas, credit unions 
express their difference to protect their privilege of tax exemption. 
 
Keywords: Credit unions; Banks; Risk-taking; Competition; Lerner Index;  
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3.1 Introduction  
“The bank’s scam is a marketing dream for credit unions… If there are any winners in 
the Wells Fargo & Co. scandal, it may be the mega-banks' not-for-profit country cousin, the 
credit union.” (Woolley, Bloomberg 2016).  
An interesting aspect of the financial services industry is that for-profit institutions and 
not-for-profit financial intermediaries compete against one another (Emmons & Schmid, 2000). 
In fact, credit unions and commercial banks engage in often aggressive competition (Anderson & 
Liu, 2013). Both credit unions and commercial banks can have either a federal charter or a state 
charter and are governed by a set of regulations that maintains the competitive balance between 
the two types of institutions (Anderson & Liu, 2013). However, Stern, Swidler, and Hinkelman 
(2009) identify two major differences between banks and credit unions. First, credit unions’ 
customers are their members; the members share a common bond based on criteria such as 
geographic location, employer or occupation. Second, the members are also the owners of the 
credit union. These unique institutional characteristics give rise to differences in governance. For 
instance, unlike banks, which governance system follows closely Jensen and Meckling’s (1976) 
shareholder-focused principal-agent perspective, credit unions’ governance revolves around 
members, a board of directors and an appointed general manager (Hillier et al., 2008; Keasey et 
al., 2005). Such a governance system faces several oversight and monitoring challenges since the 
board of directors consists mainly of volunteer members lacking the necessary skills to manage 
and monitor the credit union (Hillier et al., 2008). Wilcox (2006) even claims that the interests of 
managers and members of mutuals
6
 are not aligned and that the corporate governance of mutuals 
is incompetent, and it is nothing but a set of entrenched managers ((Akella and Greenbaum 1988: 
422, Smith and Underwood 1997: 17, and Daily 2000) in Wilcox, 2006).  
Despite these differences between credit unions and commercial banks, both types of 
financial institutions compete in the same markets, and households essentially consider credit 
unions as an alternative to banks (Anderson & Liu, 2013). Credit unions are providing a variety 
of retail financial services similar to the ones offered by banks, such as interest-bearing business 
checking accounts and commercial loans, agricultural loans, and venture capital loans (Goddard, 
                                                 
6
 In mutual organizations, the customer becomes the user and owner of the business. A credit union is an 
example of a mutual where the depositors and the borrowers become the owners/members of the credit union.    
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McKillop, & Wilson, 2009). As credit unions have expanded their range of services and products 
over time, they are now perceived as interchangeable to mainstream financial service providers 
such as banks (Feinberg, 2001; Feinberg & Rahman, 2001; Hannan, 2003; Schmid, 2005; Tokle 
& Tokle, 2000). Nowadays, credit unions are aggressively competing with banks by being more 
active on the lending side (Fox, 2018). For example, in the first quarter of 2018, S&P Global 
Market Intelligence reported a quarter-over-quarter increase in commercial and industrial loans 
for credit unions of 3.9%, whereas small domestic commercial banks reported an increase of 2.0 
% according to Federal Reserve.  
The rise in credit unions’ lending activity is exerting competitive pressures upon 
commercial banks (Fox, 2018). A principal belief about the relation between bank competition 
and risk is that as competition increases on banks, they would change their choices of borrowers 
(Bushman et al., 2016). The academic literature has extensively examined the effect of 
competition on risk-taking. In the banking industry, the results are explained by two 
contradicting hypotheses: according to the competition-fragility hypothesis, increased 
competition could erode the franchise value of a bank and encourage it to take more risk to 
preserve its profits (Keeley, 1990; Marquez, 2002). In contrast, the competition-stability 
hypothesis induces banks' managers to take less risk to protect their higher franchise value (Boyd 
& De Nicolo, 2005; Bushman et al., 2016; Jiménez, Lopez, & Saurina, 2013). In this context, 
this study aims to examine the risk-taking of banks and credit unions, and how competition 
affects risk-taking, i.e., whether it affects differently credit unions and banks.  
Revisiting the issue of the relative value creation potential of banks and credit unions 
seems timely. For instance, the Wells Fargo & Co. 2016 fraudulent accounts’ scandal illustrates 
that private sector governance does carry risks for customers which they are unlikely to face in a 
credit union. Hence, as an outcome of the scandal, credit unions expectations were to the effect 
that depositors and borrowers had lost trust in commercial banks and would look for safer places 
(creditunions.com); i.e., credit unions. The lower level of risks for credit unions is consistent 
with the view put forward by Smith and Woodbury (2010) who assume that banks and credit 
unions follow different risk strategies due to the difference in their governance structures, with 




Alternatively, prior research shows that credit unions in mature industries such as the 
U.S., Canada, and Australia have a commercial based objective to compete with mainstream 
financial institutions (McKillop & Wilson, 2011). In an analysis of Australian credit unions, 
Worthington (2004) emphasizes that the process of deregulation and the increased competition in 
the financial industry have shaped the objectives of credit unions towards a more commercial 
orientation. Thus, commercial objectives are likely to compete for priority with that of balancing 
members’ interests (McKillop & Wilson, 2011). Moreover, the objective of the financial 
institution can influence its asset portfolio. For example, banks can make risky loans to 
maximize their profits, whereas credit unions’ risk comes from extending loans to customers 
with limited financial means. In another study, Challita (2016) compares the risk-taking of credit 
unions and banks in the U.S., she finds that credit unions take more risk than community banks
7
. 
Therefore, it is debatable whether credit unions' managers are less risk-takers knowing that they 
have a commercial objective in mind in the presence of a weak governance system.  
The study is conducted on a sample of 412 credit unions that are matched to 412 banks 
by size and county location over the period from 2010 until 2017 on a quarterly basis. Two 
proxies for the competition are used. The first measure, the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI), 
is industry specific. It measures the market share of market competitors in a particular region, 
i.e., respectively commercial banks, and credit unions. The second measure, the Lerner Index 
(LI), is a firm-specific measure that measures the extent the bank or credit union can increase 
their marginal price beyond the marginal cost. Three proxies are used for risk-taking: 1) the Z-
score, which measures an institution’s stability, 2) the ratio of non-performing loans to total 
loans, and 3) the ratio of loan charge-offs to total loans. The second and third are measures for 
credit risk. First, univariate analyses are conducted to compare the means of the risk-taking and 
competition measures of the two types of institutions. Results show that the means of the risk-
taking measures and the mean of the firm-specific measure of competition do not differ 
significantly between credit unions and banks in the sample. Second, examining the difference in 
the risk-taking of credit unions and banks in a multivariate analysis, we find that banks’ 
managers engage in riskier activities. Third, also relying on regression analyses, the effect of 
                                                 
7
 “A community bank holds a commercial bank or thrift charter; operates physical offices only within a limited 
geographic area; offers a variety of loans and checkable insured deposit accounts; and has a local focus that 
precludes its equity shares from trading in well-developed capital markets.” (DeYoung, Hunter, & Udell, 2004) 
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competition on risk-taking is examined. We find that increased competition induces banks’ and 
credit unions’ managers to take more risk. This finding is consistent with the competition-
fragility hypothesis. We also find that credit unions’ managers take more risk than banks’ 
managers in the presence of competition. Finally, the risk-taking proxy is regressed on the 
quadratic term of the competition measure to find any possible non-linear relationship between 
competition and risk. We support the findings of Berger, Klapper, and Turk-Ariss (2009) and 
Jimenez et al., (2013) of a non-linear relationship between competition and risk-taking. 
This study contributes to the literature in several aspects. First, it adds to the scant 
literature on the comparison of risk-taking between credit unions and banks. Several studies 
compare certain characteristics of banks and credit unions; however, few have looked at the 
management risk-taking of these two types of financial institutions. Smith and Woodbury (2010) 
compare the resiliency of banks and credit unions to economic stress from 1986 to mid-2009. 
They find that credit unions, in general, are less risky and conservative. They assume that banks 
and credit unions follow different risk strategies due to the difference in their governance 
structures, with the member-owned governance structure of credit unions leading them to less 
risky strategies. On the contrary, Challita (2016) compares the risk-taking of credit unions and 
banks in the U.S. over the period from 1999 until 2014. She finds that credit unions take more 
risk than community banks. However, these two studies compare the risk-taking of all the banks 
and credit unions without eliminating or controlling for the effect of the financial crisis, and the 
samples of both studies consist of all banks and credit unions without taking into consideration 
that the financial institutions’ strategies differ according to size, and last they do not examine the 
effect of competition on the risk-taking. This study examines the risk-taking of a matched sample 
of credit unions and banks after the financial crisis.   
Second, this paper adds to the strand of literature that considers the competition between 
credit unions and commercial banks. This study is the first study to examine the effect of 
competition on risk-taking in banks and credit unions, as prior research has mostly examined 
other facets of the industry. For example, Emmons and Schmid (2000) develop a dynamic 
theoretical model, and support it empirically, suggesting that commercial banks and credit unions 
compete directly in the local household deposit market. Feinberg (2001) presents a theoretical 
framework to explain the competitive discipline that credit unions provide on consumer credit 
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rates offered by banks, and suggests a significant role for credit unions in disciplining the 
exercise of market power by banks. Feinberg and Rahman (2001), using Granger-causality tests, 
conclude that due to the competition between banks and credit unions in the US, banks take 
account of loan rates offered by credit unions while setting their own rates for two types of 
consumer loans, and vice versa. Hannan (2003) assesses the competitive power of credit unions 
by investigating the deposit pricing behavior of several types of financial institutions in the same 
market. He finds that banks and thrifts offer higher rates on deposits in markets where there is a 
significant credit union presence.  
Third, this study adds to the governance literature by comparing the risk-taking of credit 
unions and commercial banks in the presence of different ownership and governance structures. 
Commercial banks and credit unions are similar since they are both financial institutions, which 
primarily accept deposits and make loans. However, the objectives of commercial banks are to 
maximize profits and prioritize the welfare of owners over customers; whereas, in credit unions, 
owners and customers coincide. Moreover, credit unions and commercial banks differ in the 
agency conflicts; while with commercial banks the conflict is between the customers and the 
owners, credit unions still face a potential conflict between borrowers (who want access to low-
cost credit) and depositors (who want a high rate of return on funds invested). With different 
perspectives of conflict, this study extends the findings of Smith and Woodbury (2010) by 
comparing the risk-taking of a matched sample of commercial banks and credit unions and 
examining the effect of competition on the risk-taking of the two types of financial institutions 
which differ in terms of ownership and governance structures.  
Fourth, this study has public policy implications. According to Adams, Brevoort, and 
Kiser (2007), the willingness of consumers to substitute between different types of financial 
institutions is of strong interest to policymakers. For example, the American Banking 
Association argues that public policy toward credit unions and banks should be similar assuming 
that the two types of institutions are not very different (Smith & Woodbury, 2010). On the other 
hand, credit unions express their difference to policymakers and stakeholders especially to 
protect their privilege of tax exemption. This study empirically provides evidence that credit 
unions’ behaviors are oriented commercially and that they take more risk than banks. Therefore, 
one can assume that the members' interests are at risk.  
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The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows: the next section reviews the relevant 
literature and develops the research questions. Section 3 details the sample selection and 
describes the research design including the empirical model. Section 4 reports and discusses the 
empirical results. Finally, section 5 concludes the paper. 
3.2 Literature review and research question development: 
3.2.1 Risk-taking: credit unions vs. banks 
The literature on risk-taking behavior in credit unions is scant. Given that credit unions are 
mutuals where the members are the owners, one may conclude that they are contractually 
organized to avoid moral hazard engagement (McKillop & Wilson, 2011). Credit unions depend 
on internally generated capital to fuel expansion which hinders their involvement in risky 
activities. Concurrently, raising new capital for future growth is difficult. Thus management is 
encouraged to be conservative (Llewellyn & Holmes, 1991). Moreover, since managers of 
financial cooperatives do not share in the profits of the organization through stock-based 
compensation packages, they may act in a risk-averse manner (Rasmusen, 1988).  
However, similar to stock-owned financial institutions, regulations (deregulations) usually 
discourage (encourage) risk-taking behaviors. For example, the introduction of deposit insurance 
for credit unions may increase their probability of engaging in risky behavior. Black and Duggar 
(1981) and Clair (1984) find evidence of increased risk-taking by credit unions post-adoption of 
deposit insurance. They show that credit unions usually take greater risks in the form of lower 
capital and liquidity levels and higher loan-to-share ratio. However, Karels and McClatchey 
(1999), employing time-series and cross-sectional tests, do not find any evidence of an increase 
in risk-taking post-adoption of deposit insurance. Moreover, Van Dalsem (2017) finds that 
uninsured depositors and excess share insurers provide valuable monitoring benefits for credit 
unions; thus, they are value-maximizing stakeholders who exercise control over the firm and 
prevent the management from taking risk. 
Moreover, following the deregulation of the credit union industry
8
, several studies find 
evidence that diversification through expansion impacts the risk profile due to lower information 
                                                 
8
 In 1982, the National Credit Union Administration (NCUA) interpreted the common bond requirement in a way to 
allow federal credit unions to add select employee groups and thus create institutions with multiple-group common 
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advantage after the weakening of the common bond. For example, Frame, Karels, and 
McClatchey (2002) empirically support the deregulation hypothesis by examining differences in 
credit union risk profiles based on membership type and expansion. They find that multiple-bond 
occupational credit unions have higher loan-to-share ratios and lower capital ratios. Moreover, 
Ely (2014) finds evidence that credit unions that switched from single-bond institutions to 
broader field-of-membership types operate with greater risk due to diversification effects and 
changes in informational advantages. In tests for differences in risk of bankruptcy and of 
breaching regulatory standards, the risk is found to be greater for credit unions with broader 
field-of-membership types.  
Furthermore, two studies examine the risk-taking of credit unions in comparison to the risk-
taking of commercial banks. However, the findings of these two studies are contradictory. Smith 
and Woodbury (2010) compare the resiliency of banks and credit unions to economic stress by 
examining the sensitivity of loan delinquencies and net charge-offs to the unemployment rate. 
They find that credit unions, in general, are less risky and follow conservative portfolio 
strategies. Smith and Woodbury (2010) blame the differences in incentives to assume risk on the 
different governance structures of the two types of institutions. On the contrary, Challita (2016) 
finds that credit unions have a higher level of insolvency risk due to the unsecured and small 
loans that credit unions extend to their members.  
These two types of financial institutions offer similar products and are competitors in the 
same market. However, they still differ regarding their governance and ownership structures. 
Therefore, we expect that credit unions and commercial banks make different operating and 
investing decisions. Moreover, banks with different corporate governance structure, under the 
same regulation, face different risks (Laeven & Levine, 2009). Based on this, we develop the 
first research question: 
RQ 1: Is risk-taking in credit unions different from risk-taking in commercial banks? 
                                                                                                                                                             
bonds. In 1998, the Credit Union Membership Access Act (CUMAA) expressly permitted federal credit unions to 
add multiple common bonds under certain conditions.  
 39 
 
3.2.2 Competition and risk-taking 
The U.S. credit union industry is mature (McKillop & Wilson, 2011) and credit unions 
provide an array of retail financial services similar to those of banks
9
. These product offerings 
have distorted the lines of separation between credit unions and mainstream financial services 
providers, such as banks (Goddard et al., 2009). Moreover, increased competition in the financial 
industry has reshaped the objectives of credit unions towards a more commercial orientation 
(Worthington, 2004). Several studies examine the economic impact of credit unions, and their 
role as competitors to banks. For example, Emmons and Schmid (2000) conclude that credit 
unions and commercial banks are indeed direct competitors in the local household deposit 
market. Similarly, Hannan (2003) finds that credit unions are strong competitors, and that the 
presence of credit unions has an impact on banks’ and thrifts’ deposit rates. In markets with 
credit union presence, higher deposit rates are offered by banks and thrifts. On the lending side, 
Feinberg (2001) finds that increased competition from credit unions lowers the rates on 
unsecured consumer loans and auto loans. Thus, the presence of credit unions impacts rates that 
banks can charge on consumer loans.  
From another perspective, banks play an important role in the financial system, but at the 
same time, they are prone to excessive risk-taking which is of concern to regulators and 
academics. The process of deregulation has lifted many restrictions on competition in the 
banking sector which opened up the possibility for banks to engage in risky activities (Carletti, 
2008). The theoretical and empirical literature has extensively examined the effect of 
competition on risk-taking in banks; but the evidence is inconclusive (Bushman et al., 2016; 
Carletti, 2008). The hypotheses used in the literature to explain the effect of competition on risk-
taking are the competition-fragility hypothesis and the competition-stability hypothesis. On the 
one hand, the competition-fragility hypothesis posits that increased competition could erode the 
franchise value of the bank, thus creating incentives for excessive bank risk-taking to preserve 
profits (e.g., (Keeley, 1990; Marquez, 2002). For example, in a market with high competition 
among banks, certain banks could become at risk of solvency. Therefore, these banks, to 
preserve their profits, are motivated to pursue risky activities; such as extending riskier loans and 
                                                 
9
 Financial services provided by credit unions include interest-bearing business checking accounts and commercial 
loans, agricultural loans, and venture capital loans. Some credit unions deal in investment products such as bankers’ 
acceptances, cash forward agreements and reverse purchase transactions. 
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taking on credit risk in the loan portfolio, lowering capital levels, or both (Jiménez et al., 2013). 
On the other hand, the competition-stability hypothesis posits that restrained competition 
encourages banks to protect their higher franchise values by pursuing safer policies. For 
example, banks with greater market power charge higher rates, which induce borrowing firms to 
take on greater risk and increases the risk of banks’ loan portfolios. This leads to the conclusion 
that banks become less risky as competition increases (Boyd & De Nicolo, 2005; Bushman et al., 
2016; Jiménez et al., 2013).  
In sum, credit unions and banks are aggresive competitors in the same market, and the 
increased competition has structured the objectives of credit unions towards a more commercial 
orientation. Prior studies has examined the effect of this competition on deposit and loan rates; 
however, is the effect on risk-taking going to be different? Based on this, the second research 
question is: 
RQ 2: Does competition affect risk-taking in credit unions differently than in commercial 
banks? 
3.3 Data and research design 
3.3.1 Data  
The dataset is constructed from financial information published by U.S. credit unions and 
commercial banks in their regulatory reports and made available by SNL Financials over the 
period 2010 - 2017. The dataset starts in 2010 to attenuate any confounding effect from the 
financial crisis.   
Credit unions and commercial banks operating in the same geographical area are 
considered as competitors since they target the same clients. Therefore, a matching is performed 
on the two types of financial institutions in the same county that are closest in size (similar to 
Lys and Watts (1994)
10
). Size is measured by total assets at the end of 2017. The range of 
variance in size is +/- 15%. Each credit union is matched to only one bank; i.e., multiple matches 
                                                 
10
 Lys and Watts (1994) match a sample of firms whose auditors are sued to a control sample of firms whose 
auditors are not sued. The matching is based on two criteria in the filing year: the size of the firm (measured by total 
assets) and the three-digit SIC industry. 
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are dropped. The ending sample is formed of a pair of 412 credit unions and 412 commercial 
banks. 
3.3.2 Variables measurement 
3.3.2.1 Measures for risk-taking 
In this study, we use the measures of risk that are derived from accounting data.
11
 The first 
measure of risk-taking is the Z-score. This proxy has been used extensively in the literature to 
measure risk-taking in banks (Beck, De Jonghe, & Schepens, 2013; Chircop, Fabrizi, Ipino, & 
Parbonetti, 2017; Kanagaretnam, Lee, & Lobo, 2014; Laeven & Levine, 2009) and credit unions 
(Beck et al., 2013; Ely, 2014; Goenner, 2018). The Z-score measures the institution’s stability 
which is the distance from insolvency (Roy, 1952). It is computed as                , 
where ROA is earnings to asset ratio, EA is equity to asset ratio, and σ(ROA) is the standard 
deviation of ROA over the sample period. The Z-score indicates the number of standard 
deviations that a bank’s ROA has to drop below its expected value before equity is depleted and 
the bank or credit union becomes insolvent. The higher the Z-score, the more stable is the 
institution. The Z-score is highly skewed, thus its logarithmic transformation is used, and then it 
is multiplied by −1, so that a higher value indicates higher risk. For brevity, the label “Z-score” is 
used in the remainder of the paper to refer to the negative of the natural logarithm of the Z-score 
explained above. 
The second measure of risk-taking used in this study is the ratio of non-performing loans to 
total loans (NPL), which is an ex-post measure of credit risk. Credit risk is the primary driver of 
risk for most banks (Jiménez et al., 2013). Non-performing loans are the loans that have been 
modified in a troubled debt restructuring, are past due, or for which interest revenue is not 
currently being recorded. They correspond to economic losses and losses of interest revenue 
resulting from the poor credit quality of the borrower (Chircop et al., 2017). 
The third measure of risk-taking also used in the literature is the ratio of net loan charge-offs 
to total loans (NCO). Charge-offs are the loans that are written off and deemed uncollectible in 
                                                 
11
 Risk measures based on share price cannot be used since the credit unions are member owned and not publicly 
traded, and most of the commercial banks in this study are privately owned banks and not publicly traded. 
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the financial statement. NCO is also a measure of credit risk; however, it is subject to managerial 
discretion (Liu & Ryan, 2006). 
3.3.2.2 Measures for competition 
Various measures of the degree of bank competition have been used in the literature; 
however, there is no consensus as to which measure is better (Beck, 2008; Bushman et al., 2016). 
Similar to other studies, this study uses the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index to measure the industry 
structure, and the Lerner Index to indicate the market power without regard to the industry 
structure.  
Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI ) 
The first measure to be used in this study is the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) for 
depository financial institutions in the U.S. Prior studies calculate the HHI variable by extracting 
the data from the summary of deposits in market share from the database provided by the Federal 
Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC), which is for U.S. banks only. This study, similar to 
Challita (2016), calculates the index using the deposit data of credit unions and commercial 
banks available in the SNL financials database, Eq (1): 
           
 
 
   
 
Where j is the county, i is the financial institution in the market j; s is the market share of 
deposits of each institution (commercial bank and credit union) i for time t in the county j.  
The disadvantage of this measure is that it does not take into consideration the competition 
from potential entrants and other institutions competing in the market (Bushman et al., 2016). 
Therefore, I will use another measure for competition, which is a measure of the market power.  
Lerner Index (LI) 
The Lerner Index is a firm-specific measure that attempts to capture the extent to which firms 
can increase the marginal price beyond the marginal cost (Beck et al., 2013). The Lerner Index 
(LI) examines the relationship between the factor input and the factor output (Bushman et al., 
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2016) and is computed following Beck et al. (2013) and Bushman et al. (2016) as follows, Eq 
(2): 
     
        
   
 
where Pit is the price of the financial institution i at time t, defined as the operating income 
(interest revenue plus noninterest revenue) to total assets; and the MCit is the marginal cost, 
estimated using the following translog cost function, Eq (3): 
                               
               
 
   
                     
 
   
                     
 
   
 
 
   
     
Cit are the bank’s total costs (interest expenses plus noninterest operating expenses) to total 
assets. Q is the bank’s total output, which is defined as total assets. W1, W2, and W3, are the 
input price of labor, of funds, and of fixed capital respectively. W1 is total wages scaled by total 
assets, W2 is the interest expense to total deposits, and W3 is defined as noninterest expenses 
divided by total assets. 
 Equation (3) is estimated using all observations of commercial banks and credit unions 
with available data. The predicted coefficients are then used to calculate the marginal cost for 
each observation as follows, Eq (4): 
     
   
   
                  
 
   
       
 The resulting measure of MC of each credit union or commercial bank at every quarter is 
inserted in equation (2) to calculate the LI measure.  
3.3.3 Research design 
The model, used to analyze the difference in risk-taking between credit unions and 
commercial banks, is defined by Eq. (5): 
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And, the general model, used to analyze the effect of competition on the risk-taking of 
credit unions and commercial banks, is defined by Eq. (6): 
                                                               
                                                
                                                        
                                                
                                   
Where j is the county, i is the financial institution in the market j, and time t 
Risk = Measure of risk; 
Type = 1 for commercial banks, 0 for credit unions; 
Competition = Measure of competition; 
STAT = 1 for state-charter, 0 for federal-charter; 
lnTA = Natural logarithm of total assets; 
ΔlnTA = Proxy for Growth 
ROA = Return on assets; 
KA = Regulatory Capital ratio (Net worth to assets ratio); 
LoanRatio = Ratio of total loans to total assets; 
EBLLP = Earnings before loan loss provisions and taxes scaled by lagged total loans 
LoanGrowth = Percentage change in total loans over the quarter 
Deposits = Total deposits scaled by lagged total  loans 
UNEMPL = Unemployment rate from the Bureau of Labor Statistics; 
Rural = Percentage of rural area in the county; 
LOANCATEGORIES = (1) Real Estate, (2) Consumer, and (3) Commercial. 
 
The risk measures included in our analysis are the Z-score, the NPL ratio, and the NCO ratio. 
The measures of competition included in our analysis are the Herfindahl–Hirschmann Index 
(HHI) and the Lerner Index (LI). The variable Type controls for the type of the financial 
institution, whether a commercial bank or credit union.  
Several control variables that may have an effect on risk-taking are included similar to prior 
studies (Bushman et al., 2016; Chircop et al., 2017; Kanagaretnam et al., 2014; Kasman & 
Kasman, 2015). Size (lnTA) measured by the natural logarithm of total assets, and asset 
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composition (LoanRatio) which is the ratio of total loans to total assets, control for firm-specific 
heterogeneity. Deposits, total deposits scaled by lagged loans, controls for differences in funding. 
We control for profitability using ROA, the ratio of earnings before tax to total assets; and for 
growth by ΔlnTA, the difference in total assets between the current period and the prior period. 
EBLLP is earnings before loan loss provisions and taxes scaled by lagged total loans; 
LoanGrowth is the percentage change in total loans over the quarter, and KA is the ratio of total 
capital or equity to assets.  
Moreover, financial institutions’ estimation of credit losses is influenced by the loan portfolio 
composition and the loan administration procedures (AICPA, 2016). The loan composition is 
used as a measure of risk. Similar to Bushman et al. (2016), the loan portfolio composition 
variables included in this model are Real Estate, Consumer, and Commercial loans. Real Estate 
consists of all the loans secured by real estate whether residential or nonresidential property, 
Consumer consists of loans to individuals for household, family, or other personal expenditures, 
and Commercial is composed of all the other loan categories that are not classified as real estate 
or consumer.  
STAT is the proxy for the charter type. State-chartered credit unions or banks are supervised 
by the state regulator; therefore, they might exhibit different risk patterns from the federal-
chartered credit unions or banks (Ely, 2014).  
The economic environment measures used in this study are similar to Ely (2014). The first 
economic environment measure is the unemployment rate (UNEMPL). Institutions operating in 
markets experiencing high unemployment rate are expected to record higher measures of risk of 
bankruptcy. The unemployment variable is based on the county in which the commercial bank or 
credit union is headquartered. Moreover, since financial institutions in urban and rural areas may 
face different types of risk, Rural, is included to identify the percentage of rural area in each 
county. Moreover, the market concentration is usually higher in non-rural markets; therefore, the 
interaction term Rural*Competition is included in the model. 
TimeControls variable controls for period-specific effects. An OLS regression tests the 
model. Table 12 defines all the variables used in the analyses and their corresponding sources. 
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Following Berger, Klapper, and Turk-Ariss (2009)  and Jimenez et al. (2013), we also use a 
quadratic term for the competition measures to find a possible non-linear relationship between 
competition and risk, Eq (7): 
                                                 
                       
                      
                                
                                                     
                                                     
                                                            





if needed.  
3.4 Empirical results 
3.4.1 Descriptive statistics 
Tables 13 and 14 report descriptive statistics for the different risk measures, competition 
measures, and the control variables used in the regression. Table 13 reports the descriptive 
statistics for credit unions. Table 14 reports the descriptive statistics for the same variables for 
banks.  
[INSERT TABLE 13 ABOUT HERE] 
[INSERT TABLE 14 ABOUT HERE] 
The results in tables 13 and 14 show that the average (median) credit union in the sample of 
this study has a Z-score of -4.0151 (-4.0359), this is comparable to the average (median) bank’s 
Z-score of -3.9848 (-4.0227). For the average (median) credit union in our sample, NCO and 
NPL represent 0.15% (0.10%) and 1.04% (0.76%) of gross loans, respectively; whereas, for the 
average (median) bank in our sample, NCO and NPL represent 0.10% (0.00%) and 1.98% 
(0.99%) of gross loans, respectively. Regarding the competition measures, the average (median) 
HHI is 27% (22%) for credit unions and banks; this measure is the same for credit unions and 
banks since it is an industry measure. The average (median) credit union has an LI of 0.1483 
(0.1521), while the average (median) bank has an LI of 0.1745 (0.1958).   
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The descriptive statistics also reveal that the average (median) credit union in the sample has 
a size of around $200 million ($180 million) of total assets, with the largest and smallest credit 
unions have an asset size of $37 billion and $8.8 million, respectively. The average (median) 
bank in the sample has a size of around $186 million ($176 million) of total assets, with the 
largest and smallest banks have an asset size of $35 billion and $8.5 million, respectively. On 
average, credit unions and commercial banks have similar growth rates of 1.24% and 1.35%, 
respectively. However, the performance of the banks is better with a mean (median) ROA of 
0.2153% (0.2131%) compared to a mean (median) ROA of 0.1420% (0.1399%) for credit unions. 
Banks in the sample are more capitalized than the credit unions with mean (median) capital ratio 
of 14.92% (15.00%) for banks compared to 10.89% (10.14%) capital ratio for credit unions. 
Most of the loans for the commercial banks are classified in the Real Estate category, 
76.26%, while a non-trivial percentage are classified in the Commercial category, 18.88%. 
Whereas most of the loans for the credit unions are divided equally between the Real Estate 
(48.43%) and Consumer (45.32%) categories, and the category of Commercial loans is only 
6.25%. 
Table 15 presents Pearson and Spearman pairwise correlations between the variables used in 
the regressions in Table 15. The lower part of the correlation matrix is the Pearson's correlation 
matrix while the upper part is the Spearman's correlation matrix. The three proxies for risk-
taking are highly correlated, and the two proxies for competition are highly correlated
12
. The 
HHI measure of competition is positively correlated with the risk-taking measures, while the LI 
measure of competition is negatively correlated with the risk-taking measures. Simple correlation 
analysis suggests a negative relationship between the LI measure of competition and risk, 
supporting the competition-fragility hypothesis; on the contrary, the positive relationship 
between the HHI measure of competition and risk supports the competition-stability hypothesis. 
[INSERT TABLE 15 ABOUT HERE] 
                                                 
12
 In Beck, De Jonghe, and Schepens (2013), they do not find a correlation between Herfindahl-Hirschman Index 
(HHI) and Lerner Index (LI). 
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3.4.2 Univariate analysis 
We employ simple univariate analysis to obtain a first impression on potential differences 
between banks’ and credit unions’ risk-taking measures and the firm-specific competition 
measure. The univariate analysis allows for the investigation as to whether risk measures and 
competition for credit unions are significantly different from those reported by commercial 
banks. The results of the t-test of mean differences are reported in Table 16. Most importantly, 
the results show that the three measures for risk-taking (Z-score, NCO, and NPL) and the firm-
specific competition measure (LI) do not differ significantly between credit unions and banks in 
the sample. 
[INSERT TABLE 16 ABOUT HERE] 
3.4.3 Multivariate analysis 
This section analyzes the research questions in a multivariate framework to provide more 
reliable evidence on the difference between the risk-taking of banks and credit unions, and then 
on the effect of competition on the risk-taking of the two types of financial institutions. Ordinary 
least squares (OLS) regressions are employed, with quarter fixed effects to control for any 
general time trend effects and cluster standard errors by both quarter and financial institution. 
Continuous variables with outliers are winsorized at the 1% in both tails to reduce the influence 
of outliers.    
Table 17 reports the results of the first research question in a multivariate analysis. 
Alternative risk measures are regressed on type, and the control variables. Results reveal that 
banks are more risky than credit unions in the absence of competition. The coefficients of the 
Type variable are positive and significant at the 1% level in the regressions of Z-score, NCO, and 
NPL. The results mean that banks’ managers are more risk-taking than credit unions’ managers. 
The coefficients of Type are 0.5959 (p-value < 0.01), 0.00024 (p-value < 0.01), and 0.00957 (p-
value < 0.1) in the regressions of Z-score, NCO, and NPL, respectively. 
[INSERT TABLE 17 ABOUT HERE] 
Tables 18 through 21 report the results of the second research question, which takes into 
consideration the effect of competition on the risk-taking of the two types of financial 
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institutions. Alternative risk measures are regressed on alternative measures of competition, and 
the control variables. Tables 18 and 19 report the results of the regression of the risk measures on 
the HHI and LI measures of competition, respectively. Results are consistent with the 
competition-fragility hypothesis, where increased competition induces banks' and credit unions' 
managers to take more risk, and the results are consistent for the industry-specific (HHI) and 
firm-specific (LI) measures of competition.  The coefficients of the HHI and LI are negative and 
significant at the 1% level; which means that risk is inversely related to the value of HHI or LI, 
and as the value of either HHI or LI increases then competition is decreasing. The coefficients of 
HHI are -0.18454 (p-value < 0.01), -0.00017 (p-value < 0.01), and -0.00022 (p-value > 0.1) in 
the regressions of Z-score, NCO, and NPL, respectively. The coefficients of LI are -1.54297 (p-
value < 0.01), -0.00124 (p-value < 0.01), and -0.03460 (p-value < 0.01) in the regressions of Z-
score, NCO, and NPL, respectively. Moreover, the coefficient of the interaction term between 
competition and type is of interest to determine whether banks' or credit unions' managers take 
more risk in the presence of competition. The coefficient of the interaction term between HHI 
and Type in table 18 is positive but insignificant for the Z-score (0.04575, p-value > 0.1) and 
NCO (0.00015, p-value > 0.1) measures of risk and only significant for the regression with NPL 
(0.00510, p-value < 0.01) as a measure of risk. However, the coefficient of the interaction term 
between LI and Type in table 19 is negative and significant at the 1% level of significance for Z-
score (-0.60408, p-value < 0.01), NCO (-0.00154, p-value < 0.01), and NPL (-0.03138, p-value < 
0.01). Therefore, we provide evidence that credit unions’ managers take more risk than banks’ 
managers in the presence of competition. 
[INSERT TABLE 18 ABOUT HERE] 
[INSERT TABLE 19 ABOUT HERE] 
As for the control variables, STAT is positive and significant for Z-score, and negative and 
significant for NPL; therefore, state regulations are more strict with credit risk than insolvency 
risk. STAT*Type is only negative and significant for Z-score, meaning that state regulations are 
less strict with credit unions than banks when it comes to insolvency risk. Size (proxied by the 
natural logarithm of total assets), profitability (proxied by the return on assets), and KA (proxied 
by regulatory capital) are negatively related to the risk measures, suggesting that larger, 
profitable, and well-capitalized institutions are less risky. EBLLP is positive and significant 
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suggesting that as earnings before tax and provision increase, managers will take more risk. The 
coefficients of Deposits and LoanGrowth are negative and significant suggesting that as the ratio 
of deposits to total loans and the loan portfolio increase from quarter to quarter, financial 
institutions become more conservative and grant less risky loans. Moreover, the coefficient of 
the percentage of the unemployment rate is positive and significant in all the regressions, 
suggesting that increases in unemployment rate increase the risk of bankruptcy. The coefficient 
of the Percent Rural is negative and significant and the coefficient of Rural*Competition is 
positive and significant, suggesting that risk increases in the areas with higher market 
concentration.  
[INSERT TABLE 20 ABOUT HERE] 
[INSERT TABLE 21 ABOUT HERE] 
Tables 20 and 21 report the results of the regression of the risk measures on the quadratic 
term for the competition measures, HHI and LI respectively. In this specification, the values of 
the coefficients of the competition and the quadratic term of the competition are of interest. In 
table 20, the coefficients of HHI are positive and significant (except for the Z-score, 
insignificant), and the coefficients of HHI
2
 are negative and significant, the results find support 
for the non-linear relationship between risk and competition similar to the findings of Berger et 
al. (2009). Whereas in table 21, the coefficients of LI are negative and significant, and the 
coefficients of LI
2
 are positive and significant, the results support a U-shaped pattern between 
competition and risk-taking, similar to the findings of Jimenez et al. (2013).  
 [INSERT TABLE 22 ABOUT HERE] 
An additional test, we also examine the impact of bank competition on the risk-taking of 
banks and credit unions by including both measures of competition in the same regression, i.e., 
industry-specific and firm-specific measures. The regression results are reported in table 22.  The 





An interesting feature of the financial services industry is that for-profit institutions and 
not-for-profit financial intermediaries compete against one another, sometimes in an aggressive 
manner. Nowadays, credit unions are aggressively competing with banks by being more active 
on the lending side (Fox, 2018). As competition increases on banks, they would take more risk 
by changing their choices of borrowers (Bushman et al., 2016). However, the literature on how 
risk-taking and competition interact in the banking industry is inconclusive. According to the 
competition-fragility hypothesis, increased competition induces banks' managers to take more 
risk; whereas the competition-stability hypothesis shows the opposite. This study empirically 
examines the risk-taking, and how competition affects the risk-taking of a matched sample (by 
size and county) of banks and credit unions, and whether it affects differently credit unions and 
banks.  
Risk-taking is measured by the financial institution’s stability, which is the distance from 
insolvency, and credit risk. The proxy of the distance to insolvency is Z-score, and the proxies of 
credit risk are the ratios of non-performing loans to total loans (NPL) and loan charge-offs to 
total loans (NCO). And two measures for competition are used, an industry-specific measure 
(HHI) and a firm-specific measure (LI). The period of the study is from 2010 till 2017. First, 
univariate analyses are conducted to compare the risk-taking of the two types of institutions. We 
find that the means of the risk-taking measures do not differ significantly between banks and 
credit unions. Second, examining the difference in the risk-taking of credit unions and banks in a 
multivariate analysis, we find that banks’ managers engage in riskier activities. Third, a 
regression examines the effect of competition on risk-taking. We find that increased competition 
induces managers of credit unions and banks to take more risk; this finding supports the 
competition-fragility hypothesis. We also find that credit unions’ managers take more risk than 
banks’ managers in the presence of competition. Finally, by including the quadratic term of 
competition, we find that there is a non-linear relationship between competition and risk-taking. 
This study contributes to the literature in several aspects. First, it adds to the scant 
literature on the comparison of risk-taking between credit unions and banks. Second, this paper 
adds to the strand of literature that considers the competition between credit unions and 
commercial banks. Moreover, this is the first study to examine the effect of competition on risk-
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taking in banks and credit unions, as prior research has mostly examined other facets of the 
industry. Third, this study contributes to the governance literature by comparing the risk-taking 
of credit unions and commercial banks in the presence of different ownership and governance 
structures. Finally, the study has public policy implications: the American Banking Association 
argues that public policy toward credit unions and banks should be similar due to their 





Chapter 4: Which is the most attractive credit union? Characteristics of 
targets? 
Abstract 
As any mature industry, the credit union industry in the United States has experienced 
increased consolidation. Nowadays, the majority of credit unions merge to expand their services. 
These mergers are considered to be voluntary. According to the National Credit Union 
Administration (NCUA) merger rules, the voluntary merger process is legal, except that it is not 
transparent to members, especially in terms of compensation paid to boards and executives of 
acquired credit unions. While governance and compensation data is not publicly available for 
credit unions, this study attempts to identify certain traits of the target credit unions in 
comparison to acquiring and non-merging credit unions. The analysis is performed both 
qualitatively and quantitatively. First, the paper presents a clinical analysis of three cases of 
mergers of credit unions. Each case is analyzed from the perspective of agency theory to 
determine the reason for merger. The three cases illustrate how the executives and directors are 
seeking their own utilities at the expense of the members. Second, we aim to identify certain 
characteristics of target credit unions empirically by comparing a sample of acquired credit 
unions to a matched sample of non-merging credit unions and the acquiring credit unions. The 
sample comprises U.S. credit unions above $10 million in total assets that merged to expand 
their services between 2011 and 2017. We identified a list of ratios that are used by the NCUA 
for credit union assessment, a univariate analysis of variance tests for differences between the 
means of these ratios among the three groups (targets, acquiring, and non-merging credit 
unions); the means of the ratios of the three groups are statistically different. Then, factor 
analysis is performed to classify the major factors that explain the majority of variance. Growth, 
capital adequacy, asset quality, and earnings are the major ratios that differentiate between the 
target, acquiring, and non-merging credit unions. The paper has public policy implications; it 
provides the NCUA with the necessary information for the amendment of the voluntary mergers 
proposed rule on May 25, 2017.  
Keywords: Mergers; target; voluntary merger; acquisition; credit union; agency hypothesis. 
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4.1 Introduction  
As any mature industry, the credit union industry in the United States has experienced 
increased consolidation
13
. Four decades ago, more than 20,000 active credit union charters 
existed in the United States; recently, less than one third of these credit unions remain 
(Creditunions.com). This sharp decrease in the number of credit unions is mainly due to 
liquidations and involuntary mergers, most often an outcome from providing poor service to 
members (Keldon J. Bauer et al., 2009). After inspecting the reasons for the recent credit unions 
mergers (since 2011), table 23 shows that the majority of credit unions merge to expand their 
services, and not due to poor financial condition.  
This new trend of mergers is regarded as a voluntary merger. For example, on July 1, 2017, 
Cornerstone FCU (with $109.1M in assets and based in Carlisle, PA) merged with Belco 
Community Credit Union ($470.9M in assets and based in Harrisburg, PA) under the pretext of a 
“brighter future” for their members. Belco Community CU is more than four times larger than 
Cornerstone. Nevertheless, its expense ratio over the past five years has been over 1% of average 
assets higher than Cornerstone. As a result of its cost advantage, Cornerstone was able to offer its 
members better interest rates and lower fees than Belco. However, Cornerstone’s board of 
directors and management team completed the merger deal without giving their members any 
due diligence or comparison; despite that more than 35% of the members were against the 
merger (Filson, creditunions.com, June 26, 2017). Thus, one concludes that the board and 
management of Cornerstone are being compensated for this deal, and they benefit by sacrificing 
their members' wealth and loyalty. Had the members of Cornerstone perceived Belco as more 
efficient, they could have joined it a long time ago.    
According to the National Credit Union Administration (NCUA) merger rules, the voluntary 
merger process is legal, except that it is not transparent to members, especially regarding 
compensation paid to boards and executives of acquired credit unions. For example, a credit 
union had a merger-related compensation in the "low seven-figure" range to 18 executives, with 
four executives getting the bulk of the money (McCarthy, Credit Union Digest May 25, 2017). 
                                                 
13
 “A credit union is a customer/member owned financial cooperative, democratically controlled by its 
members, and operated for the purpose of maximizing the economic benefit of its members by providing 
financial services at competitive and fair rates” (World Council of Credit Unions [WOCCU], 2017) 
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Moreover, Chip Filson, co-founder and Chairman of the Board of Callahan & Associates, and a 
nationally recognized leader in the credit union industry (CU.com, 2017) said that: "This charade 
of voluntary mergers is becoming more frequent. Stealing members’ collective wealth may not 
violate NCUA rules, but it’s certainly corrupt". He describes it as a managed sale of the credit 
union by its board and management at the expense of its members.   
The voluntary merger in the credit union industry can be described as a tender offer takeover 
agreed to by both parties; however, not a hostile takeover (R. Brown, Brown, & O'connor, 1999). 
However, the parties involved in the takeover are the management and board members of the 
acquiring and target credit unions and not the members. Moreover, the negotiations include 
compensation to the management and board of target credit unions. For example, during a recent 
review, the NCUA found that 75% to 80% of mergers have included "significant" merger-related 
compensation to executives of the acquired credit union without disclosing it to the members 
(McCarthy, Credit Union Digest May 25, 2017).  
Wilcox (2006) claims that the interests of managers and members of mutuals
14
 are not 
aligned and that the corporate governance of mutuals is incompetent, and it is nothing but a set of 
entrenched managers. Moreover, The Credit Union Membership Access Act (CUMAA) of 1998 
relaxed the common bond restrictions by allowing credit unions to add more member groups. As 
a result, management started seeking new opportunities for growth or merger (Goddard et al., 
2002). This study aims to investigate the motives of management and characteristics of target 
credit unions after the passage of CUMAA in 1998. First, three cases of mergers are presented 
and analyzed from the perspective of agency hypothesis in mergers. Then, the characteristics of 
target credit unions are examined in comparison to matched non-merging credit unions and 
acquiring credit unions. The non-merging credit unions are matched by state and size in total 
assets. The analysis is performed on the credit unions that merged for expansion between 2011 
and 2017. First, a univariate analysis of variance tests for differences between the means of the 
ratios among the three groups (targets, acquiring, and non-merging credit unions); the means of 
the ratios of the three groups are statistically different. Second, factor analysis is performed to 
identify the major factors that explain the majority of variance. We find that growth, capital 
                                                 
14
 In mutual organizations, the customer becomes the user and owner of the business. A credit union is an 
example of a mutual where the depositors and the borrowers become the owners/members of the credit union.    
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adequacy, asset quality, and earnings are the major ratios that differentiate between the target, 
acquiring, and non-merging credit unions. 
This study contributes to the literature in several ways. First, it contributes to the mergers and 
acquisition literature on financial institutions, more specifically on credit unions. The literature 
on bank mergers is vast and disparate; whereas, the literature on credit union mergers is 
minuscule. Credit unions have experienced a phase of consolidation in many countries. The 
number of credit unions declined by 16 percent during the period 2007-2011 in Australia, 
Canada, Ireland, New Zealand, South Korea, and the UK and by 14 percent in the US (Prieg & 
Greenham, 2012). However, the majority of the few mergers related academic papers (e.g., 
(Fried, Lovell, & Yaisawarng, 1999; Ralston, Wright, & Garden, 2001; Worthington, 2004) 
investigate the determinants and consequences of mergers in American and non-American credit 
union before the financial crisis and by looking at the effect on service provision. In this study, 
we seek to update the literature by examining the merger activity for US credit unions after the 
financial crisis, i.e., starting in 2011; since the financial crisis had an enormous effect on the 
financial sector. 
Second, several studies investigate the characteristics of takeover targets using a normative 
approach to construct a predictive model that identifies takeover targets (Thompson, 1997). This 
study adds to the prior findings of the determinants of mergers in credit unions by a clinical 
analysis of three credit union merger cases that have been extensively discussed in the media, 
and then looking at the characteristics of targets and comparing the targets to a matched sample 
of non-merging credit unions and acquirers. For example, Sant and Carter (2015) examine only 
one determinant of credit union merger, i.e., poor management ability, by looking only at the 
managerial performance of acquired credit unions before the acquisition date. Examining the 
financial ratios over 23 quarters before the merger date, they find that the financial ratios of 
acquired credit unions decline up to two years prior to the merger. Sant and Carter (2015) 
examine the whole population of merged credit unions from third quarter 2008 till the first 
quarter of 2014. However, they only examine the trends in the performance of target credit 
unions prior to mergers.   
 Third, this study provides information to regulators and standard setters in the United States 
about the importance of a new rule for the mergers. The NCUA is concerned that recent mergers 
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are tailored towards executives’ benefits and keeping owners/members uninformed. Management 
and boards are compromising their fiduciary responsibilities to their members and putting the 
cooperative principle at risk, for the purpose of a merger. As a result, on May 25, 2017, the 
NCUA board approved a proposed rule that would require credit unions involved in a voluntary 
merger to open up member communications and provide greater transparency before mergers. 
Moreover, NCUA Acting Board Chairman J. Mark McWatters said: “the rule would follow an 
SEC approach of full and fair disclosure of material items involved in a merger.” 
The rest of this paper is structured as follows. Section 2 provides background information on 
the merging process in credit unions and reviews the literature. Section 3 discusses the 
conceptual underpinnings. Section 4 describes the research method. Section 5 presents the results 
of the empirical analysis. Finally, Section 6 summarizes and concludes. 
4.2 Literature review  
4.2.1 Background 
The voluntary merger rule adopted by the National Credit Union Administration (NCUA) 
Board requires credit unions proposing to merge to submit a merger package that includes a plan 
summarizing the details of the merger. The package should also include financial compensation 
related to the merger. Moreover, federal credit unions should present the documents related to 
their disclosures of the merger to their members. The package is reviewed by the NCUA regional 
office and is approved if the proposed merger meets the member protection, safety and 
soundness requirements. Besides, merging federal credit unions’ members are given the 
opportunity to vote on the merger (Federal register, 2017). 
The NCUA analyzed the recent merger trends in the industry; they find that some acquiring 
credit unions are influencing the merging credit union by offering financial incentives to 
management and certain highly compensated employees to support the merger. As a result, on 
May 27, 2017, the NCUA Board proposed and sought comments on the revision to the voluntary 
merger procedure. The proposed changes are not only to federal chartered credit unions, and they 
include: “revise and clarify the contents and format of the member notice; require merging credit 
unions to disclose all merger-related financial arrangements for covered persons; increase the 
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minimum member notice period; and provide procedures to allow reasonable member-to-
member communications regarding the proposed merger” (Federal register, 2017). 
4.2.2 Literature on mergers in credit unions 
Credit unions are known for their financial services, especially for the weaker and 
disadvantaged segments of society (Goddard et al., 2002). Prior research on credit union mergers 
examines the consequences of service provision, by analyzing how the service changes after the 
merger for acquiring and acquired credit unions. Moreover, studies on credit union mergers are 
country-specific and limited to the mature industries in countries such as in the U.S., Australia, 
and Canada. 
For example, NCUA (1989) investigates the effect of mergers on the financial safety and 
soundness of the merging credit unions. In a sample of 509 merging credit unions, the study 
finds that the financial condition of healthy credit unions declined during the two years following 
the merger. Thus, the members of the surviving credit union experienced diminished service 
provision. However, the financial condition of the weak credit unions improved following the 
merger. As a result, the service provided to their members improved.  
By the same token, Fried, Lovell, and Yaisawarng (1999) use data envelopment analysis 
(DEA) to analyze the service provision in acquired and acquiring credit unions in the U.S. 
between 1989 and 1994. They find that, three years following the merger, the service provided to 
the members/owners of acquired credit unions improved. Whereas, members/owners of 
acquiring credit unions benefited more when they and the target credit union had different levels 
of profitability, different numbers of select employee groups, and when one of them had a 
community charter. However, on average, the acquiring credit unions did not experience any 
change in service provision following the merger. Also using DEA, Ralston, et al. (2001) 
evaluate the gains in technical and scale efficiency achieved by the merged credit union in 
Australia between 1993 and 1995. Their findings are mixed. Gains are larger when pre-merger 
technical efficiency scores were low for both partners; which is inconsistent with the belief that 
technical efficiency gains are recognized by the transfer of assets from inefficient managers to 
efficient managers. They find that the efficiency gains generated by the merger are not more than 
the efficiency gains generated through internal growth of non-merging credit unions. In New 
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Zealand, Mcalevey, Sibbald, and Tripe (2010) employ DEA to examine efficiency changes in 
merged credit unions between 1996 and 2001. However, they find that government action 
required mergers and not increased efficiency.  
Alternatively, Bauer, Miles, and Nishikawa (2009), using a different methodology, examine 
the performance of merged U.S. credit unions. They find that the performance of the acquired 
credit union improved. Whereas, the acquiring credit union performance did not change. In 
Bauer (2010), the author compares consolidated state farm credit unions to a control sample of 
non-farm credit unions. He finds that both the members of the acquiring and acquired credit 
unions benefit from the merger since the merging credit unions were healthy, of comparable size 
and offered similar products.  
Moreover, Goddard, McKillop, and Wilson (2009) use a hazard function and include 
technology variables in the determinants of credit union mergers in the U.S. during the period 
2001–2006. They find that the probability of a credit union to be acquired is negatively related to 
asset size and profitability, and directly related to liquidity. Whereas, Worthington (2004) finds 
that the probability of acquisition of Australian credit unions is influenced by asset size, asset 
management, liquidity, and regulatory variables during the period 1992–1995. 
Sant and Carter (2015) examine a determinant of credit union merger, i.e., poor management 
ability, by looking only at the managerial performance of acquired credit unions before the 
acquisition date. Examining the financial ratios over 23 quarters prior to the merger date, they 
find that the financial ratios of acquired credit unions decline up to two years before the merger. 
Finally, McKillop, Ferguson, and Goth (2006) did not find any determinant of a merger in UK 
credit unions after 2004. They only find that service provision of healthy credit unions 
deteriorates after acquiring unhealthy credit unions.  
4.3 Conceptual underpinning  
The academic literature has categorized the reasons for acquisitions in any industry into 
synergy, agency/managerialism and hubris hypotheses (Bauer et al., 2009). Seth, Song and Pettit 
(2000) describe the three hypothesis: acquisitions that take place when the value of the new 
combined firm is greater than the sum of the values of the individual firms are described as 
synergy, the agency/managerialism hypothesis suggests that managers seek acquisitions that 
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maximize their own utility at the expense of the owners, and the hubris hypothesis suggests that 
bidding firm managers make mistakes in evaluating target firms, but undertake acquisitions 
presuming that their valuations are correct. 
Davis and Staout (1992) state that the most effective way to take control of an opposed target 
is by tender offers. The mergers in credit unions are described as tender offers agreed to by the 
management and board of acquiring and acquired credit unions without members’ consent. 
Therefore, mergers in credit unions can best be described by the agency/managerialism 
hypothesis. In credit unions, the agency problem arises from self-serving and entrenched 
managers engaging in activities that serve their interest and not the interest of owners (Wilcox, 
2006). Moreover, Davis (2005) discusses the intensity of the owner-manager agency problem 
with the development of the credit union; as credit unions grow in size, entrenched managers 
would seek growth opportunities through mergers which based on wealth expropriation motives. 
4.4 Research method 
This paper investigates the reasons for mergers of credit unions first through a detailed 
clinical analysis of three cases of mergers of credit unions, and then through an empirical 
analysis of merged credit unions between 2011 and 2017. The data is gathered from different 
sources: Financial data is gathered from SNL financials database; articles in the news are 
gathered from Credit Union Digest (SNL articles), creditunions.com, and cutoday.info.  
Each case is presented in the following manner: first, a general description of the merging 
credit unions, regarding their respective age, size, performance, and characteristics, is presented. 
Second, we present a synopsis of the merging case. Third, we present financial highlights, for the 
three years before the merger date, for the acquiring and target credit unions. Finally, we 
comment on any observed new trends in mergers from the perspective of the agency hypothesis 
of mergers.   
4.4.1 Case analysis 
We choose three merging cases that have been discussed extensively in the news to be our 
case studies for this research paper. Our cases selection aimed to provide a picture of the new 
trend in mergers of credit unions and to support the NCUA board update of the merger rules. The 
case mergers selected for analysis in this study are the merger of Cornerstone Federal Credit 
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Union into Belco Community credit union, the merger of North Island Financial into California 
Credit Union, and the merger of Belvoir Federal Credit Union into Pentagon Federal Credit 
Union.   
4.4.1.1 Cornerstone FCU into Belco Community Credit Union  
Cornerstone Federal Credit Union (Cornerstone FCU) and Belco Community Credit Union 
(Belco CCU) completed the merger deal in July 2017. Cornerstone FCU was established in 1974 
to serve the community of Cumberland County, Pennsylvania. At the date of the merger, 
Cornerstone FCU had $108.5 million in total assets and was serving 11,078 members through 
four branches with twenty-seven full-time employees and eight part-time employees. It had an 
ROA of 0.23% and a net worth of 9.96 %; the credit union was considered well-capitalized. 
Belco CCU, a federally insured state chartered credit union, was established in 1939 to serve the 
communities of Adams, Cumberland, Dauphin, Lancaster, Lebanon, Perry or York Counties, and 
Pennsylvania. At the date of the merger, Belco CCU had $474.7 million in total assets and 
serving 474,656 members through eleven branches, and 124 full-time employees and twenty-one 
part-time employees. It had an ROA of 0.94 % and a net worth of 9.76 %; the credit union was 
also considered well-capitalized. As a result of the merger of the two credit unions, no branch 
locations closed and all the employees of both credit unions are retained. The Chief Executive 
Officer (CEO) of Belco Community Credit Union, Amey Sgrignoli, serves as the CEO of the 
combined credit union and the CEO of Cornerstone, Samuel Glesner, became part of the 
executive team. Moreover, the directors of Cornerstone FCU joined Belco CCU as volunteers to 
serve on committees, as associate directors, and as voting directors. 
Belco CCU and Cornerstone FCU announced plans to merge in late 2016 after both Board of 
Directors gave their initial approval in October of the same year. Before the deal was completed, 
the members of the acquired credit union should approve the merger deal. However, the prior 
CEO of Cornerstone FCU, Dave Keffer, led an effort to stop the merger assuming that the 
merger was not to the benefit of the members. Keffer served as a CEO of Cornerstone FCU for 
33 years before retiring in 2014, and Glesner was serving as the President of the board before he 
became the CEO. Few months before Keffer retired, Belco CCU approached Cornerstone FCU 
about a merger, but they were turned down. However, the management team along with the 
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board, after Keffer, approved the merger. Keffer claimed that Cornerstone FCU is outperforming 
Belco CCU, by having a lower expense-to-asset ratio, a stronger net worth position, and 
competitive fees to members. Moreover, he believed that Cornerstone FCU did not provide all 
the information about the deal to its members to be able to make an informed decision. He said. 
“I feel members were being left in the dark about a lot with this merger. You control the 
communications, and you control the vote … This deal was done without any sunshine on it, no 
open air.”  
[INSERT TABLE 24 ABOUT HERE] 
After comparing the performance of Belco CCU and Cornerstone FCU over the three years 
before the merger, we notice that Cornerstone FCU outperforms Belco CCU in some of the 
areas. For example, in 2015, Cornerstone FCU has higher asset, share and deposit, and member 
growth rates than Belco CCU, which means Cornerstone FCU is implementing more effective 
business strategies in the market to attract more members. Even though Cornerstone FCU has a 
lower ROAA, this might not mean that it is a less profitable credit union, but this might be due to 
the lower fees that it charges its members; this can be emphasized more by the lower ratio of 
noninterest income to average assets. Moreover, Cornerstone FCU has a higher net worth to 
assets ratio; this shows that the credit union management is not pursuing risky activities and 
accumulating the reserve. For example, the loan portfolio consists of a lower portion of credit 
card and unsecured loans, and vehicle loans compared to the loan portfolio of Belco CCU.      
4.4.1.2 North Island Financial into California Credit Union 
North Island Financial Credit Union (North Island CU) and California Credit Union 
(California CU) completed the merger deal in early 2017. North Island CU, federally insured 
state-chartered credit union, was established in 1940 to serve the community of San Diego, 
California. At the date of the merger, North Island CU had $1.26 billion in total assets and 
serving 73,486 members. It had an ROA of 0.45% and a net worth of 10%; the credit union was 
considered well-capitalized. It had twelve branches, and 222 full-time employees and 37 part-
time employees. California CU, federally insured state-chartered credit union, was established in 
1933 to serve school employees, current and retired educators, students and their families in 
California. At the date of the merger, California CU had $1.6 billion in total assets and serving 
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92,339 members. It had an ROA of 0.39% and a net worth of 11%; the credit union was also 
considered well-capitalized. It had thirteen branches, and 266 full-time employees and 36 part-
time employees.  
The North Island Financial and California Credit Union merger was the largest one in 2017. 
Both credit unions are of comparable sizes, and they planned to merge to provide "extraordinary 
banking experience" to their members. As a result of the merger, all the branches of the two 
credit unions will continue to operate to serve the members along with retaining all the 
employees of both credit unions. Moreover, the merged credit union will operate with dual 
headquarters, and the boards of directors and supervisory committees of both credit unions will 
combine to form the directors of the merged credit union. The CEO of North Island CU, Steve 
O’Connell, became the CEO of the combined credit unions; however, Steve O’Connell was the 
CEO of California CU before becoming the CEO at North Island. O’Connell said to the 
members: "California Credit Union is a natural fit as a merger partner with shared values and an 
absolute commitment to providing the best possible member experience in service, pricing, and 
convenience. Partnering with a healthy, established credit union will immediately expand our 
California footprint, significantly increase operating efficiencies, and put us in a much stronger 
competitive position…As a larger credit union, we will have the resources to continue to 
improve your banking experience with the latest online and mobile technologies, new products 
and services to meet all your financial needs, and highly competitive rates.” 
[INSERT TABLE 25 ABOUT HERE] 
North Island CU and California CU are of comparable sizes. California CU had a better 
growth rate regarding assets, loans, and shares. The net worth ratio of North Island CU is better 
than the net worth of California CU; this implies that California CU is riskier. This is also 
supported by the higher ratio of delinquent loans to total loans, and the higher ratio of credit card 
and unsecured loans to total loans. California CU has a higher liquidity risk; the ratio of liquid 
assets to total assets is lower than the ratio for North Island, and a higher loans to deposits ratio. 
California CU charges higher fees to its members; i.e., they have a higher noninterest income to 
average assets ratio.  
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4.4.1.3 Belvoir FCU into PenFed CU 
Pentagon Federal Credit Union (PenFed CU) and Belvoir Federal Credit Union (Belvoir 
FCU) completed the merger deal in early 2016. PenFed CU was established in 1935 to serve 
enlisted military personnel and civilian employees of the Department of the Army, and it is 
headquartered in Alexandria, Virginia. At the date of the merger, PenFed CU had $19.92 billion 
in total assets and serving 1.4 million members. It had an ROA of 0.81% and a net worth of 
10.12%; the credit union was considered well-capitalized. It had thirty-four branches, and 1,666 
full-time employees and 72 part-time employees. PenFed CU has a federal charter, and its 
members have multiple common bonds, but primarily military. Belvoir FCU was established in 
1946 to serve military personnel and civilian employees of the United States Government, 
employees who work at Fort Belvoir, Virginia, and the communities of Fairfax and Prince 
William Counties, Virginia. At the date of the merger, Belvoir FCU had $333.3 million in total 
assets and serving 27,458 members. It had an ROA of 0.28%, and a net worth of 8.38%; the 
credit union was also considered well-capitalized. It had six branches, and 81 full-time 
employees and one part-time employee. Belvoir FCU had a federal charter and its members had 
multiple common bonds, but primarily military. 
The merger between Belvoir FCU and PenFed CU seemed somewhat unexpected to many, 
especially the members. On February 23, 2016, the day before the announcement of the merger, 
Belvoir FCU was publicizing a new branch in Northern Virginia, yet they did not at all discuss 
the merger that was set to occur the following day. The deal seemed to be one-sided, and Belvoir 
did not gather the opinions of its members. Belvoir’s board operated completely in secret from 
the approval in August 2015 until it sent out its required notice to members of the special 
meeting to vote on the merger. The notice was not mailed out until March 11, 2016, even though 
it was dated Feb. 24, 2016, when it was already too late for the members to seek out other 
options.  
Board members were able to control what information they wanted to be released, so much 
information was left out. After Freedom of Information (FOIA) filings, the revealed documents 
of the merger did not include the board’s or managers’ due diligence in fulfillment of their 
fiduciary responsibility. The NCUA also insisted that compensation is disclosed to the official 
notice: "The CEO would receive a bonus of $250,000; the CFO and COO payments of $125,000 
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each, upon the merger’s approval." However, they did not disclose any other staff bonuses or 
employment guarantees. For example, Alfred Rudolph, the Chairman of Belvoir FCU for the six 
years before the merger, was placed on the PenFed Board of Directors. Rudolph was the one who 
spearheaded the Board’s decision to merge with PenFed.  
Moreover, Belvoir FCU’s board chair announced the intent to merge with PenFed in the 
February 2016 Special Membership Meeting Notice. The notice included a statement of the 
combined financial condition of the two credit unions, as of June 2015. The merger adjustments 
included an entry for “negative goodwill” totaling $40.7 million which would be added to 
PenFed’s balance sheet when the combination was completed. Each member of Belvoir FCU 
paid around $1,482 to join PenFed, even though it had previously been an option for them to join 
PenFed by simply buying one redeemable share. PenFed recognized this extraordinary gain as 
“non-operating income” in 2016 to cover PenFed’s operating expenses and support the dividend 
to its members.  
[INSERT TABLE 26 ABOUT HERE] 
Comparing the performance of PenFed CU and Belvoir FCU over the last three years before 
the merger, the table shows that PenFed CU has a better financial performance. The growth rates 
for PenFed CU are higher than Belvoir CU. The net worth to assets ratio of PenFed CU is higher, 
i.e., Belvoir FCU is riskier; this is also shown in the higher percentage of credit card and 
unsecured loans. The noninterest income to average assets is higher for Belvoir CU; this implies 
that Belvoir CU charges higher fees to its members. However, even though the financial 
performance of PenFed CU is better than the financial performance of Belvoir CU, it should be 
noted that the size of PenFed CU is more than fifty-five times the size of Belvoir CU. The 
members of Belvoir CU are served better since each full-time employee serves 343 members 
compared to PenFed CU where each full-time employee serves 945 members. 
4.4.1.4 Synthesis of cases 
Among the three hypothesis that explain the reasons for acquisitions, synergy, 
agency/managerialism, and hubris hypotheses, the agency/managerialism hypothesis best 
explains the three cases presented in this study. The agency/managerialism hypothesis suggests 
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that managers seek acquisitions that maximize their own utility at the expense of the owners 
(Seth et al., 2000). In the case of the merger of Cornerstone FCU into Belco CCU, despite all the 
opposition from the members, the management team with the board succeeded in completing the 
merger deal. The board controls the communication to the members; they convinced the 
uninformed investors about the benefits of the merger by telling them only the pros of the 
merger. They gave the members a short notice about the merger and to vote, which left the 
members with no option but to accept the deal as is. Moreover, the credit union members trust 
their management and board of directors. As a result, they will be convinced that the deal is for 
the benefit of the members.  
The agency/managerialism hypothesis also explains the mergers of North Island CU into 
California CU and Belvoir CU into PenFed CU. The CEO of the merged Credit union of North 
Island CU and California CU, Steve O'Connell, served as the CEO of both credit unions. He is 
an insider who is very well connected to the key personnel of both credit unions. O'Connell 
should have been a major player in the negotiation of the merger of the two credit unions, and 
becoming the CEO of the merged credit union is the ultimate benefit for him. Moreover, in the 
merger of Belvoir CU and PenFed CU, not only the benefit went to the management and board 
of directors, but also the members had to pay for this merger to happen. It is true that PenFed CU 
is financially healthier than Belvoir CU; however, the members of Belvoir CU were happy with 
the service they are getting from Belvoir CU. Had they wanted to join PenFed CU, they could 
have done so a long time ago since both credit unions serve the military personnel in Virginia.  
These merger deals are legal according to the NCUA regulations. However, to mitigate this 
agency problem in the mergers, the NCUA Board believes that more clarity is needed in the 
merging process to stop manipulative board members. As a result, the NCUA board requested 
comments on the new proposed rules. With a notice period more than two weeks, the members 
of Cornerstone FCU and Belvoir FCU could have investigated more about the deals, and the 
deals could have been rejected by majority vote. Moreover, the merging credit unions 
(Cornerstone FCU, North Island CU, and Belvoir FCU) did not disclose the merger-related 
financial arrangements and job guarantees for the covered persons. After the mergers, the 
management and directors of the merging credit unions ended up with executive positions in the 
acquiring credit union.  
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4.4.2 Quantitative analysis 
4.4.2.1 Data Sources  
The dataset is constructed from the financial information published by U.S. credit unions in 
their ‘5300 Call Reports’ and made available by SNL Financials. The sample consists of all 
acquiring and acquired credit union quarterly observations available on SNL Financial from the 
first quarter of 2011 till the third quarter of 2017. The first quarter of 2011 is the initial date that 
SNL Financial started to gather data on the reasons for merger (Table 23). Then a non-merging 
credit union is matched for each target credit union based on the same state and size in total 
assets. The study only examines the credit unions that merged to expand their services. 
Moreover, federal credit unions with at least $10 million in assets must submit their financial 
reports in accordance with GAAP; as a result, all credit unions with less than $10 million in 
assets are dropped. Moreover, observations with extreme or non-sensical values for certain 
variables are eliminated from the sample.  
[INSERT TABLE 27 ABOUT HERE] 
4.4.2.2 Method 
The study adopts the method of Sorenson (2000) to determine the characteristics of the target 
credit unions. The study is conducted in two steps. The first step involves the univariate analysis. 
Then an analysis of variance (ANOVA) tests for differences between the means of the financial 
ratios of the three groups. The ratios examined represent the CAMEL
15
 ratios that are used by 
NCUA for credit unions assessment. The CAMEL ratios are defined in the Appendix. 
Second, the analysis is performed using a multivariate factor analysis. The multivariate test 
might show that variables that are unimportant in the univariate comparison of means test are 
important. “Factor analysis is a statistical tool by which it is possible to disentangle complex 
interrelationships among a set of variables into a set of functional unities that identify the 
independent influences or causes at work” (Rummel, 1988).  
                                                 
15
 CAMEL stands for: Capital adequacy, Asset quality, Management quality, Earnings, and Liquidity. The ratios are 
defined in the Financial Performance Reports (FPR) User’s Guide. 
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4.5 Empirical results 
4.5.1 Descriptive statistics 
Table 28 presents the summary statistics of the CAMEL ratios of each category in the study. 
Panels A presents the descriptive statistics of the target credit unions. The mean (median) total 
assets of a credit union in the acquired category is $52.78 million ($29.18 million), with the 
smallest credit union having $10.4 million and the largest $717.48 million. The mean (median) 
total loans of a credit union in the acquired category is $45.20 million ($24.68 million), and the 
mean (median) total shares and deposits is $2.2 million ($262 thousand). The acquired credit 
unions have a mean (median) quarterly growth rate of total assets of 2.54% (1.41%), a mean 
(median) quarterly growth rate of total loans of -1.92% (-3.38%), a mean (median) quarterly 
growth rate of total shares and deposits of 3.29% (1.93%), and a mean (median) quarterly growth 
rate of total equity of -2.02% (0.48%). They have an average (median) return on assets and net 
worth ratio of -0.20% (0.06%) and 11.79% (10.62%) respectively.  
Panels B presents the descriptive statistics of the acquiring credit unions.  The mean (median) 
total assets of a credit union in the acquiring category is $746.25 million ($321.79 million), with 
the smallest credit union having $20.15 million and the largest $37.3 billion. The mean (median) 
total loans of a credit union in the acquiring category is $642.20 million ($279.86 million), and 
the mean (median) total shares and deposits is $58.92 million ($12.37 million). The acquiring 
credit unions have a mean (median) quarterly growth rate of total assets of 7.61% (4.91%), a 
mean (median) quarterly growth rate of total loans of 7.40% (5.81%), a mean (median) quarterly 
growth rate of total shares and deposits of 7.70% (4.57%), and a mean (median) quarterly growth 
rate of total equity of 6.87% (6.01%). They have an average (median) return on assets and net 
worth ratio of 0.55% (0.59%) and 10.72% (10.29%) respectively. 
Panels C presents the descriptive statistics of the non-merging credit unions. The mean 
(median) total assets of a credit union in the non-merging category is $59.34 million ($31.20 
million), with the smallest credit union having $11.24 million and the largest $1.48 billion. The 
mean (median) total loans of a credit union in the non-merging category is $51.27 million 
($26.81 million), and the mean (median) total shares and deposits is $5.44 million ($324 
thousand). The non-merging credit unions have a mean (median) quarterly growth rate of total 
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assets of 4.22% (3.06%), a mean (median) quarterly growth rate of total loans of 2.66% (1.29%), 
a mean (median) quarterly growth rate of total shares and deposits of 4.50% (3.02%), and a mean 
(median) quarterly growth rate of total equity of 2.71% (2.98%). They have an average (median) 
return on assets and net worth ratio of 0.32% (0.35%) and 12.12% (11.23%) respectively. 
[INSERT TABLE 28 ABOUT HERE] 
4.5.2 ANOVA 
In the first step, a univariate analysis of variance (ANOVA) to test for differences between 
the means of the ratios among the three groups is performed. Table 29 shows the following: the 
CAMEL ratios, the means for each ratio, the ANOVA F ratio, and the significance level for each 
group. Results show that the CAMEL ratios differ significantly between groups.  
It appears from this initial test that non-merging credit unions have higher growth rates 
compared to acquired credit unions. On average, the non-merging credit unions have the highest 
net worth ratio, with acquiring credit unions having the lowest net worth ratio. The asset quality 
ratios of acquired and acquiring credit unions are almost the same; whereas, non-merging credit 
unions have higher quality assets. Merger target credit unions are similar in earnings ratios to 
non-merging credit unions. Except for the return on assets ratio and operating expense to gross 
income ratio, where the non-merging credit unions outperform the acquired credit unions. In 
addition, target credit unions have better liquidity since their loans to assets ratio is the lowest. 
Moreover, in terms of productivity, target and non-merging credit unions have the same 
productivity ratios, and they outperform acquiring credit unions.  
 [INSERT TABLE 29 ABOUT HERE] 
4.5.3 Factor analysis  
The multivariate factor analysis is performed in the second step of the analysis. We analyze 
the whole sample and then each category separately. Four major factors, with eigenvalues greater 
than one, are identified that explain the majority of the variance among the whole sample, and 
among each category of the acquired, acquiring, and non-merging credit unions. The four factors 
that are identified for the whole sample explain 34.43%, 16.84%, 14.98%, and 9.47% of the 
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sample variance, respectively. Table 30 shows the Factor Component Matrix after a Varimax 
rotation for the whole sample, and Table 31 – Panels A, B, and C show the Factor Component 
Matrix after a Varimax rotation for the acquired, acquiring, and non-merging credit unions, 
respectively. Tables 30 and 31 present the loading of each ratio on the four major factors 
identified in the factor analysis. A higher loading number indicates that the ratio is highly 
associated with that factor, the loadings with absolute value greater than 0.5 are highlighted.  
[INSERT TABLE 30 ABOUT HERE] 
[INSERT TABLE 31 ABOUT HERE] 
After examining the factor loadings on the ratios, we find that the capital adequacy, asset 
quality, and earnings ratios load most highly on factor 1; growth ratios load most highly on 
factors 2 and 4; and asset quality ratios load most highly on factor 3.    
4.6 Conclusion 
With the increase in voluntary mergers in the credit unions industry, the NCUA is concerned 
that recent mergers are tailored towards executives’ benefits and keeping owners/members 
uninformed. Management and boards are compromising their fiduciary responsibilities to their 
members and putting the cooperative principle at risk, for the purpose of a merger. As a result, 
on May 25, 2017, the NCUA board approved a proposed rule that would require credit unions 
involved in a voluntary merger to open up member communications and provide greater 
transparency before mergers. Performing a case analysis on three cases of voluntary mergers that 
were discussed in the media, the study supports the agency hypothesis that managers seek 
acquisitions that maximize their own utility at the expense of the owners.  
Moreover, the second part of the study aims to identify certain characteristics of target credit 
unions empirically by comparing a sample of acquired credit unions to a matched sample of non-
merging credit unions and the acquiring credit unions. The sample comprises U.S. credit unions 
above $10 million in total assets that merged to expand their services between 2011 and 2017. 
First, a univariate analysis of variance tests for differences between the means of the CAMEL 
ratios among the three groups (targets, acquiring, and non-merging credit unions) shows that the 
means of the ratios of the three groups are statistically different. Second, factor analysis is 
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performed to classify the major factors that explain the majority of variance. Growth, capital 
adequacy, asset quality, and earnings are found to be the major ratios that differentiate between 
the target, acquiring, and non-merging credit unions.    
The main contribution of this study is its policy implication. This study shows the importance 
of a new rule for mergers which increases communication to members and provide greater 
transparency. Moreover, this study adds to the academic literature on mergers of credit unions. 
This study updates the literature by examining the merger activity for US credit unions after the 
financial crisis. Moreover, the study adds to the prior findings of the determinants of mergers in 
credit unions by performing a clinical case analysis, and then looking at the characteristics of 
targets and comparing the targets to a matched sample of non-merging credit unions and 
acquirers.  
Finally, we acknowledge the limitations of this study. The study focuses only on three cases 
of mergers, even though this analysis reveals certain important trends in voluntary mergers that 
provide an in-depth understanding of the severity of these mergers to members, it confines the 
generalizability of the results. Moreover, in the case analysis, the study shows the role of 
management and boards in merger decisions; however, due to lack of governance and 
compensation data in credit unions, we are not able to compare these data for the three categories 
of credit unions. Yet, these limitations do not prevent this study from contributing to the credit 
unions merger literature by offering insights into the current merger practices. Finally, we 
believe that the findings of this study make interesting material for future research in which 
researchers and policy makers can better understand the trend of voluntary mergers and find 
solutions to protect the members.  






Chapter 5: Conclusion 
 This dissertation is comprised of three essays which discuss crucial topics related to 
credit unions in the U.S. The first essay presents the presence of earnings management in credit 
unions and demonstrates how managers are sacrificing the members'/owners' benefits for their 
own interests. The second essay reveals the risk-taking of credit unions management, and how 
credit unions' managers are more risk-takers than banks' managers in the presence of 
competition. The third essay uncovers the trends of voluntary mergers to help regulators 
understand the practices and decisions of managers and boards to sell their credit unions, and the 
essay tries to find certain characteristics of credit unions that attract acquirers.  
The first essay extends the earnings management literature by investigating earnings 
management engagement in the credit union industry. Prior studies on earnings management 
have discussed it from the perspective of manager-customer agency problem, and managers 
engage in earnings management to please the owners. However, this essay investigates earnings 
management in credit unions from the perspective of the manager-owner agency problem, and 
shows how entrenched managers seek their own benefit at the expense of the members’/owners’ 
benefit.   
The second essay probes into a special aspect of credit unions and banks, which is the 
risk-taking. Given that credit unions are mutuals where the members are the owners, one may 
conclude that they are contractually organized to avoid moral hazard engagement (McKillop & 
Wilson, 2011). The results of this essay are interesting since they are contradictory to the 
anecdotal belief that credit unions’ managers are risk-averse. The essay provides evidence that in 
the presence of competition, credit unions’ managers are more risk-takers than banks’ managers.   
The third essay contributes to the merger literature of credit unions by providing recent 
evidence on the new trend of voluntary mergers. The trend of the voluntary merger has raised 
concerns to regulators as it is putting the cooperative principle at risk. On May 25, 2017, the 
NCUA board approved a proposed rule that would require credit unions involved in a voluntary 
merger to open up member communications and provide greater transparency to members before 
mergers. The essay supports the necessity of this new rule by unfolding three cases of voluntary 
mergers. The three cases are analyzed from the perspective of the agency/managerialism 
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hypothesis which suggests that managers seek acquisitions that maximize their own utility at the 
expense of the owners.  
In general, the dissertation contributes to the governance literature; the unique 
institutional characteristics of credit unions give rise to differences in governance from investor-
owned firms. Owners of credit unions are the members themselves who are exposed to equal 
rights for voting and decision-making irrespective of the size of the deposits paid (Goddard et al., 
2002). Therefore, each credit union member has the right to one vote at the annual general 
meeting to elect the board of directors (Mook et al., 2015). The elected board members are 
usually volunteer members who are not compensated. For example, Smith and Woodbury (2010) 
assume that banks and credit unions follow different risk strategies due to the difference in their 
governance structures. This dissertation divulges the consequences of volunteer board members 
that lack the skills and knowledge to monitor the management. This is shown in the first essay 
through the practice of earnings management. The second essay also supports the idea of weak 
governance by showing the risk-taking of credit unions' managers compared to the risk-taking of 
banks' managers. Finally, the third essay discloses how boards are colluding with management to 
sell their credit unions for certain compensations and/or guaranteed position.   
Moreover, this dissertation has public policy implications. Credit unions are not-for-profit 
financial institutions intended to voluntarily support the weaker segments of society; therefore, 
they enjoy a tax-exemption benefit since 1978. Credit unions pass this tax benefit to its members 
through higher rates on the savings and deposits, and lower rates on loans. However, this has 
caused an ongoing debate from bankers claiming that credit unions should not enjoy the tax 
exemption since they have grown in size and have commercial objectives which caused them to 
go beyond their mission of serving the weaker segments of society. Moreover, a recent article in 
the American Bankers, on April 23, 2018 (https://www.americanbanker.com/news/do-credit-
unions-still-warrant-a-tax-exemption), supports the debate by providing evidence from the 
example of Pentagon Federal credit union in Virginia. PenFed has expanded its field of 
membership significantly through acquiring several credit unions, it recently spent $164 million 
to build a new headquarter, and spent another $31 million on a marketing campaign. These 
expenses that are channeled away from the members are much more than what a commercial 
bank its size would spend. This dissertation supports the argument that credit unions have a 
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commercial objective, and compete directly with banks. The three essays raise the concern that 
the managers' activities are putting the cooperative principle at risk.  
In this dissertation, the analysis is based on data published in the quarterly regulatory 
financial reports of credit unions. Credit unions do not have to prepare financial statements to the 
investors with disclosures. Therefore, the lack of governance data and the use of economic 
variables as indirect proxies for governance is a limitation of this dissertation. It would be 
interesting in the future to conduct studies based on data gathered either by surveys or interviews 
with the management and executives of credit unions. This would provide a more in-depth 
understanding of the governance and practices of management, and corroborate the findings. 
In this dissertation, we concentrate mainly on credit unions in the United States. 
However, it would be interesting to look at reporting practices of credit unions in other countries. 
For example, in 2012, the Federal government of Canada established a new legal framework for 
co-operatives to expand their services across the country. The federal and state/provincial 
charters of US and Canadian credit unions provides a unique setting that can be explored and 
contribute to regulators and standards setters in both countries. For example, Canadian credit 
unions are not tax-exempt; therefore, comparing the credit unions in the two North American 
countries provides insights on whether the tax-exemption is advantageous to the members or 
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Table 1 Sample selection 
All credit unions available in SNL Financials 5,836 
Less: Credit unions with $10 million or less in total assets (1,649) 
Less: Credit unions with more than $10 million in total assets but 
was established less than 10 years ago 
(4) 
Less: Corporate Credit unions (10) 
Less: Credit unions with less than $50 million in total assets (2,636) 
Credit unions used in study 1,537 
 
Table 2 Cleaning process 
Process  All Observations 
Credit union- quarter observations  86,072 
Less: Observations with extreme or unbelievable value for 
any variable 
(2,438) 
Total observations  83,634 
 
Table 3 Distribution by charter type and size 
NCUA Charter Type 
# of credit 
unions 
# of quarterly 
observations prior 
to cleaning 
# of quarterly 
observations after 
cleaning 
Federal 796 44,576 43,489 
Federally Insured State Chartered 697 39,032 37,900 
Non-Federally Insured State Chartered 44 2,464 2,245 
Total 1,537 86,072 83,634 
 
Size categories 
# of quarterly 
observations after 
cleaning 
Large (TA > $500M) 27,652 
Small (TA < $500M) 55,982 
Total 83,634 
 
NCUA Charter Type / Size categories Large Small Total 
Federal 12,184 31,305 43,489 
Federally Insured State Chartered 14,987 22,913 37,900 
Non-Federally Insured State Chartered 481 1,764 2,245 




Table 4 Descriptive statistics of variables used in the regressions 
Size 
Category 











LLP 0.0010 0.0012 -0.01026 0.000247 0.000662 0.001273 0.02228 
BEGLLA 0.0057 0.0049 0 0.002853 0.004464 0.006982 0.073273 
BEGNPL 0.0060 0.0060 0 0.002352 0.004357 0.007589 0.186993 
 NPL 0.0001 0.0027 -0.1786 -0.0007 0.0000 0.0008 0.1798 
NLCO 0.0009 0.0011 -0.0105 0.0003 0.0007 0.0012 0.0266 
LOANS 0.6285 0.1594 0.0754 0.5250 0.6423 0.7457 2.4674 
 LOANS 0.0098 0.0270 -0.2084 -0.0030 0.0072 0.0194 1.8969 
UnsecLoans 0.0615 0.0374 0.0000 0.0351 0.0566 0.0810 0.4972 
CarLoans 0.2232 0.1319 0 0.1266 0.2022 0.2991 0.9750 
RealEstate 0.3055 0.1452 0 0.1976 0.2927 0.4011 1.6716 
OtherLoans 0.0383 0.0514 0 0.0100 0.0242 0.0491 0.9683 
DLLP 0.0000 0.0008 -0.0142 -0.0003 -0.00002 0.00028 0.01359 
EBLLP 0.0041 0.0032 -0.0429 0.0025 0.0039 0.0056 0.0477 
 EBLLP -0.000046 0.0034 -0.1501 -0.0009 0.0000 0.0009 0.0150 
lnTA 19.33 0.9999 17.74 18.55 19.14 19.95 23.94 
 lnTA 0.0139 0.0348 -0.3902 -0.0037 0.0106 0.0277 1.5510 
ROAA 0.60 0.7112 -3 0.27 0.63 0.99 3 
NW 10.97 2.87 1.42 9.06 10.4 12.2 29.83 





LLP 0.0011 0.0013 -0.0047 0.0003 0.0008 0.0014 0.0168 
BEGLLA 0.0063 0.0052 0 0.0032 0.0050 0.0076 0.0733 
BEGNPL 0.0057 0.0061 0 0.0022 0.0040 0.0071 0.0912 
 NPL 0.0001 0.0021 -0.0574 -0.0005 0.0001 0.0007 0.0373 
NLCO 0.0010 0.0011 -0.0069 0.0004 0.0008 0.0013 0.0266 
LOANS 0.6648 0.1566 0.0916 0.5647 0.6780 0.7807 2.3788 
 LOANS 0.0137 0.0306 -0.1558 0.0006 0.0113 0.0237 1.4999 
UnsecLoans 0.0600 0.0349 0.0000 0.0343 0.0561 0.0804 0.2992 
CarLoans 0.2275 0.1364 0 0.1270 0.2077 0.3075 0.8583 
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RealEstate 0.3408 0.1458 0 0.2335 0.3325 0.4373 1.6716 
OtherLoans 0.0365 0.0504 0 0.0088 0.0218 0.0454 0.7894 
DLLP 0.0001 0.0008 -0.0143 -0.0002 0.0000 0.0003 0.0111 
EBLLP 0.00484 0.002903 -0.02642 0.00326 0.00459 0.0061 0.0462 
 EBLLP -0.0000132 0.003001 -0.04192 -0.00074 0.0000 0.0008 0.0132 
lnTA 20.4580 0.7670 18.2871 19.9406 20.3398 20.8856 23.9422 
 lnTA 0.0181 0.0357 -0.2946 0.0009 0.0145 0.0311 1.5046 
ROAA 0.77 0.6723 -3 0.47 0.8 1.13 3 
NW 10.59 2.33 1.42 9.07 10.2 11.65 25 






LLP 0.0009 0.0012 -0.0103 0.0002 0.0006 0.0012 0.0223 
BEGLLA 0.0055 0.0048 0 0.0027 0.0042 0.0067 0.0723 
BEGNPL 0.0061 0.0059 0 0.0024 0.0045 0.0078 0.1870 
 NPL 0.0001 0.0029 -0.1786 -0.0008 0.0000 0.0009 0.1798 
NLCO 0.0009 0.0010 -0.0105 0.0003 0.0006 0.0011 0.0210 
LOANS 0.6106 0.1577 0.0754 0.5067 0.6251 0.7275 2.4674 
 LOANS 0.0078 0.0247 -0.2084 -0.0045 0.0053 0.0170 1.8969 
UnsecLoans 0.0622 0.0385 0.0000 0.0354 0.0569 0.0813 0.4972 
CarLoans 0.2211 0.1296 0 0.1264 0.1997 0.2942 0.9750 
RealEstate 0.2881 0.1417 0 0.1826 0.2750 0.3799 1.3101 
OtherLoans 0.0393 0.0519 0 0.0107 0.0253 0.0506 0.9683 
DLLP 0.0000 0.0008 -0.0124 -0.0004 -0.0001 0.0003 0.0136 
EBLLP 0.00374 0.00328 -0.04288 0.0021 0.00355 0.0052 0.0477 
 EBLLP -0.0000614 0.00364 -0.15014 -0.00096 0.0000 0.00096 0.01496 
lnTA 18.7738 0.5150 17.7385 18.3606 18.7400 19.1603 20.2240 
 lnTA 0.0118 0.0341 -0.3902 -0.0059 0.0085 0.0258 1.5510 
ROAA 0.52 0.71525 -3 0.2 0.54 0.91 3 
NW 11.16 3.09 1.89 9.05 10.54 12.55 29.83 
Stat 0.56 0.50 0 0 1 1 1 
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Table 5 Correlations between variables (Lower Pearson’s correlation, upper Spearman’s correlation) 
 
LLP BEGLLA BEGNPL  NPL NLCO LOANS 
 LOAN
S 
DLLP EBLLP  EBLLP lnTA  lnTA ROAA NW Stat 
LLP 1 0.4122 0.4631 0.0470 0.7468 0.3186 -0.0312 0.4338 0.2121 0.0437 0.1130 -0.0183 -0.1992 -0.1658 -0.0473 
  (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
BEGLLA 0.3946 1 0.5437 -0.0669 0.599 0.2595 -0.1052 0.0912 0.1488 -0.0218 0.1475 -0.0199 0.0244 -0.1805 -0.1286 
 (0.00)  (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
BEGNPL 0.4335 0.5658 1 -0.1549 0.5429 0.2552 -0.1849 -0.0934 -0.0111 -0.0196 -0.0345 -0.0298 -0.1691 -0.1805 -0.0470 
 (0.00) (0.00)  (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
 NPL 0.0264 -0.0926 -0.2252 1 -0.0805 0.0729 0.1469 -0.0362 0.0104 0.0242 0.0100 -0.0917 0.0121 0.0263 0.0023 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)  (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.50) 
NLCO 0.7178 0.6125 0.5200 -0.1355 1 0.2979 -0.1118 0.0226 0.1679 -0.0066 0.1085 -0.0230 -0.1233 -0.2058 -0.0654 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)  (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.06) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
LOANS 0.2603 0.1878 0.2004 0.0556 0.2269 1 0.2822   -0.1548  -0.0853  0.0100 0.1484 0.1604  0.1319   -0.2326   -0.1192 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)  (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
 LOANS -0.0424 -0.1338 -0.1465 0.1310 -0.1024 0.2765  1   -0.0037 0.0808   0.0856 0.1536 0.0866 0.2116 0.0073   -0.0280   
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)  (0.28) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.04) (0.00) 
DLLP 0.6450 0.0904 -0.0350 -0.0013 0.0526   -0.0658 0.0023 1 0.2433 0.0594 0.1345   -0.0456 -0.1337  0.0440    -0.0290 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.70) (0.00) (0.00) (0.51)  (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
EBLLP 0.1914 0.1426 0.0081 0.0083 0.1505 -0.1125   0063  0.1887 1 0.3472 0.1951 0.0667 0.7541 0.1580 -0.0113 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.02) (0.02) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)  (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
 EBLLP 0.0605 0.0027 0.0083 0.0115 0.0225 0.0322 0.0462 0.0532 0.4642 1 0.0073 -0.0527 0.3207 -0.0117 -0.0005 
 (0.00) (0.44) (0.02) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)  (0.03) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
lnTA 0.0802 0.1155 -0.0155 0.0042 0.0667 0.1354   0.0998 0.0981 0.1596 0.0088 1 0.1226 0.1726 -0.1077 -0.0960 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.22) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01)  (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
 lnTA -0.0278 -0.0558 -0.0430 0.0056 -0.0313 0.1807  0.4359     -0.0371 0.0411 0.0209 0.0870 1 0.1514 -0.0613 -0.0107 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.10) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)  (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
ROAA -0.3408 0.0001 -0.1767 0.0031 0.20 0.0931 0.1343 -0.2506 0.7270 0.4045 0.1446 0.0813 1 0.1643 -0.0327 
 (0.00) (0.97) (0.00) (0.38) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)  (0.00) (0.00) 
NW -0.1476 -0.1482 -0.1379 0.0211 -0.1790    -0.2701 -0.0145   0.0130 0.1380 -0.0281 -0.1370 -0.0552 0.1237 1 -0.0242 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)  (0.00) 
Stat -0.0412 -0.1005 -0.0368 0.0014 -0.0551   -0.1220    -0.0308     -0.0245 -0.007 -0.0024 -0.0881 -0.0152 -0.0289 -0.0027 1 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.69) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.04) (0.49) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.44)  
p-values in parentheses  
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Table 6 Results of regression of LLP on determinants of normal LLP 
















  (62.52) (41.33) (47.25)  























  (9.96) (8.17) (6.64)  





























  (-3.93) (-3.89) (-2.15)  
ΔlnGSP + -0.002*** -0.003*** -0.001*** 2.50 
  (-6.69) (-5.81) (-3.72)  
ΔUnemp (%) + 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** -1.24 








  (-22.89) (-13.54) (-18.86)  
Quarter controls  Yes Yes Yes  
Observations  83415 27652 55763  
R
2
  0.508 0.604 0.463  
Adjusted R
2
  0.498 0.596 0.453  
t-values in parentheses 
*
 p < 0.10, 
**
 p < 0.05, 
***




















Negative ΔEBLLP Positive ΔEBLLP t-test 
 Mean Mean p-value 
DLLP 
-0.0000389 
(n = 40,366) 
0.0000364 




(n = 40,481) 
1597.24 




(n = 40,481) 
0.49% 
(n = 43,153) 
0.00 
DLLP  (large) 
-0.0000386 
(n = 13, 162) 
0.0000351 




(n =  27,204) 
0.0000361 





















 11.22 4.51 
  (180.42) (188.91) (94.05) (101.86) (154.12) (158.60)   
ΔEBLLP + 0.00865*** 0.01116*** 0.01394*** 0.01716*** 0.00685*** 0.00916*** -4.29 -4.34 













 5.32 8.80 
  (32.56) (37.75) (6.55) (7.19) (13.62) (18.85)   
ΔlnTA  -0.00019*** -0.00008 -0.00047*** -0.00043*** -0.00007 0.00005 3.05 3.37 













 -15.10 -9.38 













 -9.00 -6.34 













 0.78 1.09 











 -3.90 -4.94 













 -0.04 0.45 













   
  (-40.31) (-39.07) (-12.08) (-10.01) (-17.74) (-20.68)   
Quarter  No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes 
Observations  83384 83384 27646 27646 55738 55738   
R
2 
 0.368 0.403 0.327 0.378 0.382 0.411   
Adjusted R
2
  0.367 0.403 0.327 0.376 0.382 0.411   
t statistics in parentheses 
*
 p < 0.10, 
**
 p < 0.05, 
***




Table 9 Results of regression of DLLP on EBLLP and Merge  













 8.61 3.92 













 -0.54 0.13 













 -0.32 -1.25 













 6.74 7.87 
  (26.67) (24.25) (8.59) (3.10) (18.26) (14.40)   
ΔlnTA  -0.00024** 0.00024** -0.00026* 0.00008 -0.00025** 0.00025* 0.07 0.79 













 -10.93 -6.57 













 -8.34 -5.03 













 0.01 0.42 









 -3.30 -4.42 













 -0.34 -0.04 













   
  (-33.28) (-33.34) (-12.86) (-8.93) (-21.44) (-19.21)   
Quarter  No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes 
Observations  46299 46299 15576 15576 30723 30723   
R
2 
 0.371 0.405 0.325 0.374 0.387 0.413   
Adjusted R
2
  0.371 0.404 0.324 0.372 0.386 0.412   
t statistics in parentheses 
*
 p < 0.10, 
**
 p < 0.05, 
***
 p < 0.01 
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Table 10 Variables’ regulatory codes and SNL keys 
Symbol Acct Code SNL Name SNL Key 
LLP 300 Provision for Loan & Lease Losses 215420 
LLA 719 Total Reserves 215372 
NPL 041B Delinquent Lonas: >= 60 Days 214003 
 NPL 
 
NPLt - NPLt-1  
NLCO 550 - 551 




LOANS 025B Total Loans & Leases 216900 
 LOANS 
 
LOANSt – LOANSt-1  
DLLP 
 
Error of model 1 
 
EBLLP 661A-300 
Net Income - Provision for Loan & Lease 
Losses 




EBLLP t – EBLLP t-1  
lnA 10 Natural logarithm of Total Assets 215382 
 lnA 
 
lnAt- lnAt-1  
ROAA  Return on Average Assets 205264 
NW 998 Net Worth Ratio 214532 
STAT 
 
NCUA Charter Type 205240 
 lnGSP 
 
Change in natural logarithm of Gross Domestic 





Change in the seasonally non-adjusted 
unemployment rate from prior year at the State, 
MSA or County level 
259656 
Pop_density  




% of population age 25 years and older with 
Bachelor degree or more at the State, MSA or 







Table 11 Loan categories 
Variables Symbol Acct Code Acct Name SNL Key 
UnsecLoans 
CC 396 




All other Unsecured loans/lines of credit 213697 
CarLoans 
NVL 385 New vehicle loans 213698 
UVL 370 Used Vehicle Loans 213699 
RealEstateLoans 
REL 703 
Total 1st Mortgage Real estate loans/ 
lines of credit 
215793 
ORE 386 Other RE Loans & Lines of Credit 213704 
OtherLoans 
PAL 397A 
Payday alternative loans (PAL loans) 
(Federal CU only) 
228101 
STD 698A 
Non-Federally Guaranteed Student Loans 231964 
LR 002 Leases Receivable 213731 








Table 12 Variable definition 
Symbol SNL Name SNL Key 
LLP Provision for Loan & Lease Losses 215420 
NPL Delinquent Lonas: >= 60 Days 214003 
NLCO 




LOANS Total Loans & Leases 216900 
EBLLP 
Net Income - Provision for Loan & Lease 
Losses 
 216878 - 
215420 
lnTA Natural logarithm of Total Assets 215382 
 lnTA lnAt- lnAt-1  
ROA ROAA 205264 
NW Net Worth Ratio 214532 
STAT Charter Type 205240 
Unemployment 
Change in the seasonally non-adjusted 
unemployment rate from prior year at the State, 





Table 13 Descriptive statistics for credit unions 
 
N Mean Std. dev. Min. 25th percentile Median 75th percentile Max. 
Z-score 13,141 -4.0151 0.5708 -5.7169 -4.3845 -4.0359 -3.6910 1.1892 
NCO 13,118 0.0015 0.0020 -0.0196 0.0004 0.0010 0.0018 0.0406 
NPL 13,152 0.0104 0.0102 0.0000 0.0041 0.0076 0.0131 0.1240 
HHI  13,152 0.2727 0.1891 0.0552 0.1410 0.2211 0.3517 0.9978 
LI 13,151 0.1483 0.1049 -0.1913 0.0855 0.1521 0.2168 0.3878 
STAT 13,152 0.5426 0.4982 0 0 1 1 1 
lnTA 13,152 19.1113 1.1433 15.9946 18.2711 19.0036 19.8820 24.3428 
ΔlnTA 13,152 0.0124 0.0352 -0.3121 -0.0046 0.0091 0.0253 0.9779 
ROA 13,152 0.1420 0.1576 -0.3740 0.0594 0.1399 0.2227 2.6316 
EA 13,152 0.1068 0.0299 0.0553 0.0861 0.0997 0.1198 0.2113 
KA 13,152 10.8902 3.1344 -1.8600 8.8200 10.1350 12.1900 34.8700 
EBLLP 13,152 0.0038 0.0026 -0.0033 0.0022 0.0035 0.0053 0.0123 
Deposits 13,152 1.6216 0.6039 0.7393 1.2329 1.4505 1.7770 4.2827 
LoanGrowth 13,152 1.3222 3.0792 -5.5146 -0.6274 1.1044 2.9565 12.5754 
LoanRatio 13,152 0.5975 0.1586 0.1009 0.4972 0.6122 0.7164 0.9754 
RealEstate 13,152 0.4843 0.2128 0.0000 0.3279 0.4860 0.6376 0.9944 
Consumer 13,152 0.4532 0.2005 0.0027 0.3082 0.4449 0.5898 1.0000 





Table 14 Descriptive statistics for commercial banks 
 
N Mean Std. dev. Min. 25
th
 percentile Median 75th percentile Max.  
Z-score 13,087 -3.9848 0.8845 -6.1791 -4.6132 -4.0227 -3.3935 2.6403  
NCO 13,124 0.0010 0.0034 -0.0273 0.0000 0.0000 0.0008 0.1131  
NPL 13,124 0.0198 0.0288 0.0000 0.0026 0.0099 0.0249 0.3174  
HHI  13,124 0.2730 0.1892 0.0552 0.1410 0.2214 0.3519 0.9978  
LI 13,080 0.1745 0.2150 -0.8349 0.0833 0.1958 0.3028 0.6349  
STAT 13,124 0.8293 0.3762 0 1 1 1 1  
lnTA 13,124 19.0394 1.1062 15.9573 18.2725 18.9850 19.7201 24.2671  
ΔlnTA 13,123 0.0135 0.0593 -1.0176 -0.0125 0.0083 0.0326 1.1610  
ROA 13,089 0.2153 0.4227 -1.3854 0.0876 0.2131 0.3586 5.5932  
EA 13,092 0.1142 0.0374 0.0495 0.0909 0.1052 0.1269 0.2822  
KA 13,124 14.9156 3.1584 0.9500 12.3500 15.0000 18.2278 20.0000  
EBLLP 13,088 0.0044 0.0056 -0.0136 0.0021 0.0040 0.0062 0.0367  
Deposits 13,076 1.4546 0.6776 0.0040 1.1075 1.2591 1.5298 5.3511  
LoanGrowth 13,123 1.5168 5.2923 -11.1746 -1.3767 0.9875 3.6822 24.2907  
LoanRatio 13,124 0.6470 0.1646 0.0012 0.5598 0.6772 0.7676 1.0554  
RealEstate 13,124 0.7626 0.1934 0.0000 0.6901 0.7991 0.8940 1.0210  
Consumer 13,077 0.0491 0.1139 0.0000 0.0044 0.0164 0.0447 1.0015  
Commercial 13,077 0.1888 0.1617 0.0000 0.0749 0.1592 0.2610 1.0000  
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Table 15 Correlation matrix (lower Pearson's correlation, upper Spearman's correlation) 
 
Z-score NCO NPL HHI  LI STAT lnTA ΔlnTA ROA EA 
Z-score 1 0.1625*** 0.1884*** 0.0292*** -0.2184*** 0.0436*** -0.0637*** -0.0324*** -0.1841*** -0.3345*** 
  
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 




(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 




(0.13) (0.00) (0.53) (0.54) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
HHI  0.0083 0.0102* 0.0151** 1   -0.014** -0.0099 -0.1632*** -0.003   -0.0105* 0.0001 
 
(0.18) (0.09) (0.01) 
 
(0.02) (0.11) (0.00) (0.62) (0.09) (0.99) 
LI -0.2649*** -0.0830*** -0.2553*** -0.0187*** 1 0.0729*** 0.2644*** 0.1199*** 0.8250*** 0.1845*** 
 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
STAT 0.0446*** -0.0224*** 0.0397***  -0.0129** 0.0659*** 1 0.0024 0.014** 0.1028*** 0.0096 
 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.04) (0.00) 
 
(0.69) (0.02) (0.00) (0.12) 
lnTA -0.0425*** 0.0271*** -0.0226*** -0.1266*** 0.2499*** 0.0038 1 0.0791*** 0.1968*** -0.0892*** 
 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.54) 
 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
ΔlnTA  -0.0124** -0.0714*** -0.1411*** -0.0171*** 0.1012*** 0.0189*** 0.0662*** 1 0.1390*** -0.0239*** 
 
(0.04) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
 
(0.00) (0.00) 
ROA -0.1590*** -0.2588*** -0.2379*** -0.0283*** 0.7020*** 0.0756*** 0.1370*** 0.0996*** 1 0.1963*** 
 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
 
(0.00) 
EA -0.3450*** -0.0814*** -0.0243*** 0.0001 0.1336*** -0.0048 -0.1183*** -0.0001 0.1809*** 1 
 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.99) (0.00) (0. 44) (0.00) (0.99) (0.00) 
 
KA -0.3193*** -0.1360*** 0.0298*** 0.0138** 0.0916*** 0.0707*** -0.1733*** -0.0001 0.1388*** 0.6746*** 
 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.03) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.99) (0.00) (0.00) 
EBLLP -0.1433*** 0.008 -0.1375*** -0.0099 0.7894*** 0.0425*** 0.1716*** 0.1266*** 0.7706*** 0.1756*** 
 
(0.00) (0.19) (0.00) (0.11) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Deposits -0.1171*** -0.0350*** -0.0878*** 0.0302*** -0.1624*** -0.1693*** -0.1613*** 0.0614*** -0.1125*** 0.0106* 
 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.08) 
LoanGrowth -0.0330*** -0.1996*** -0.2310*** -0.0161*** 0.1036*** 0.0223*** 0.0845*** 0.3536*** 0.1142*** 0.0356*** 
 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
LoanRatio 0.1649*** 0.0205*** 0.0451*** -0.0527*** 0.1974*** 0.1805*** 0.1683*** 0.0002 0.1169*** -0.0980*** 
 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.97) (0.00) (0.00) 
Unempl 0.0787*** 0.1920*** 0.2632*** -0.0377*** -0.0972*** -0.0518*** -0.0548*** -0.0449*** -0.1183*** -0.009 
 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.14) 
PercentRural -0.1955*** -0.0851*** -0.0749*** 0.0797*** 0.0514*** -0.0182*** -0.3668*** -0.0198*** 0.0262*** 0.0236*** 
 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
RealEstate -0.0434*** -0.0995*** 0.2104*** -0.1022*** -0.0291*** 0.1688*** 0.1639*** -0.0357*** -0.0691*** 0.0235*** 
 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Consumer 0.0166*** 0.1087*** -0.2163*** 0.0656*** -0.0750*** -0.2615*** -0.1420*** 0.0006 -0.0746*** -0.0631*** 
 
(0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.92) (0.00) (0.00) 
Commercial 0.0426*** -0.0263*** 0.0309*** 0.0570*** 0.1905*** 0.1880*** -0.0251*** 0.0607*** 0.2592*** 0.0777*** 
 




 KA EBLLP Deposits LoanGrowth LoanRatio Unempl PercentRural RealEstate Consumer Commercial 
Risk -0.3039*** -0.1756*** -0.1037*** -0.0506*** 0.1550*** 0.0523*** -0.2506*** -0.0599*** -0.0210*** 0.0825*** 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
NCO -0.3330*** 0.0515*** 0.0293*** -0.1753*** -0.0178*** 0.2218*** -0.0976*** -0.3416*** 0.4083*** -0.1931*** 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
NPL 0.0088 -0.0647*** -0.0661*** -0.2433*** 0.0118* 0.3104*** -0.0455*** 0.1454*** -0.1221*** 0.0196*** 
 (0.15) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.06) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
HHI  0.0221*** 0.0352*** 0.1027*** -0.0109* -0.0853*** -0.0231*** 0.1382*** -0.1559*** 0.1076*** 0.1352*** 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.08) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
LI 0.1531*** 0.8765*** -0.2309*** 0.1255*** 0.2386*** -0.1035*** 0.0442*** 0.0231*** -0.1244*** 0.1780*** 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
STAT 0.1022*** 0.0186*** -0.1988*** 0.0167*** 0.1794*** -0.0509*** 0.0217*** 0.1683*** -0.2597*** 0.1924*** 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
lnTA -0.1635*** 0.1895*** -0.1779*** 0.1191*** 0.1652*** -0.0621*** -0.3110*** 0.1390*** -0.1534*** -0.0688*** 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
ΔlnTA -0.0319*** 0.1100*** 0.0134** 0.2301*** 0.0385*** -0.0586*** 0.0038 -0.0520*** 0.0179*** 0.0411*** 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.03) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.54) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
ROA 0.1981*** 0.7976*** -0.2307*** 0.1601*** 0.2367*** -0.1348*** 0.0600*** 0.0611*** -0.1616*** 0.1941*** 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
EA 0.7043*** 0.1863*** -0.0288*** 0.0206*** -0.0736*** -0.0422*** -0.0156** 0.0712*** -0.1145*** 0.0258*** 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
KA 1 0.1531*** 0.0428*** -0.0271*** -0.1551*** -0.0228*** 0.0391*** 0.3787*** -0.4555*** 0.2047*** 
  (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
EBLLP 0.1392*** 1 -0.006 0.1047*** 0.0112* -0.0058 0.0390*** -0.1140*** 0.0224*** 0.1439*** 
 (0.00)  (0.34) (0.00) (0.07) (0.35) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Deposits 0.1312*** 0.0981*** 1 -0.0248*** -0.9388*** 0.0841*** 0.0628*** -0.2376*** 0.3201*** -0.1361*** 
 (0.00) (0.00)  (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
LoanGrowth 0.0039 0.1067*** 0.0166*** 1 0.1708*** -0.2093*** -0.0100 -0.0514*** 0.0067 0.0411*** 
 (0.53) (0.00) (0.01)  (0.00) (0.00) (0.11) (0.00) (0.28) (0.00) 
LoanRatio -0.1998*** -0.0619*** -0.8853*** 0.1248*** 1 -0.1119*** -0.0508*** 0.1674*** -0.2449*** 0.1332*** 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)  (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Unempl -0.0173*** -0.0311*** 0.0272*** -0.1647*** -0.0775*** 1 -0.0778*** 0.0696*** -0.0166*** -0.0751*** 
 (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)  (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) 
PercentRural 0.0841*** 0.0171*** 0.0443*** -0.0386*** -0.0687*** 0.0059 1 -0.1297*** 0.1548*** 0.1899*** 
 (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.34)  (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
RealEstate 0.3159*** -0.1616*** -0.1957*** -0.0411*** 0.1766*** 0.0675*** -0.1121*** 1 -0.8129*** -0.0944*** 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)  (0.00) (0.00) 
Consumer -0.3965*** 0.0114* 0.2093*** -0.0042 -0.2082*** -0.0146** 0.0527*** -0.8477*** 1 -0.3512*** 
 (0.00) (0.07) (0.00) (0.50) (0.00) (0.02) (0.00) (0.00)  (0.00) 
Commercial 0.1828*** 0.2632*** -0.0440*** 0.0779*** 0.0745*** -0.0880*** 0.0981*** -0.1865*** -0.3631*** 1 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
 101 
 








Z-score -4.015 -3.98 -0.0303 0.0010 
NCO 0.0015 0.00099 0.0004 0.0000 
NPL 0.0104 0.0198 -0.0094 0.0000 





Table 17 Regression of risk measures on Type 
 Z-score Z-score NCO NCO NPL NPL 
Type 0.59599*** 0.58203*** 0.00024*** 0.00026*** 0.00957*** 0.00991*** 
 (24.32) (23.77) (3.00) (3.25) (13.51) (14.01) 
STAT 0.06306*** 0.06578*** -0.00001 -0.00002 -0.00099*** -0.00108*** 
 (7.43) (7.83) (-0.49) (-0.52) (-5.47) (-5.95) 
Type*Stat -0.22077*** -0.21432*** -0.00005 -0.00005 -0.00074 -0.00088 
 (-10.61) (-10.34) (-0.69) (-0.80) (-1.16) (-1.38) 
lnTA -0.11441*** -0.12241*** -0.00002 -0.00001 -0.00091*** -0.00073*** 
 (-25.91) (-27.62) (-1.36) (-0.65) (-7.90) (-6.24) 
ΔlnTA 0.15848 0.23757* -0.00036 -0.00005 -0.02645*** -0.02597*** 
 (1.27) (1.83) (-0.41) (-0.05) (-5.16) (-4.87) 
ROA -0.29516*** -0.33250*** -0.00586*** -0.00576*** -0.02423*** -0.02388*** 
 (-7.28) (-7.84) (-15.70) (-15.36) (-14.53) (-14.11) 
KA -0.08569*** -0.08709*** -0.00005*** -0.00005*** -0.00052*** -0.00049*** 
 (-47.02) (-48.23) (-7.44) (-7.41) (-8.69) (-8.13) 
EBLLP 3.20945 5.92309*** 0.35397*** 0.34675*** 0.92320*** 0.88300*** 
 (1.47) (2.64) (18.88) (18.25) (10.19) (9.58) 
Deposits 0.00823 -0.00879 -0.00060*** -0.00057*** -0.00526*** -0.00483*** 
 (0.53) (-0.56) (-6.27) (-6.02) (-11.52) (-10.56) 
LoanGrowth -0.00557*** -0.00724*** -0.00011*** -0.00011*** -0.00077*** -0.00077*** 
 (-4.30) (-5.36) (-15.79) (-15.06) (-18.43) (-17.50) 
LoanRatio 0.43085*** 0.37479*** 0.00063* 0.00067** -0.00950*** -0.00697*** 
 (6.89) (5.93) (1.91) (2.02) (-4.83) (-3.55) 
Unemployment (%) 0.01762*** 0.04042*** 0.00013*** 0.00011*** 0.00174*** 0.00127*** 
 (9.69) (16.84) (16.83) (11.76) (32.10) (18.49) 
Percent Rural -0.01060*** -0.01082*** -0.00001*** -0.00001*** -0.00011*** -0.00010*** 
 (-40.07) (-41.21) (-15.43) (-15.23) (-15.03) (-14.40) 
RealEstate -0.39402*** -0.43492*** -0.00127*** -0.00124*** 0.00003 0.00067 
 (-9.23) (-10.10) (-6.13) (-6.01) (0.03) (0.58) 
Consumer -0.11412** -0.17660*** -0.00003 0.00004 -0.00940*** -0.00802*** 
 (-2.47) (-3.77) (-0.11) (0.19) (-7.47) (-6.37) 
Constant -0.90410*** -0.97360*** 0.00264*** 0.00220*** 0.04407*** 0.03999*** 
 (-7.55) (-7.99) (4.31) (3.63) (12.35) (11.05) 
Quarter Control No Yes No Yes No Yes 
Observations 26183 26183 26162 26162 26196 26196 
R
2 0.241 0.248 0.265 0.271 0.233 0.240 
Adjusted R




Table 18 Regression of risk measures on HHI as a measure of competition 
 Z-score Z-score NCO NCO NPL NPL 
Type 0.57313*** 0.56252*** 0.00020** 0.00022** 0.00826*** 0.00854*** 
 (21.57) (21.18) (2.16) (2.35) (10.10) (10.47) 
HHI  -0.18454*** -0.16727*** -0.00017** -0.00019** -0.00022 -0.00073 
 (-7.29) (-6.63) (-2.08) (-2.33) (-0.39) (-1.25) 
Type*HHI  0.04575 0.03934 0.00015 0.00016 0.00510*** 0.00525*** 
 (1.15) (0.99) (0.98) (1.04) (3.39) (3.50) 
STAT 0.06936*** 0.07147*** -0.00001 -0.00001 -0.00098*** -0.00106*** 
 (8.22) (8.54) (-0.44) (-0.47) (-5.42) (-5.85) 
Type*Stat -0.22284*** -0.21675*** -0.00005 -0.00005 -0.00084 -0.00098 
 (-10.74) (-10.48) (-0.69) (-0.81) (-1.33) (-1.55) 
lnTA -0.11424*** -0.12173*** -0.00002 -0.00001 -0.00087*** -0.00069*** 
 (-25.84) (-27.42) (-1.36) (-0.64) (-7.57) (-5.91) 
ΔlnTA 0.16199 0.23787* -0.00035 -0.00004 -0.02621*** -0.02574*** 
 (1.30) (1.83) (-0.40) (-0.05) (-5.11) (-4.83) 
ROA -0.29536*** -0.33124*** -0.00586*** -0.00575*** -0.02411*** -0.02375*** 
 (-7.29) (-7.82) (-15.72) (-15.37) (-14.44) (-14.02) 
KA -0.08623*** -0.08751*** -0.00005*** -0.00005*** -0.00051*** -0.00048*** 
 (-48.09) (-49.13) (-7.37) (-7.34) (-8.48) (-7.94) 
EBLLP 2.95988 5.57552** 0.35384*** 0.34653*** 0.91804*** 0.87700*** 
 (1.36) (2.49) (18.88) (18.25) (10.12) (9.50) 
Deposits 0.01111 -0.00492 -0.00060*** -0.00057*** -0.00519*** -0.00475*** 
 (0.72) (-0.31) (-6.27) (-6.01) (-11.37) (-10.40) 
LoanGrowth -0.00569*** -0.00730*** -0.00011*** -0.00011*** -0.00077*** -0.00077*** 
 (-4.41) (-5.41) (-15.80) (-15.07) (-18.40) (-17.47) 
LoanRatio 0.44204*** 0.39080*** 0.00063* 0.00068** -0.00913*** -0.00659*** 
 (7.08) (6.20) (1.91) (2.04) (-4.64) (-3.36) 
Unemployment (%) 0.01616*** 0.03764*** 0.00013*** 0.00011*** 0.00175*** 0.00127*** 
 (8.89) (15.66) (16.78) (11.57) (32.01) (18.40) 
Percent Rural -0.01651*** -0.01627*** -0.00002*** -0.00002*** -0.00011*** -0.00012*** 
 (-32.42) (-32.03) (-10.94) (-11.12) (-7.69) (-8.17) 
HHI *Rural 0.01917*** 0.01777*** 0.00001** 0.00001** 0.00000 0.00004 
 (14.16) (13.20) (2.04) (2.38) (0.03) (0.95) 
RealEstate -0.39071*** -0.42929*** -0.00127*** -0.00123*** 0.00031 0.00095 
 (-9.19) (-10.01) (-6.11) (-5.99) (0.26) (0.81) 
Consumer -0.14328*** -0.19981*** -0.00003 0.00004 -0.00908*** -0.00774*** 
 (-3.12) (-4.29) (-0.13) (0.16) (-7.11) (-6.07) 
Constant -0.84032*** -0.91668*** 0.00270*** 0.00227*** 0.04251*** 0.03867*** 
 (-6.96) (-7.46) (4.36) (3.70) (11.81) (10.58) 
Quarter Control No Yes No Yes No Yes 
Observations 26183 26183 26162 26162 26196 26196 
R
2 0.246 0.252 0.265 0.271 0.234 0.241 
Adjusted R
2 0.245 0.250 0.265 0.270 0.234 0.239 
t statistics in parentheses 
*
 p < 0.10, 
**
 p < 0.05, 
***




Table 19 Regression of risk measures on LI as a measure of competition 
 Z-score Z-score NCO NCO NPL NPL 
Type 0.59273*** 0.57116*** 0.00036*** 0.00037*** 0.01156*** 0.01169*** 
 (22.81) (22.06) (3.60) (3.63) (14.73) (14.90) 
LI -1.54297*** -1.61213*** -0.00124*** -0.00125*** -0.03460*** -0.03519*** 
 (-17.30) (-17.55) (-2.99) (-3.03) (-13.85) (-13.71) 
Type*LI -0.60408*** -0.59278*** -0.00154*** -0.00146*** -0.03138*** -0.03042*** 
 (-9.92) (-9.68) (-5.10) (-4.84) (-15.02) (-14.54) 
STAT 0.04071*** 0.04332*** -0.00004 -0.00004 -0.00164*** -0.00171*** 
 (4.81) (5.18) (-1.46) (-1.45) (-9.12) (-9.49) 
Type*Stat -0.16510*** -0.15607*** 0.00003 0.00002 0.00101 0.00088 
 (-8.41) (-8.00) (0.44) (0.33) (1.59) (1.40) 
lnTA -0.08821*** -0.09680*** 0.00000 0.00001 -0.00027** -0.00013 
 (-20.70) (-22.65) (0.30) (0.81) (-2.33) (-1.07) 
ΔlnTA 0.20975* 0.28795** -0.00027 0.00003 -0.02435*** -0.02404*** 
 (1.84) (2.44) (-0.31) (0.03) (-5.38) (-5.10) 
ROA -0.13708*** -0.17932*** -0.00560*** -0.00551*** -0.01887*** -0.01878*** 
 (-4.46) (-5.66) (-15.13) (-14.85) (-13.60) (-13.33) 
KA -0.08279*** -0.08421*** -0.00005*** -0.00005*** -0.00051*** -0.00048*** 
 (-45.76) (-46.98) (-7.37) (-7.33) (-8.82) (-8.27) 
EBLLP 56.01453*** 61.21656*** 0.41265*** 0.40506*** 2.32885*** 2.30324*** 
 (20.04) (21.07) (20.31) (19.47) (22.08) (21.37) 
Deposits -0.01748 -0.03864** -0.00066*** -0.00064*** -0.00605*** -0.00569*** 
 (-1.17) (-2.55) (-6.92) (-6.69) (-12.04) (-11.30) 
LoanGrowth -0.00681*** -0.00884*** -0.00011*** -0.00011*** -0.00080*** -0.00080*** 
 (-5.84) (-7.33) (-16.00) (-15.24) (-19.94) (-19.06) 
LoanRatio 0.76989*** 0.71484*** 0.00086** 0.00088*** -0.00153 0.00068 
 (12.53) (11.55) (2.57) (2.64) (-0.77) (0.34) 
Unemployment (%) 0.01034*** 0.03683*** 0.00012*** 0.00011*** 0.00152*** 0.00115*** 
 (5.84) (15.81) (16.31) (11.50) (29.71) (17.43) 
Percent Rural -0.00915*** -0.00922*** -0.00001*** -0.00001*** -0.00014*** -0.00014*** 
 (-25.39) (-25.73) (-8.43) (-8.43) (-11.71) (-11.41) 
LI*Rural 0.00305* 0.00232 0.00001 0.00001 0.00052*** 0.00052*** 
 (1.89) (1.44) (0.83) (0.88) (8.48) (8.50) 
RealEstate -0.28035*** -0.32316*** -0.00120*** -0.00117*** 0.00269** 0.00318*** 
 (-7.05) (-8.05) (-6.21) (-6.12) (2.47) (2.93) 
Consumer -0.11621*** -0.18974*** -0.00008 -0.00003 -0.00999*** -0.00888*** 
 (-2.76) (-4.45) (-0.37) (-0.12) (-8.43) (-7.48) 
Constant -1.60934*** -1.69589*** 0.00207*** 0.00165*** 0.02737*** 0.02362*** 
 (-13.83) (-14.37) (3.41) (2.78) (7.74) (6.59) 
Quarter Control No Yes No Yes No Yes 
Observations 26174 26174 26153 26153 26187 26187 
R
2 0.304 0.314 0.272 0.277 0.299 0.304 
Adjusted R
2 0.304 0.312 0.271 0.276 0.299 0.303 
t statistics in parentheses 
*
 p < 0.10, 
**
 p < 0.05, 
***




Table 20 Regression of risk measures on square of HHI  














 (16.80) (16.52) (2.55) (2.70) (12.85) (13.13) 


































































 -0.00004 -0.00005 -0.00086 -0.00100 










 (-25.89) (-27.48) (-1.39) (-0.66) (-7.79) (-6.13) 
ΔlnTA 0.16500 0.24082* -0.00035 -0.00004 -0.02628*** -0.02580*** 








































 (1.29) (2.42) (18.89) (18.25) (10.14) (9.52) 








































































 0.00000 0.00004 









 0.00011 0.00075 
























 (-7.40) (-7.89) (4.16) (3.49) (11.52) (10.30) 
Quarter Control No Yes No Yes No Yes 
Observations 26183 26183 26162 26162 26196 26196 
R
2
 0.247 0.253 0.266 0.271 0.236 0.243 
Adjusted R
2
 0.246 0.252 0.265 0.270 0.236 0.241 
t statistics in parentheses 
*
 p < 0.10, 
**
 p < 0.05, 
***




Table 21 Regression of risk measures on square of LI 























































































 0.00000 -0.00000 0.00082 0.00071 










 (-21.84) (-23.86) (-0.63) (-0.05) (-3.40) (-2.11) 
ΔlnTA 0.21708* 0.29032** -0.00025 0.00004 -0.02417*** -0.02398*** 














































































































 (-23.86) (-24.33) (-7.17) (-7.21) (-10.78) (-10.47) 











































 (-11.91) (-12.38) (4.25) (3.60) (8.73) (7.58) 
Quarter Control No Yes No Yes No Yes 
Observations 26174 26174 26153 26153 26187 26187 
R
2
 0.309 0.319 0.275 0.280 0.302 0.306 
Adjusted R
2
 0.308 0.318 0.274 0.278 0.301 0.305 
t statistics in parentheses 
*
 p < 0.10, 
**
 p < 0.05, 
***





Table 22 Regression of risk measures on both measures of competition 




















































 (-5.91) (-5.04) (-1.56) (-1.76) (1.66) (0.97) 




















 0.00003 0.00002 0.00088 0.00076 





 0.00000 0.00001 -0.00022
*
 -0.00007 
 (-20.63) (-22.44) (0.30) (0.82) (-1.87) (-0.63) 
ΔlnTA 0.21327* 0.28862** -0.00027 0.00003 -0.02412*** -0.02381*** 













































































 -0.00105 0.00116 




























 (-25.80) (-25.05) (-7.76) (-7.97) (-7.76) (-8.08) 
LI*Rural 0.00274
*














 -0.00004 -0.00001 






































 (-13.41) (-14.01) (3.44) (2.83) (7.06) (5.97) 
Quarter Control No Yes No Yes No Yes 
Observations 26174 26174 26153 26153 26187 26187 
R
2
 0.309 0.317 0.272 0.277 0.300 0.305 
Adjusted R
2
 0.308 0.316 0.271 0.276 0.300 0.304 
t statistics in parentheses 
*
 p < 0.10, 
**
 p < 0.05, 
***





Table 23 Reasons for merger 
Reason for merger Frequency Percentage 
Conversion to or merger with FCU 15 0.97% 
Conversion to or merger with FISCU 26 1.67% 
Conversion to or merger with NFICU 5 0.32% 
Expanded services 1,009 64.93% 
Inability to obtain officials 51 3.28% 
Lack of growth 67 4.31% 
Lack of sponsor support 57 3.67% 
Loss/declining field of membership 49 3.15% 
Poor Financial Condition 240 15.44% 
Poor management 35 2.25% 






Table 24 Belco vs Cornertsone 
Year 2014 Y 2015 Y 2016 Y 
Credit union Belco Cornerstone Belco Cornerstone Belco Cornerstone 
       
Total Assets ($ million) 419,170 98,927 438,560 104,872 453,824 105,406 
Total Loans & Leases ($ million) 296,627 66,581 317,897 62,881 338,784 61,313 
Total Shares and Deposits ($ million)  353,359 88,554 374,486 94,528 397,254 94,816 
Asset Growth Rate (%) 7.58 2.35 4.63 6.01 3.48 0.51 
Loan Growth (%) 12.34 4.81 7.17 (5.56) 6.57 (2.49) 
Share and Deposit Growth (%) 4.48 2.21 5.98 6.75 6.08 0.30 
Net Worth/ Assets (%) 9.03 10.22 9.40 10.07 9.81 10.24 
Net Worth Growth (%) 7.08 3.59 8.93 4.43 8.00 2.27 
Total Delinquent Loans/ Total Loans (%) 1.06 2.16 1.14 1.78 1.56 0.66 
Net Charge Offs/ Average Loans (%) 0.69 0.08 0.67 0.14 0.60 0.23 
ROAA (%) 0.62 0.35 0.39 0.44 0.73 0.23 
Net Margin/ Average Assets (%) 5.09 3.57 5.08 3.62 5.15 3.53 
Operating Expense/ Average Assets (%) 4.32 3.06 4.20 3.14 4.24 3.23 
Provision for Loan Losses/ Average Assets 
(%) 
0.53 0.17 0.59 0.04 0.45 0.08 
Net Interest Margin (%) 4.28 3.17 4.21 3.06 4.16 3.08 
Operating Expense/ Gross Income (%) 77.62 77.43 76.08 79.39 76.51 84.55 
Operating Expense/ Operating Revenue 
(%) 
78.95 85.54 81.12 86.77 78.25 91.16 
Net Interest Income Before Provisions/ 
Avg Assets (%) 
3.58 2.77 3.57 2.77 3.53 2.69 
Noninterest Income/ Average Assets (%) 1.89 0.80 1.61 0.85 1.88 0.85 
Noninterest Expense/ Average Assets (%) 4.32 3.06 4.20 3.14 4.24 3.23 
Net Long Term Assets/ Assets (%) 33.29 40.86 33.82 39.98 33.00 43.76 
Gross Loans/ Assets (%) 70.77 67.30 72.49 59.96 74.65 58.17 
Liquid Assets/ Assets (%) 4.73 11.12 4.42 17.93 4.14 14.26 
Members/ Potential Members (%) 3.41 4.23 3.50 4.29 3.55 4.40 
Members/ Full-Time Employees (x) 377.93 340.94 397.92 330.06 388.33 343.63 
Loans/ Deposits (%) 83.94 75.19 84.89 66.52 85.28 64.67 
Credit Card and Unsecured Loans/ Loans 
(%) 
16.30 8.69 16.86 8.84 16.41 8.95 
Vehicle Loans/ Loans (%) 28.19 20.31 29.62 20.26 30.15 19.85 





Table 25 California vs North Island 
Year 2014 Y 2015 Y 2016 Y 
Credit Union California North Island California North Island California North Island 
       
Total Assets ($ million) 1,334,157 1,143,960 1,463,533 1,182,284 1,596,149 1,258,849 
Total Loans & Leases ($ million) 876,492 743,590 1,063,569 837,524 1,205,470 903,489 
Total Shares and Deposits ($ million) 1,028,679 1,007,337 1,167,305 1,034,445 1,291,380 1,093,805 
Asset Growth Rate (%) 13.64 3.94 9.70 3.35 9.06 6.48 
Loan Growth (%) 26.58 8.31 21.34 12.63 13.34 7.88 
Share and Deposit Growth (%) 5.12 2.42 13.48 2.69 10.63 5.74 
Net Worth/ Assets (%) 10.86 10.69 10.52 11.24 10.04 11.30 
Net Worth Growth (%) 17.58 17.07 6.25 8.71 4.06 7.03 
Total Delinquent Loans/ Total Loans (%) 1.16 1.55 0.79 0.57 0.72 0.42 
Net Charge Offs/ Average Assets (%) 0.35 0.16 0.27 0.21 0.17 0.16 
ROAA (%) 1.73 1.57 0.63 0.91 0.40 0.76 
Net Margin/ Average Assets (%) 4.72 4.47 4.41 4.54 4.41 4.72 
Operating Expense/ Average Assets (%) 3.88 3.50 3.99 3.64 4.25 3.78 
Provision for loan Losses/ Average Assets (%) 0.05 (0.56) 0.04 (0.05) 0.03 0.01 
Net Interest Margin (%) 3.54 3.36 3.29 3.41 3.36 3.46 
Operating Expense/ Gross Income (%) 78.23 76.12 84.24 78.37 89.33 78.28 
Operating Expense/ Operating Revenue (%) 68.6 77.51 85.64 80.95 90.81 83.17 
Net Interest Income Before Provisions/ Average 
Assets (%) 
3.12 2.67 2.96 2.73 2.99 2.89 
Noninterest Income/ Average Assets (%) 2.53 1.84 1.70 1.77 1.69 1.66 
Noninterest Expense/ Average Assets (%) 3.88 3.50 3.99 3.64 4.25 3.78 
Net long Term Assets/ Assets (%) 48.47 34.43 46.03 39.76 44.13 40.32 
Gross Loans/ Assets (%) 65.7 65.00 72.67 70.84 75.52 71.77 
Liquid Assets/ Assets (%) 10.7 13.78 9.69 10.55 7.90 11.46 
Members/ Potential Members (%) 56.89 0.95 59.13 0.94 61.56 0.92 
Members/ Full-Time Employees (x) 323.88 293.77 309.06 292.73 325.14 305.56 
Loans/ Deposits (%) 85.21 73.82 91.11 80.96 93.35 82.60 
Credit Card and Unsecured Loans/ Loans (%) 6.28 3.26 6.37 4.08 6.79 4.64 
Vehicles Loans/ Loans (%) 10.67 17.67 11.60 20.75 12.93 22.29 





Table 26 Pentagon vs Belvoir 
Year 2013 Y 2014 Y 2015 Y 
 Pentagon Belvoir Pentagon Belvoir Pentagon Belvoir 
Total Assets ($ million) 16,840,840 310,522 17,796,419 318,505 19,460,442 324,033 
Total Loans & Leases ($ million) 14,932,876 213,160 16,272,444 231,201 17,430,495 243,151 
Total Shares and Deposits ($ million) 13,428,370 283,369 13,945,219 289,858 15,321,403 294,455 
Asset Growth Rate (%) 8.42 3.86 5.67 2.57 9.35 1.74 
Loan Growth (%) 8.84 7.09 8.97 8.46 7.12 5.17 
Share and Deposit Growth (%) 9.74 5.08 3.85 2.29 9.87 1.59 
Net Worth/ Assets (%) 9.94 7.97 10.21 8.16 10.18 8.34 
Net Worth Growth (%) 7.47 6.10 8.54 5.00 9.07 3.93 
Total Delinquent Loans/ Total Loans (%) 0.29 0.87 0.27 0.82 0.29 0.92 
Net Charge Offs/ Average Assets (%) 0.35 0.46 0.29 0.37 0.31 0.37 
ROAA (%) 0.72 0.46 0.77 0.39 0.86 0.32 
Net Margin/ Average Assets (%) 2.33 4.35 2.25 4.46 2.58 4.50 
Operating Expense/ Average Assets (%) 1.32 3.64 1.26 3.80 1.43 3.94 
Provision for loan Losses/ Average Assets (%) 0.30 0.25 0.22 0.29 0.29 0.26 
Net Interest Margin (%) 1.59 3.29 1.76 3.40 1.96 3.56 
Operating Expense/ Gross Income (%) 31.75 73.34 33.33 76.18 36.03 79.41 
Operating Expense/ Operating Revenue (%) 56.31 83.75 56.07 84.78 55.54 87.21 
Net Interest Income Before Provisions/ Average Assets 
(%) 
1.51 2.83 1.68 2.97 1.87 3.09 
Noninterest Income/ Average Assets (%) 0.82 1.52 0.58 1.51 0.71 1.42 
Noninterest Expense/ Average Assets (%) 1.32 3.64 1.26 3.80 1.43 3.94 
Net long Term Assets/ Assets (%) 17.75 36.34 19.03 30.16 21.73 23.19 
Gross Loans/ Assets (%) 88.67 68.65 91.44 72.59 89.57 75.04 
Liquid Assets/ Assets (%) 4.09 9.27 1.81 6.43 2.45 9.10 
Members/ Potential Members (%) 17.53 43.22 18.01 43.64 18.96 45.24 
Members/ Full-Time Employees  945.42 343.48 914.57 342.26 825.58 337.16 
Loans/ Deposits (%) 111.20 75.22 116.69 79.76 113.77 82.58 
Credit Card and Unsecured Loans/ Loans (%) 12.06 17.32 11.37 17.33 10.72 17.12 
Vehicles Loans/ Loans (%) 17.77 37.69 12.92 37.71 13.67 35.70 






Table 27 Initial sample 
Classification # of Credit unions # of Observations # of Observations 
after cleaning 
Target 299 11,960 8,239 
Acquiring 241 9,640 9,621 






Table 28 Descriptive statistics 
Panel A – Acquired credit unions 
 
N mean sd min p25 p50 p75 max 
TotalAssets 8239 52781.25 66337.72 10444 17500 29183 59953 717486 
TotalLoans 8239 45203.8 57820.74 8490 14570 24687 50578 656128 
TotalShares 7342 2232.671 9259.397 0 3 262 1206 128597 
AssetGrowthRate (%) 8236 2.54 12.92 -29.62 -5.53 1.41 9.60 44.95 
EquityGrowth 8239 -2.02 15.21 -74.19 -4.98 0.48 4.54 34.75 
LoanGrowth 8236 -1.92 15.00 -34.78 -11.46 -3.38 5.81 54.80 
MemberGrowth 8237 -2.26 8.49 -38.43 -4.87 -1.68 0.89 33.01 
ShareGrowth 8239 3.29 14.30 -30.95 -5.74 1.93 11.17 48.77 
NetWorthRatio (%) 8239 11.79 4.47 5.31 8.60 10.62 13.96 27.53 
DelinquentLoansNWRatio 8238 7.07 8.83 0.00 1.54 4.02 8.86 50.12 
ClassifiedAssetsNWRatio 8238 5.92 6.64 0.26 1.90 3.62 7.30 38.37 
DelinquentLoansRatio  8239 0.83 0.89 0.00 0.21 0.53 1.13 4.74 
DelinquentAssetsRatio 8239 0.70 0.75 0.00 0.18 0.45 0.96 4.03 
NCOLoansRatio 8239 0.11 0.16 -0.07 0.01 0.05 0.14 0.86 
ROAA 8239 -0.20 1.44 -7.30 -0.48 0.06 0.46 2.94 
GrossIncomeAverageAssets 8239 4.94 1.55 1.93 3.75 4.85 5.98 9.08 
YieldonLoans 8239 6.26 1.13 3.89 5.50 6.23 6.92 9.53 
CostofFundsAverageAssets 8235 0.77 0.67 0.02 0.25 0.53 1.13 2.87 
NetMarginAverageAssets 8239 4.17 1.32 1.29 3.26 4.11 4.99 8.01 
OperatingExpenseAverageAsset 8239 3.91 1.28 1.10 3.12 3.82 4.58 8.44 
ProvisionforLoanLossesAvera  8239 0.38 0.72 -0.77 0.00 0.14 0.45 4.14 
NetInterestMargin  8239 3.72 1.05 1.37 2.99 3.66 4.37 6.75 
OperatingExpenseGrossIncome  8239 82.02 23.32 31.79 67.33 80.50 93.09 185.42 
NetOperatingExpenseAverageA  8239 3.18 1.00 1.02 2.56 3.08 3.66 7.26 
LoansAssets 8239 85.04 7.14 61.71 81.04 86.26 90.10 97.30 
SharestoEarningsAssets 7342 3.13 8.87 0.00 0.02 1.03 2.82 80.77 
BorrowingstoSharesandNetWorth 8239 0.36 1.60 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 11.10 
MemberstoPotential 8233 0.28 0.26 0.00 0.04 0.21 0.45 0.93 
MemberstoEmployees 8218 475.97 172.82 225.79 354.38 438.42 555.25 1128.00 





Panel B – Acquiring credit unions 
 
N mean sd min p25 p50 p75 max 
TotalAssets 9621 746247.9 2146114 20152 121588 321790 710016 37,300,000 
TotalLoans 9621 642198 1689119 17517 106568 279859 620582  26,800,000 
TotalShares 8881 58923.94 232618.9 0 2707 12371 44483 4,621,021 
AssetGrowthRate (%) 9619 7.61 15.29 -17.99 -0.71 4.91 12.40 94.99 
EquityGrowth 9621 6.87 14.78 -35.87 1.61 6.01 10.83 89.54 
LoanGrowth 9618 7.40 14.63 -20.78 -1.06 5.81 13.46 81.14 
MemberGrowth 9621 4.45 16.71 -29.04 -0.86 2.38 5.82 115.48 
ShareGrowth 9621 7.70 16.23 -19.08 -1.42 4.57 13.18 97.49 
NetWorthRatio (%) 9621 10.72 2.46 7.02 9.02 10.29 11.90 21.32 
DelinquentLoansNWRatio 9621 7.25 6.96 0.37 2.90 5.24 9.04 41.60 
ClassifiedAssetsNWRatio 9621 6.92 5.07 0.87 3.51 5.72 8.55 29.10 
DelinquentLoansRatio  9621 0.82 0.71 0.05 0.37 0.63 1.04 4.24 
DelinquentAssetsRatio 9621 0.71 0.60 0.05 0.32 0.55 0.90 3.54 
NCOLoansRatio 9621 0.12 0.11 -0.01 0.05 0.09 0.16 0.57 
ROAA 9621 0.55 0.87 -3.23 0.24 0.59 0.96 3.05 
GrossIncomeAverageAssets 9621 5.67 1.36 2.82 4.72 5.55 6.55 9.40 
YieldonLoans 9621 5.65 1.06 3.43 4.85 5.62 6.39 8.30 
CostofFundsAverageAssets 9620 0.85 0.66 0.08 0.38 0.60 1.14 2.85 
NetMarginAverageAssets 9621 4.83 1.20 2.22 4.03 4.74 5.52 8.27 
OperatingExpenseAverageAsset 9621 3.83 1.04 1.58 3.13 3.76 4.43 7.23 
ProvisionforLoanLossesAvera  9621 0.46 0.48 -0.30 0.15 0.34 0.62 2.63 
NetInterestMargin  9621 3.78 0.83 2.02 3.23 3.71 4.27 6.31 
OperatingExpenseGrossIncome  9621 68.27 13.02 35.67 59.59 68.81 77.03 101.31 
NetOperatingExpenseAverageA  9621 2.87 0.79 1.06 2.35 2.82 3.35 5.43 
LoansAssets 9621 87.15 5.38 68.83 84.16 87.81 90.99 96.73 
SharestoEarningsAssets 8881 5.95 5.43 0.00 2.16 4.28 8.13 26.27 
BorrowingstoSharesandNetWorth 9621 2.10 4.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 2.52 19.31 
MemberstoPotential 9619 0.18 0.21 0.00 0.03 0.09 0.25 0.94 
MemberstoEmployees 9619 397.39 110.71 208.80 319.53 377.01 450.50 840.08 




Panel C – Non-merging credit unions 
 
N mean Sd min p25 p50 p75 max 
TotalAssets 11200 59338.47 93300.39 11244 18569 31206 62489  1,481,000 
TotalLoans 11200 51265.46 79672.85 9323 16053.5 26813.5 53955.5 1,312,306 
TotalShares 10346 5440.415 31666.6 0 21 324 1604 522979 
AssetGrowthRate (%) 11198 4.22 11.73 -22.81 -3.40 3.06 10.81 41.75 
EquityGrowth 11200 2.71 9.90 -37.04 -0.42 2.98 7.14 33.28 
LoanGrowth 11180 2.66 14.15 -28.26 -6.53 1.29 10.03 53.69 
MemberGrowth 11200 -0.16 7.43 -34.61 -2.58 0.21 2.92 26.62 
ShareGrowth 11200 4.50 13.27 -25.74 -4.22 3.02 11.90 46.60 
NetWorthRatio (%) 11200 12.12 4.13 6.28 9.18 11.23 14.02 26.60 
DelinquentLoansNWRatio 11200 6.18 7.23 0.00 1.52 3.76 8.08 38.95 
ClassifiedAssetsNWRatio 11200 5.14 5.18 0.29 1.86 3.50 6.34 29.89 
DelinquentLoansRatio  11200 0.78 0.88 0.00 0.21 0.50 1.03 5.00 
DelinquentAssetsRatio 11200 0.67 0.75 0.00 0.18 0.43 0.88 4.39 
NCOLoansRatio 11200 0.09 0.13 -0.08 0.00 0.04 0.12 0.71 
ROAA 11200 0.32 0.95 -3.47 0.02 0.35 0.75 3.17 
GrossIncomeAverageAssets 11200 4.94 1.54 1.99 3.83 4.77 5.93 9.30 
YieldonLoans 11200 6.11 1.25 3.53 5.20 6.07 6.93 9.53 
CostofFundsAverageAssets 11183 0.70 0.64 0.03 0.24 0.45 0.97 2.84 
NetMarginAverageAssets 11200 4.24 1.34 1.43 3.33 4.13 5.06 8.12 
OperatingExpenseAverageAsset 11200 3.60 1.22 0.84 2.83 3.52 4.32 7.37 
ProvisionforLoanLossesAvera  11200 0.30 0.53 -0.64 0.00 0.14 0.40 3.00 
NetInterestMargin  11200 3.73 1.06 1.52 3.02 3.63 4.37 6.87 
OperatingExpenseGrossIncome  11200 74.20 17.08 25.55 63.85 75.64 85.54 116.05 
NetOperatingExpenseAverageA  11200 2.86 0.91 0.80 2.30 2.82 3.35 5.72 
LoansAssets 11200 86.34 7.29 60.84 82.93 87.70 91.46 97.50 
SharestoEarningsAssets 10346 4.71 13.74 0.00 0.10 1.19 3.54 96.04 
BorrowingstoSharesandNetWorth 11200 0.30 1.39 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 10.30 
MemberstoPotential 11198 0.31 0.25 0.00 0.07 0.28 0.50 0.91 
MemberstoEmployees 11111 484.49 207.14 206.77 356.71 431.75 544.36 1391.50 








Ratio Definition Ratio Type Target Acquiring 
Non-
merging F Ratio Significance 
AssetGrowthRate (%) Growth 2.54 7.61 4.22 341.93 0.0000 
EquityGrowth Growth -2.02 6.87 2.71 985.29 0.0000 
LoanGrowth Growth -1.92 7.40 2.66 916.57 0.0000 
MemberGrowth Growth -2.26 4.45 -0.16 808.48 0.0000 
ShareGrowth Growth 3.29 7.70 4.50 225.96 0.0000 
NetWorthRatio (%) Capital Adequacy 11.79 10.72 12.12 425.72 0.0000 
DelinquentLoansNWRatio Capital Adequacy 7.07 7.25 6.18 70.98 0.0000 
ClassifiedAssetsNWRatio Capital Adequacy 5.92 6.92 5.14 280.26 0.0000 
DelinquentLoansRatio  Asset Quality 0.83 0.82 0.78 12.88 0.0000 
DelinquentAssetsRatio Asset Quality 0.70 0.71 0.67 15.37 0.0000 
NCOLoansRatio Asset Quality 0.11 0.12 0.09 173.55 0.0000 
ROAA Earnings -0.20 0.55 0.32 1062.34 0.0000 
GrossIncomeAverageAssets Earnings 4.94 5.67 4.94 820.41 0.0000 
YieldonLoans Earnings 6.26 5.65 6.11 719.17 0.0000 
CostofFundsAverageAssets Earnings 0.77 0.85 0.70 134.02 0.0000 
NetMarginAverageAssets Earnings 4.17 4.83 4.24 782.53 0.0000 
OperatingExpenseAverageAsset Earnings 3.91 3.83 3.60 185.48 0.0000 
ProvisionforLoanLossesAvera  Earnings 0.38 0.46 0.30 192.24 0.0000 
NetInterestMargin  Earnings 3.72 3.78 3.73 13.06 0.0000 
OperatingExpenseGrossIncome  Earnings 82.02 68.27 74.20 1254.72 0.0000 
NetOperatingExpenseAverageA  Earnings 3.18 2.87 2.86 321.54 0.0000 
LoansAssets Asset/Liability Mgmt 85.04 87.15 86.34 234.16 0.0000 
SharestoEarningsAssets Asset/Liability Mgmt 3.13 5.95 4.71 151.46 0.0000 
BorrowingstoSharesandNetWorth Asset/Liability Mgmt 0.36 2.10 0.30 1537.44 0.0000 
MemberstoPotential Productivity 0.28 0.18 0.31 776.64 0.0000 
MemberstoEmployees Productivity 475.97 397.39 484.49 778.57 0.0000 





Table 30 Rotated component matrix for the whole sample 
Ratio Ratio Type Factor1 Factor2 Factor3 Factor4 
  
   
 AssetGrowthRate (%) Growth 0.0217 0.6944 -0.165 0.6183 
EquityGrowth Growth -0.1114 0.691 -0.0096 -0.2845 
LoanGrowth Growth -0.0765 0.3808 -0.1014 -0.0149 
MemberGrowth Growth 0.0399 0.4875 -0.0842 0.2133 
ShareGrowth Growth 0.0443 0.6239 -0.159 0.6801 
NetWorthRatio (%) Capital Adequacy -0.2549 -0.0372 -0.0016 -0.0311 
DelinquentLoansNWRatio Capital Adequacy 0.7071 -0.1281 0.5121 0.1362 
ClassifiedAssetsNWRatio Capital Adequacy 0.6132 -0.0743 0.2115 -0.0328 
DelinquentLoansRatio  Asset Quality 0.712 -0.1183 0.5152 0.1406 
DelinquentAssetsRatio Asset Quality 0.7048 -0.113 0.5381 0.1244 
NCOLoansRatio Asset Quality 0.601 -0.0931 0.1307 0.0122 
ROAA Earnings -0.1705 0.5897 0.0722 -0.5249 
GrossIncomeAverageAssets Earnings 0.838 0.3487 -0.1723 -0.2387 
YieldonLoans Earnings 0.4807 -0.0146 -0.0684 0.0138 
CostofFundsAverageAssets Earnings 0.3212 0.2689 0.4305 0.1238 
NetMarginAverageAssets Earnings 0.8014 0.2777 -0.3678 -0.3115 
OperatingExpenseAverageAsset Earnings 0.721 -0.1237 -0.6195 -0.0162 
ProvisionforLoanLossesAvera  Earnings 0.5825 -0.1275 0.2036 0.108 
NetInterestMargin  Earnings 0.7892 0.138 -0.3182 -0.1689 
OperatingExpenseGrossIncome  Earnings -0.0714 -0.5889 -0.57 0.2715 
NetOperatingExpenseAverageA  Earnings 0.5807 -0.2653 -0.5814 0.1187 
LoansAssets Asset/Liability Mgmt -0.1836 0.0607 0.2229 -0.1822 
SharestoEarningsAssets Asset/Liability Mgmt 0.0044 0.0908 0.1084 0.0009 
BorrowingstoSharesandNetWorth Asset/Liability Mgmt 0.1177 0.1882 0.1464 -0.0086 
MemberstoPotential Productivity -0.1653 -0.1104 0.1284 0.0896 
MemberstoEmployees Productivity -0.2675 -0.1321 0.1251 0.1142 





Table 31 Rotated component matrix 
Panel A – Acquired credit unions 
 
Ratio Type Factor1 Factor2 Factor3 Factor4 
  
   
 AssetGrowthRate (%) Growth -0.0712 0.4042 0.3804 0.6469 
EquityGrowth Growth -0.2386 0.6632 0.098 -0.4516 
LoanGrowth Growth -0.1018 0.1376 0.0646 -0.0852 
MemberGrowth Growth 0.0103 0.1633 0.0773 0.0861 
ShareGrowth Growth -0.0367 0.3159 0.3649 0.7242 
NetWorthRatio (%) Capital Adequacy -0.2842 0.0372 0.0087 0.0198 
DelinquentLoansNWRatio Capital Adequacy 0.7245 0.0312 -0.5171 0.0134 
ClassifiedAssetsNWRatio Capital Adequacy 0.6448 -0.0383 -0.2192 -0.0371 
DelinquentLoansRatio  Asset Quality 0.7305 0.0798 -0.5239 0.0213 
DelinquentAssetsRatio Asset Quality 0.7251 0.0847 -0.5425 0.0124 
NCOLoansRatio Asset Quality 0.573 -0.0388 -0.1235 0.0968 
ROAA Earnings -0.2431 0.6815 0.0741 -0.4962 
GrossIncomeAverageAssets Earnings 0.8239 0.3452 0.3358 -0.075 
YieldonLoans Earnings 0.4163 0.1615 0.1389 0.0691 
CostofFundsAverageAssets Earnings 0.3187 0.398 -0.1268 0.4292 
NetMarginAverageAssets Earnings 0.7988 0.2188 0.4319 -0.2562 
OperatingExpenseAverageAsset Earnings 0.6999 -0.3824 0.5176 -0.1237 
ProvisionforLoanLossesAvera  Earnings 0.5724 -0.1214 -0.2181 0.2423 
NetInterestMargin  Earnings 0.79 0.1783 0.3397 -0.1725 
OperatingExpenseGrossIncome  Earnings -0.094 -0.8377 0.2217 -0.0547 
NetOperatingExpenseAverageA  Earnings 0.5826 -0.515 0.409 -0.0443 
LoansAssets Asset/Liability Mgmt -0.1475 0.0588 -0.2158 -0.0981 
SharestoEarningsAssets Asset/Liability Mgmt 0.0182 0.0246 -0.0917 0.0909 
BorrowingstoSharesandNetWorth Asset/Liability Mgmt 0.144 0.1113 -0.0389 0.0926 
MemberstoPotential Productivity -0.1798 -0.0484 -0.0658 0.0766 
MemberstoEmployees Productivity -0.2599 -0.0483 -0.1191 0.0852 




Panel B – Acquiring credit unions 
 
Ratio Type Factor1 Factor2 Factor3 Factor4 
  
   
 AssetGrowthRate (%) Growth 0.0217 0.5488 0.6919 0.1668 
EquityGrowth Growth -0.0635 0.436 0.535 0.0233 
LoanGrowth Growth -0.1313 0.4473 0.4061 0.1198 
MemberGrowth Growth -0.0035 0.4575 0.5757 0.1842 
ShareGrowth Growth 0.0513 0.5191 0.6664 0.1699 
NetWorthRatio (%) Capital Adequacy -0.2624 0.0975 -0.0714 -0.2223 
DelinquentLoansNWRatio Capital Adequacy 0.7013 -0.4645 0.1908 0.4249 
ClassifiedAssetsNWRatio Capital Adequacy 0.6176 -0.2947 0.0997 0.1064 
DelinquentLoansRatio  Asset Quality 0.7058 -0.4386 0.1776 0.4148 
DelinquentAssetsRatio Asset Quality 0.7035 -0.4538 0.186 0.3971 
NCOLoansRatio Asset Quality 0.6773 -0.1789 0.0225 -0.1044 
ROAA Earnings -0.1883 0.1506 0.2276 -0.2323 
GrossIncomeAverageAssets Earnings 0.8273 0.2727 0.0495 -0.4256 
YieldonLoans Earnings 0.6278 0.1451 -0.0159 -0.3376 
CostofFundsAverageAssets Earnings 0.3446 -0.3565 0.3995 -0.4418 
NetMarginAverageAssets Earnings 0.7501 0.4589 -0.1195 -0.2672 
OperatingExpenseAverageAsset Earnings 0.6716 0.5644 -0.3364 0.0333 
ProvisionforLoanLossesAvera  Earnings 0.6469 -0.2287 0.0865 -0.1483 
NetInterestMargin  Earnings 0.7598 0.3959 -0.1497 -0.0964 
OperatingExpenseGrossIncome  Earnings -0.0672 0.4542 -0.5508 0.5807 
NetOperatingExpenseAverageA  Earnings 0.5134 0.481 -0.3373 0.2312 
LoansAssets 
Asset/Liability 
Mgmt -0.1942 -0.168 0.1144 -0.1931 
SharestoEarningsAssets 
Asset/Liability 
Mgmt -0.0394 -0.3485 0.4158 0.007 
BorrowingstoSharesandNetWorth 
Asset/Liability 
Mgmt 0.043 -0.2628 0.3418 -0.0636 
MemberstoPotential Productivity -0.0528 -0.094 0.045 -0.09 
MemberstoEmployees Productivity -0.1736 -0.0882 0.0763 -0.0809 





Panel C – Non-merging credit unions 
 
Ratio Type Factor1 Factor2 Factor3 Factor4 
  
   
 AssetGrowthRate (%) Growth 0.0427 0.0246 0.6268 0.6412 
EquityGrowth Growth -0.1306 0.0718 0.5904 -0.5339 
LoanGrowth Growth -0.0782 -0.0708 0.1332 -0.1548 
MemberGrowth Growth 0.0512 0.0132 0.2181 0.0223 
ShareGrowth Growth 0.0602 0.0249 0.5614 0.7091 
NetWorthRatio (%) Capital Adequacy -0.1934 0.0812 0.0213 0.0159 
DelinquentLoansNWRatio Capital Adequacy 0.6835 0.5127 -0.247 -0.0725 
ClassifiedAssetsNWRatio Capital Adequacy 0.5602 0.1047 -0.1486 -0.0823 
DelinquentLoansRatio  Asset Quality 0.6952 0.5329 -0.2202 -0.0597 
DelinquentAssetsRatio Asset Quality 0.6814 0.5578 -0.2319 -0.079 
NCOLoansRatio Asset Quality 0.5781 0.0937 -0.1741 0.1082 
ROAA Earnings -0.1615 0.1052 0.6142 -0.5862 
GrossIncomeAverageAssets Earnings 0.8698 -0.0719 0.3535 -0.1087 
YieldonLoans Earnings 0.5475 0.0748 0.1494 0.0766 
CostofFundsAverageAssets Earnings 0.2694 0.5924 0.2685 0.2011 
NetMarginAverageAssets Earnings 0.85 -0.313 0.2815 -0.1985 
OperatingExpenseAverageAsset Earnings 0.7873 -0.5543 0.0027 -0.0289 
ProvisionforLoanLossesAvera  Earnings 0.5496 0.1656 -0.2498 0.2068 
NetInterestMargin  Earnings 0.8242 -0.238 0.2542 -0.0922 
OperatingExpenseGrossIncome  Earnings 0.0206 -0.7019 -0.4577 0.1042 
NetOperatingExpenseAverageA  Earnings 0.6652 -0.5523 -0.1105 0.0523 
LoansAssets 
Asset/Liability 
Mgmt -0.2334 0.1921 -0.1249 -0.2027 
SharestoEarningsAssets 
Asset/Liability 
Mgmt -0.0101 0.0046 -0.0067 -0.0347 
BorrowingstoSharesandNetWorth 
Asset/Liability 
Mgmt 0.1315 0.0743 0.046 -0.0276 
MemberstoPotential Productivity -0.1499 0.257 -0.0543 0.0857 
MemberstoEmployees Productivity -0.2797 0.1729 -0.1212 0.113 







CAPITAL ADEQUACY  
 NET WORTH Ratio: Net Worth divided by total assets.   
TOTAL DELINQUENT LOANS / NET WORTH: All loans 60 days or more delinquent divided 
by net worth.  
CLASSIFIED ASSETS (ESTIMATED) / NET WORTH: Estimated Losses divided by Net 
Worth. 
ASSET QUALITY  
DELINQUENT LOANS / TOTAL LOANS: All loans 60 days or more delinquent divided by 
Total Loans.  
DELINQUENT LOANS / ASSETS: All loans 60 days or more delinquent divided by total 
assets. 
NET CHARGE-OFFS / AVERAGE LOANS: Total amount of loans charged-off during the year 
less all recoveries on charged-off loans during the year divided by average loans.  
EARNINGS 
RETURN ON AVERAGE ASSETS:  Net Income (Loss) divided by average assets.  
GROSS INCOME / AVERAGE ASSETS: Gross income divided by average assets. 
YIELD ON AVERAGE LOANS:  Interest on Loans (Gross – before interest refunds) divided by 
average loans.  
COST OF FUNDS / AVERAGE ASSETS:  Cost of funds divided by average assets.  Cost of 
Funds includes dividends and borrowed funds expenses.  
NET MARGIN / AVERAGE ASSETS: Gross income minus cost of funds divided by average 
assets.  
OPERATING EXPENSES / AVERAGE ASSETS: Total operating expenses divided by average 
assets. Operating expenses do not include Provision for Loan and Lease Losses expenses.  
PROVISION FOR LOAN & LEASE LOSSES / AVERAGE ASSETS: Provision for Loan & 
Lease Losses divided by average assets.  
NET INTEREST MARGIN / AVERAGE ASSETS: Total of Interest on Loans (Gross – before 
interest refunds), Income from Investments, and Trading Profits and Losses, minus the cost of 
funds divided by average assets.  
 122 
 
OPERATING EXPENSES / GROSS INCOME:  Total operating expenses divided by gross 
income.  
NET OPERATING EXPENSES / AVERAGE ASSETS: Total operating expenses minus Fee 
Income divided by average assets. 
ASSET/LIABILITY MANAGEMENT  
TOTAL LOANS / TOTAL ASSETS:  Total Loans divided by Total Assets.  
TOTAL SHARES, DEPOSITS AND BORROWINGS / EARNING ASSETS: Total Shares and 
Deposits, and total borrowings divided by the sum of Total Loans and Total Investments.  
BORROWINGS / TOTAL SHARES AND NET WORTH: Borrowings divided by Total Shares 
and Net Worth. 
PRODUCTIVITY  
MEMBERS / POTENTIAL MEMBERS: Number of current members divided by the total of 
potential members.  
MEMBERS / FULL-TIME EMPLOYEES: Number of current members divided by equivalent 
full-time employees.  
SALARY & BENEFITS / FULL-TIME EMPLOYEES: Total Employee Compensation and 
Benefits divided by equivalent Full-time Employees. 
 
